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ABSTRACT
Within the Department of Defense there continues to be considerable
confusion and debate over the effectiveness of the warranty clauses required on
major weapon system production contracts. Despite the fact that they have been
mandated by law since 1985, and that their costs are estimated at over two percent
of total hardware costs, a uniform process to ensure their proper development and
administration does not exist. Because of the politics involved, Program Managers
have received considerable direction in the form of "thou shalt", but virtually no
guidance as far as "how to". Fortunately, significant efforts have been made by
individual programs to correct problems experienced in the past and execute
warranties that make sense. Their focus, however, has been on improving warranty
administration. In contrast, this thesis looks at the warranty development process
and discusses the potential improvements from the early integration of the warranty
development into an aircraft engine's acquisition strategy. The findings of this
report support avoiding insurance warranties, changing the Navy's "no-cost"
warranty policy, and including warranty reviews as part of the Milestone review1
process. There is potential for significant reductions in life cycle costs from this
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Beginning in 1984, as part of the Defense Appropriations
Act, congressional action was taken to make warranties
mandatory on all production contracts for major weapon systems
(Appendix A). Further refinements in 1985 resulted in Title
10, Section 2403 of the United States Code (10 U.S.C. 2403)
(Appendix B). Since that time, the Department of Defense (DoD)
has been required to obtain warranties for weapon systems over
specified dollar thresholds unless waived by the Secretary of
Defense. In addition, the DoD has promulgated implementing
directives and diligently reviewed all weapon system
procurement contracts to ensure compliance. However, the DoD
has been highly criticized in external reviews by various
agencies, including the General Accounting Office (GAO) [Ref.
2 and 3], for the poor administration of these warranties.
Additionally, they have documented the limited success in
obtaining redress for breaches in warranty. It is generally
believed that the DoD is paying too much for warranties and
getting too little and that contractors are taking our
warranty payments to the bank in the form of additional profit
(Balaban, 1985).
The majority of the work done to date to improve weapon
1
system warranties has been in the area of improved
administration through changes in contractual language. This
is particularly true for !-rcraft engine warranties. The Joint
Aeronautical Commanders Board sponsored a joint service
working group to develop a comm8on aircraft engine warranty.
Although still in development, a copy of its latest revision
effort is included as Appendix C. There has been relatively
little emphasis on integrating the development of the weapon
system warranty and the warranty administration plan with the
acquisition strategy.
Although not a major weapon system, aircraft engines fall
under the same requirements for warranties because the Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) expands the
warranty requirement to sub-systems over certain dollar
thresholds. They do provide an excellent opportunity to
evaluate the economic and logistic impact of alternative
warranty approaches used in production contracts. This is of
particular interest to AIR-536 because, in its role as the
engine program manager for NAVAIR, they must consider the
relationship between warranties and Life Cycle Costs as well
as the impact on the Component Improvement Program (CIP). The
CIP addresses emerging engineering and logistic problems on
mature aircraft engine systems. A truer understanding of the
trade-offs between warranties and CIP would enable better
resource allocation.
It must be recognized that aircraft engine development and
2
procurement are different from that of major weapon systems.
Engines are an integral part of the host aircraft acquisition
plan and, as such, are funded through the aircraft PMA.
Because they represent only a segment of the total procurement
package being managed by the aircraft Program Manager for
Acquisition (PMA), there is not a stand-alone PMA for engines.
AIR-536 is dual-he. ted in its role as the engineering class
desk for engines and as the acting engine PMA for the aircraft
PMA's.
In a previous thesis, entitled *Analysis of Navy Aircraft
Engine and Component Warranties," LCDR Melissa S. Andrews and
CPT Suzanne Hickey investigated the problems associated with
the administration of aircraft engine warranties in the Navy.
(Andrews, 1994) It drew comparisons with a major commercial
airline engine warranty program and made recommendations
regarding potential improvements in warranty administration.
Their historical research laid the ground work for this study.
D. OBJECTIVES
The primary objective of this study is to determine if
there is a better way than currently exists to develop
aircraft engine warranties that would meet the federally
required warranty clauses, including those covering essential
performance requirements (EPRs). The focus is on exploring the
potential advantages of integrating the engine's warranty
development and the warranty administration plan into the
3
acquisition strategy.
The goal is to develop a commnon sense approach to
warranties that would maximize effectiveness by minimizing the
risk and therefore cost. This approach would be useful for
evaluating alternative warranty concepts and their effect on
the engine Life Cycle Costs (LCC) and the Component
Improvement Program (CIP). It is hoped that this study will
serve as a useful guide for the aircraft engine program
managers and their support staff.
C. RESARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question was:
1. How can the Navy integrate required warranty clauses,
including essential performance requirements (EPRs) into
the aircraft engine acquisition strategy to maximize
effectiveness and reduce risk?
The subsidiary research questions were:
1. Are weapon system warranties cost-effective?
2. How does the Navy estimate warranty costs and benefits?
3. What are the logistic and Life Cycle Cost impacts
associated with the different types of warranties?
4. What is the impact of the current political initiatives
on warranty policy and program management?
D. SCOPE
The original scope of this thesis was limited to the
performance of a series of post-award Life Cycle Cost (LCC)
4
analyses on previously executed aircraft engine production
contracts in order to determine, if possible, the optimal
employment of required warranty clauses for a particular
aircraft engine acquisition strategy.
It was hoped that a detailed cost analysis would be
possible, despite the Navy's policy on obtaining "no-cost"
warranties. Unfortunately, the difficulties encountered in
determining actual warranty costs precluded that endeavor. The
analysis focusses instead on the economic effects of
integrating the aircraft engine warranty development and
administration into the acquisition strategy. It also looks at
the compatibility of the specific warranties required by
federal law with the function they are intended to perform;
that is, to produce higher quality weapon systems with minimum
life cycle costs.
Due to the political nature of this topic, it was
necessary to include a review of the current DoD and
legislative action associated with weapon system warranties.
It was also necessary to assess the strengths and weaknesses
of the current military directives, procurement review
procedures, and the training programs for acquisition
professionals as well.
The study took advantage of recent contract negotiations
on the Rolls-Royce F405-RR-402 engine used in the T-45A
aircraft and the F402-RR-408 being used in the AV-8B Harrier.
It also looked at the historical problems associated with the
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General Electric F404-GE-400 used in the F/A-18A/B & C/D and
the Fil0-GE-100, which is an Air Force managed engine being
used in the Navy F-14D. With this historical background, the
analysis focused on the warranty approaches being considered
for the General Electric F414-GE-400 engine being developed
for use in the F/A-18 E/F.
The results of the economic analysis were then used to
develop a set of guidelines to evaluate the effectiveness of
alternative warranty approaches for aircraft engines based on
the acquisition strategy. The findings of the economic
analysis, in conjunction with the policy analysis and program
management assessment, were used to support recommended
changes to the management, development and use of warranties
in the DoD.
Z. RESEARCH MRTHODOLOGY
The data to support this thesis was collected from a
number of different sources. Following a comprehensive
literature review, additional information was obtained through
telephone interviews with program managers, and applicable
staff personnel at all levels within the DoN and the DoD.
Personal on-site interviews were conducted with
representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD), Assistant Secretary of the Navy (ASN), Naval Air
Systems Command (NAVAIR), and industry specialists. Additional
technical data support was provided by the research sponsor,
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AIR-536, and the logistic support staff in AIR-410.
Post-award warranty effectiveness analysis reviews were
conducted on several major aircraft engine production
contracts. Some of the engines reviewed had contracts issued
both before and after the implementation of the law. This
assisted in the determination of the relative strengths and
weaknesses of different warranties based on their
compatibility and degree of integration with the engine
acquisition strategy.
It must be acknowledged that the theoretical economic
analysis portion of this study was strongly supported by two
major works on weapon system warranties. The first, Warranty
Handbook, was written in 1986 by Harold S. Balaban of AIRINC
for the Defense Systems Management College. The second was
written in 1987 by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA
Paper P-2024) for the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Program Analysis and Evaluation (Kuenne, 1987). Its thorough
and detailed academic reviews of the economic theory of
warranties and their role in weapon system procurement are the
cornerstone of this study.
The level of assistance obtained on the policy analysis
and program management assessment aspects of the study from
all who participated was invaluable. The enthusiastic support
received from the faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School,
program managers within the DoD and industry experts in the
conformation of principles used in this study was truly
7
appreciated.
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter II., BACKGROUND, presents a chronological review
of significant issues and events which have shaped the state
of weapon system warranties. The review covers the politics
and congressional action surrounding warranties, including
those affecting weapon system program management and
acquisition reform. Next, a brief presentation of the
applicable directives and the history of related policy
decisions within the DoD and DoN are given. The chapter
concludes with a discussion on the Navy's aircraft engine
program management and the Component Improvement Program
(CIP).
Chapter III., ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES OF WARRANTIES, reviews
pertinent literature and explains the economic theory of
warranties in the public sector, warranty types, and their
applicability. Additionally, it covers the determination of
warranty costs and the concept of the Ono-costs warranty. The
chapter concludes with a discussion of the impact of
warranties on Life Cycle Cost (LCC) and the Component
Improvement Program (CIP).
Chapter IV., ANALYSIS, presents the findings of the
research in detail, objectively and without bias. The chapter
is divided into three sections which cover an economic
analysis of the required warranty clauses found in both the
8
Section 2403 and the direction provided in both the FAR and
DFARS, the findings of the analysis conducted on the current
warranty policy at all levels within the DoD and a Warranty
Program management assessment. Chapter V., AIRCRAFT ENGINE
WARRANTY ANALYSES, continues the analysis portion of the
thesis as it presents the effectiveness of actual warranties
applied to the engine systems reviewed. It ties the
theoretical to the observed, and identifies significant
trends. Chapter VI., ENGINE WARRANTY INTEGRATION GUIDELINES,
concludes the analysis portion of the thesis with a set of a
guidelines which were developed to assist program mangers in
the future development of effective and efficient aircraft
engine warranties that are integrated into the engine and
aircraft acquisition strategy.
Chapter VII., SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
summarizes the findings, analysis and the conclusions. There
are several strong recommiendations for institutionalizing
changes necessary to rectify the current shortfalls in the




This chapter presents a chronological review, beginning in
1964, of the significant issues and events that have shaped
the development and use of weapon system warranties. The
review covers the political and congressional action
surrounding warranties and the law, as well as the associated
DoD and DON directives and policy guidance. It also introduces
the concept of acquisition strategy as it applies to weapon
system program management and warranties. The chapter
concludes with a discussion of the Navy's management of
aircraft engines and the engine Component Improvement Program
(CIP).
The history of weapon system warranties in the DoD can be
separated into two major periods. The first, which began in
1964, is referred to as the pre-mandated period. Discussed in
the next section, this period came to an end in 1984, when the
requirement for warranties on weapon system procurement
contracts became mandated by federal law.
A. wa3piT MY O r3 ZN ETM =a-UND!TND =
The best place to start is at the beginning. Independent
of ongoing action within the DoD at this time, the origin of
warranties was the evolution of common law, from which the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) developed. Codified in the
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Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR) in 1978, the UCC
provides all buyers of goods in normal commercial transactions
with two implied warranties:
1. Merchantability, or the assurance that the goods
will pass in trade as described and that they are
fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods
are used.
2. Fitness for a particular purpose, or the additional
guarantee that the goods are fit for the particular
purpose for which the buyer will use them when a) the
seller has reason to know of such purpose and b) the
buyer is relying on the seller's expertise and
judgment in their selection and provision.
It is important to understand that these implied
warranties are significant in that they apply to the hardware
bought by the DoD as well. It is ironic to note that it is the
use of the standard inspection clause used in virtually all
DoD contracts and any explicit warranty clause that nullifies
the protection provided by these implied warranties. It is the
extension of the government's right to inspect and accept
goods delivered as well as the protection offered by explicit
warranty clauses that voids the implicit protection under
conuon law.
The origin of common weapon system warranties used in the
DoD dates back to 1964 when Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara began an initiative to unify warranty practices among
the services. As a result of his initiative, the Armed
Services Procurement Regulations (ASPRs) were updated in 1967
to include a set of guidelines for contracting officers. These
guidelines were developed to assist them in determining if a
11
warranty would be in the best interest of the DoD for a
specific procurement. According to the Warranty Handbook,
(Balaban, 1986) the guidelines made the use of long-term
warranties on weapon system acquisitions the exception rather
than the rule.
A resurgence of interest in warranties surfaced in the
mid-70's when the DoD began the development and use of the
Reliability Improvement Warranty (RIW). Used primarily in the
acquisition of electronic subsystems, the RIW generally
provided for the repair of the defective component over some
period of time for a fixed price. They were described in the
IDA paper as wan experiment in the use of warranties for
positive and negative incentivization. 0 The term RIW was later
used to describe a wide range of warranties. These warranties
continued to feature both positive and negative incentives for
the expressed purpose of improving the reliability,
maintainability, and availability of the purchased equipment.
These warranties documented the government's first
significant attempt to affect control of equipment performance
in the post-acceptance period. It was this effort and the
growing concern over the poor performance of several weapon
systems that has been credited with motivating Congress to
mandate warranties.
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N. POLZTICS, TM LAW, AND CONGMZSSIONALLY MANDATD WARRANT!3S
1. Section 794
The Congressional action taken in the early 1980's to
mandate warranties was an attempt to reduce the cost of
rectifying the problems in performance and reliability of
systems like the M1 tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle
recently delivered to the DoD. What began in 1983, and was
finalized with the passage of the Section 794 of the Defense
Appropriations Act of 1984 (Appendix A), marked the beginning
of the era of mandated weapon system warranties in the DoD.
The new law, which required the use of warranties on all
weapon systems contracts after its enactment, placed emphasis
on obtaining guaranteed performance of specific operational
characteristics of the system. Its wording appeared to extend
indefinitely the period of contractor liability after
acceptance.
The controversy over the wording and expected impact
of this landmark piece of legislation led Deputy Secretary of
Defense Thayer to issue a blanket waiver of the requirements
until implementing instructions could be developed. The high
level of concern and the issues raised by both the DoD and
industry fueled the debate with Congress and eventually led to
the replacement of Section 794 the following year.
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2. Section 2403
The revised warranty requirements were signed into law
as part of the Defense Procurement Reform Act of 1984. The
section concerning warranties later became Title 10 of the
United States Code, Section 2403 (Appendix B). Since 1
January, 1985, the DoD has been required to obtain warranties
for all weapon systems production contracts over specified
dollar thresholds unless a waiver is obtained.
Specifically, the act requires the DoD to obtain a
written guarantee from the prime contractor that each item
delivered will conform to the design and manufacturing
requirements delineated in the production contract; be derived
free from all defects in materials and workmanship; and
conform to the essential performance requirements (EPRs)
specifically delineated in the production contract.
Additionally, the act requires the contractor to take prompt
action to correct any failure to meet the guarantee, at no
additional cost, or pay any costs reasonably incurred by the
government to do so.
It allows the Secretary of Defense to waive any or all
of the required clauses if it is determined to be necessary in
the interest of national defense, or that a guarantee would
not be cost-effective. In either case, the Secretary of
Defense is required to notify the Committees on Armed Services
and on Appropriations of both the Senate and the House of
Representatives in writing of any intent to waive any or all
14
of the requirements.
3. The DoD Responds
During the period that immediately followed the
legislative action, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR),
and the Defense Federal Acquisition Supplement (DFARS) were
updated to include the Section 2403 requirements. Likewise,
all applicable military implementing directives were updated
and policy guidance memorandums were generated to show their
support for the new warranty program. The effects of the minor
changes made to the program by these directives will be
addressed in the next section.
This period was also marked b" a substantial amount of
program review and analysis. The efforts sponsored by the DoD,
like the "Warranty Guidebooko (Balaban, 1986) and the IDA
Paper, *Warranties in Weapon System Procurement: An Analysis
of Practice and Theoryo, (Kuenne, 1987) were substantive works
that attempted to take the warranty debate out of the
political arena. They presented a logical discussion of the
issues concerning weapon system warranties. Additionally, they
made recommendations regarding warranty implementation based
on sound economic theory.
4. Weapon System Warranties in Practice
The published findings from audits and program reviews
conducted on the DOD's management of the warranty program to
date are not flattering. The general consensus appears to be
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that the DoD is not doing an effective job of administering
weapon system warranties. As a result, the DoD has continued
to receive a good deal of negative visibility won the Hill"
over this issue. Despite all the bad press, the DoD has
continued to push for a repeal of Section 2403 requiring the
mandatory use of weapon system warranties.
In 1992 the Director for Defense Procurement, Ms.
Eleanor -. Spector, from the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition), initiated an internal review of weapon
system warranty practices in response to two GAO reports
criticizing the DoD'S implementation and administration of
warranties. (GAO/NSIAD-87-122 July 21, 1987 and GAO/NSIAD-89-
57 September 27, 1989) The Office of the Deputy Director for
Defense Systems Management Procurement Strategies published
the results of the review in September, 1992 in the Report on
the Administration of DeDartment of Defense Weapon System
Warranties. Based on the findings of the review Ms. Spector's
staff concluded that "Deficiencies exist in the warranty
administration capabilities of the services" and that
"Warranty benefits are not fully realized on DoD contracts".
The bottom line of the report, which was forwarded to the each
of the service secretaries, was the recommendation for "A
repeal of the warranty statute (10 U.S.C. 2403)."
5. Continued Congressional Concern
Since the implementation of the law, the Congress and
16
the DoD have continued to strive to improve the way weapon
systems and all materials used by the DoD are purchased. In
1990, Congress enacted the Defense Acquisition Workforce
Improvement Act (DAWIA) as part of the 1991 Defense
Authorization Act. Now incorporated in Title 10 United States
Code, Sections 1702-1764, DAWIA attempts to bring more
centralized management and more professional development,
education, training, and career opportunities to the DoD
acquisition workforce.
6. The DoD Respoonds to Change
The need to change the way the DoD does business
gained so much visibility that a new office was established
within the DoD just to deal with this issue. The Office of
Acquisition Reform is now responsible for sponsoring such
efforts from within the DoD. One such effort was the recent
Report of the Acquisition Law Advisory Panel to the United
States Congress on Streamlining Defense Acqui3ition Laws.
Commonly referred to as the Section 800 Panel, its
independent review of the current legislation in practice was
published in 1993. Its comments regarding warranties echoed
those provided by the Director of Defense Procurement, and
recommended a repeal of Section 2403. The Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy and the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force both supported the
recommendation. The Army did not. According to the Army
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representative, it was its position that Dwarranties offer
tangible and intangible benefits which promote product quality
improvements which make costly warranty repair unnecessary".
7. Current Warranty Legislative Initiatives
The debate over the warranty issue continues today.
Interestingly, there appears to be some support for a repeal
from within both the Congress and the Administration. In
interviews with the researcher, Mr. Mike Sipple (Sipple, 1994)
and Ms. Teresa Brooks (Brooks, 1994) from the Office of the
Director for Defense Procurement, indicated that the OSD was
monitoring three pieces of legislation currently *on the Hill"
that deal with weapon systems warranties. One of these is
Representative Bilbray's Defense Acquisition Reform Act of
1993 in the House of Representatives (H.R. 3586, Section 204)
which concurs with Ms. Spector's recommendation to repeal 10
U.S.C. 2403.
Support for a repeal from the administration was
evident in an official letter from the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) to the Staff Director on the Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs (OMB, 1993). In the letter to Mr.
Leonard Weiss dated November 5, 1993, Mr. Allan Burman,
Administrator of the OMB Office of Federal Procurement Policy
provides its umark-upw of the Glenn Bill (S. 1587) which
deletes the additional provisions regarding warranty guidance
an - -bstitutes 0(1) Repeal. Section 2403 of Title 10, United
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States Code, is repealed.*
In contrast, both of the other legislative initiatives
currently being tracked not only support the current language
of Section 2403, but propose additional requirements as well.
Using identical language, Senator Glenn's Bill (S. 1587, Sec.
2402) and an amendment that Rep. Conyer and Rep. Clinger
attempted to attach to the NPR bill (H.R. 3400, Sec. 32402)
add provisions that would require the Secretary of Defense to
prescribe additional warranty regulations (Appendix D). These
regulations would include guidelines for negotiating contracts
that are reasonable and cost effective, procedures for
administering contractor guarantees, and guidelines for
determining when a waiver may be appropriate.
8. The DoD Divided
As recently as 10 March, 1994, Derek J. Vander Schaaf,
the Deputy Inspector General for the DoD, testified before the
Senate Committees on Governmental Affairs and Armed Services
strongly supporting the provisions of the Glenn Bill (S.
1587). His argument in support of the proposed legislation was
based on the appropriateness of warranties for commercial
items.
The logic of his testimony is terribly flawed. His
statement would suggest that the major weapon systems, to
which this legislation applies, are commercially available.
This point was discussed with the researcher at length by Mr.
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Sal Guli, the Program Director of Contract Audits for the DoD
Inspector General who help prepare Mr Vander Schaaf for his
testimony (Guli, 1994). Mr Guli indicated that the testimony
given was intended to support the use of warranties in general
for all DoD procurement. Although it was not necessarily
applicable to weapon systems, it supports both the continued
warranty requirements established in Section 2403 and the
additional provisions of the Glenn Bill requiring additional
DoD warranty guidance and procedures regulations.
In summary, it is evident that mandatory weapon system
warranties continue to be a sensitive political issue. In the
murky world of politics the one thing that is clpar, however,
is that *the fight ain't over yet".
C. DRZlCTZVZS AND POLICY GUIDANCZ
1. Directives
The primary directives governing the way in which the
federal government and the DoD procure major weapon systems
are the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) and the DoD
5000 series instructions. Each one of these documents will be
introduced and its relevance discussed briefly. The other
directives to be discussed were issued by the Secretary of the
Navy and the Naval Air Systems Conmand and govern the
application of warranties to production aircraft engines
contracts.
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a. Federal Acqulistlon aegulation (FAR)
The FAR, in conjunction with the DFARS, governs
all DoD procurement. Since the early 1980's, the FAR Subpart
46.7 (Warranties) has undergone extensive revisions. It
provides the basic definitions and general principles of
warranty use in the federal procurement. According to the
latest FAR (Appendix E), "the principal purposes of a warranty
in a Government contract are (1) to delineate the rights and
obligations of the contractor and the Government for defective
items and services and (2) to foster quality performance."
According to the section on the criteria for use
of warranties, the use of warranties is not mandatory.
Additionally, the FAR provides some useful guidelines and
factors that contracting officers must consider when
determining whether a warranty is appropriate for a specific
acquisition. The factors include; the nature and use of the
supplies or services, cost, the difficulty of administration
and enforcement, any customary trade practice associated with
the item, and finally consideration of reduced requirements.
The FAR gives the authority to include warranties
to the agency or department issuing the contract. It goes on
to point out that warranties should not limit the rights of
the government under an inspection clause. Some of the rights
include those that stem from the implied warranties of the UCC
discussed earlier, such as "latent defects, fraud, or gross
mistakes that amount to fraud.0 Other sections include
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guidance on warranty terms and conditions, warranties of data
and commercial items and sample contract clauses.
b. Defem Federal Acquieltion Regulaion Uuppleme(DFARS)
All the basic provisions of Section 2403, plus
some additional ones, have been incorporated in DFARS Subpart
246.7--Warranties (Appendix F). The 1991 Edition, provides DoD
contracting officers with the latest, up-to-date, appropriate
guidance. Some of the more significant changes and important
clarifications related to weapon system acquisitions and
aircraft e-gines are listed below:
1. Subpart 246.703 allows the cost of a warranty to be
included in the item's price or listed as a separate
contract line item.
2. Subpart 246.770-1 defines a weapon system as 8a system or
subsystem used directly by the armed forces to carry out
combat missions" and includes propulsion systems.
3. Subpart 246.770-2 requires that "the warranty identify
redesign as a remedy" for contracts that include an EPR
warranty.
4. Subpart 246.770-3 allows for the tailoring of warranty
terms and conditions. It permits contracting officers to
limit the contractor's financial liability if it is
necessary to make it Ocost effective" and to negotiate
the duration of performance warranties.
5. Subpart 246.770-7 requires the performance of a cost-
benefit analysis that considers both the quantitative and
qualitative costs and benefits of the warranty and
includes not only the costs of acquisition,
administration and enforcement, but also any costs
resulting from limitations in the provisions, costs
incurred during development to reduce production warranty
risks, and the logistical and operational benefits as
well as the "additional contractor motivation" that
results from the warranty.
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C. rDmp t of Defena. 5000 Serles mnatzuc•lons
The Defense Acquisition Directive, 5000.1, dated
February 23, 1991 is the lead document in a series of three
instructions that canceled 63 previously issued instructions
regarding the subject. Published after the Defense Procurement
Reform Act of 1984, it is interesting to note that this broad
reaching document, which covers the Policies Governing Defense
Acquisition, does not discuss warranties. A logical place for
such a discussion would be in Part 1, Section C on Acquiring
Quality Products, which includes discussions on the topics of
Acquisition Strategies, Program Plans and Risk Management.
However, there is no mention of the word Owarranty" or any
reference to the requirement for them.
The DoD Instruction 5000.2, of the same date, is
likewise an extensive document that establishes general policy
and procedures for managing major and non-major defense
acquisition programs. This instruction makes but one reference
to warranties in Part 9 Section B, paragraph 3.e. This
reference is with regards to the acquisition of data
warranties and simply states that they will be done in
accordance with the DFARS.
The DOD Instruction 5000.2M, Defense Acquisition
Management Documentation and Reports, supplements the rest of
the 5000 series instructions and covers the required
documentation procedures and reports. This instruction also
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makes no reference to warranties.
d. azCaaV nrsi8CTZ0K 4330.17
Released on 17 September 1987 by Everett Pyatt,
then the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Logistics and
Shipbuilding, this SECNAV instruction (Appendix G) merely
echoed the requirements as they were established in Section
2403. This was surprising because a year earlier, Pyatt issued
a policy memorandum which, although not contradictory,
established the Navy's unique position on warranty costs. This
memorandum will be discussed in further detail in the next
section.
The instruction assigned to the Chief of Naval
Operations the responsibility for administrative management of
the program and the requirement to establish procedures to
ensure that warranties are obtained for weapon systems meeting
the cost thresholds established in Section 2403. The
Comptroller of the Navy was directed to ensure procedures were
in place to properly account for funds collected under the
warranties.
a. AV3ZR MZATROL"YZOW 13070.7
The Commander, Naval Air Systems Command,
published an instruction entitled "POLICY GUIDANCE FOR
WARRANTY APPLICATION ON NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COO(AND WEAPON
SYSTEM PROCUREMENTS', NAVAIRINST 13070.7 on 9 December 1985
(Appendix H). It established responsibilities for the
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management of the warranty program within the Systems Command
along the functional lines of the organization. In addition to
repeating the basic requirements as established by Section
2403, it instituted two important additional policies. The
first new policy requires that all warranties have provisions
requiring the contractor to furnish annual cost data on
warranty repairs. The second requires that procedures be
established to ensure that all acquisition plans address the
planned use of warranties and their impact on user maintenance
operations and logistic support systems.
2. S3CUAV Policy Guid-ane
As a consequence of an official memorandum released by
Everett Pyatt, then the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Shipbuilding and Logistics on 8 September 1986, (Appendix I),
the Navy adopted a unique position regarding warranty costs.
It was Secretary Pyatt's view that the warranties required by
Section 2403 should be provided to the Navy at no additional
cost. He felt that the basic provisions of the warranty were
nothing more than assurance that the specifications agreed to
and paid for in the weapon system development and production
contracts would be met. Therefore, paying for these
provisions, as part of a separate warranty, would amount to
paying for them twice. He did conceded in his memorandum that
there may be certain circumstances in which additional costs
may be appropriate and, when they are, a cost-benefit analysis
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should be done.
Since that time, trie Navy has basically treated all
warranties as "no-costo. As a consequence, they do not appear
as separate line items in production contracts. The economic
theory which explains the concept of Ono-costs warranties and
its impact will be explained in detail in Chapter III.
3. 3&VAMR Policy Guidance
The Naval Air Systems Command, in an effort to update
its policies and incorporate changes to the regulations that
resulted from guidance received from multiple sources after
the promulgation of the 1985 instruction, issued NAVAIR NOTICE
4855, on 17 May, 1989 (Appendix J).
In an attempt to comply with the intent of the ASN
policy memorandum, the notice firmly established a NAVAIR
policy in concurrence with the ASN warranty policy memorandum
regarding warranty cost. According to paragraph 3. d., it is
NAVAIR's policy to "Pursue a no cost warranty per reference
(f)." The reference given is incorrect. Reference (g) is the
ASN memorandum while reference (f) is the ASN instruction.
Despite the dispute over the applicability of the Ono-cost"
warranty concept, and the inaccuracy of the reference cited,
the policy remains in effect today and is strongly supported
by the ASN staff (Enter, 1994).
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D. ACQUISITION STRATEGY, PROGRAM MANAGUM T, AND WARRANTIXB
"Acquisition Strategym has been defined many different
ways. Once referred to as *the conceptual basis of the overall
plan that a Program Manager follows in program execution*
according to the Acquisition Strategy Guide (ASG) (Nelson and
Balaban, 1984), it is "the framework for planning and
directing the program'. The ASG was written for the Defense
Systems Management College (DSMC) which provides advanced
professional training for all DoD acquisition professionals.
The DSMC approach to Acquisition Strategy requires the
Program Manager to consider a multitude of criteria that can
impact the development and delivery of a weapon system over
the entire life cycle. The considerations they list include
such nebulous concepts as realism, stability, resource
balance, flexibility, and controlled risk. The Program Manager
must assess the impact of each of these continuously from the
"definition of the mission neede phase of development all the
way through the Esupport and operationo phase and on to the
weapon system's retirement.
The key to developing a successful acquisition strategy
involves integration of the acquisition process with the known
trade-offs between cost, schedule and performance.
Additionally, the strategy must addresses alternatives,
resources, timing, methods, goals and risks. It is also
important to note what Henry Mintzberg stated recently in his
article on strategic planning (Mintzberg, 1994). "Strategies
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cannot be created by analysis, but their development can be
helped by it."
What does all this mean in the context of program
management and warranties? The Program Manager is the only
individual who has the total "big pictureO. As such, the PM
must understand that the concept of warranties is but another
risk management tool, which should be used to assist him or
her in obtaining improved system performance and resource
economy. Particularly, in today's context where the use of
warranties is mandatory for production contracts,
consideration as to how they are to be employed must be done
early if they are to be effective.
The use of warranties should not come as a surprise to the
contractor. The terms and criteria on which the essential
performance requirements (EPRs) are based should be
established early in the program life cycle and support
legitimate mission needs of the program. One of the most
important benefits of a warranty is the incentive to the make
the contractor honest regarding its capacity to obtain a given
EPR. Unwillingness to stand behind an EPR with an explicit
warranty is indicative of a contractor's uncertainty or
inability to meet established design and performance criteria.
Early knowledge of this allows the Program Manager to
reevaluate the risk to the program should the contractor not
meet the EPR and develop alternative courses of action for
obtaining the program's goals.
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Z. NAVY AIRCRAFT IGINZ PROGRAM MANAGUIZNT
There are several aspects of the Navy aircraft engine
program management and logistic support system that are unique
with respect to other major weapon systems. These differences
need to be understood in order to have a full appreciation for
the management challenges they represent and their impact on
warranties.
1. Acquisition Management
First of all, aircraft engine procurement does not
fall under the responsibility of a single Program Manager for
Acquisition (PMA) like most major weapon systems. Although the
majority of responsibility for management of the program lies
within AIR-536, the ultimate responsibility lies with the
aircraft PMA. From both a funding and scheduling perspective,
all aircraft engine development and procurement actions are
driven by the host aircraft acquisition plan. Even though the
size of most engine programs is larger than many separately
managed weapon systems, they represent only a segment of the
total procurement package being managed by the aircraft PMA.
AIR-536, as the Propulsion and Power Division for the
Assistant Conmander for Systems Engineering (AIR-05), performs
its primary function as the engineering class desk for
engines. Its secondary role becomes that of the acting engine
PMA for the aircraft PMAs.
An additional aspect which makes the Navy aircraft
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engine acquisition program management unique, with respect to
the applicability mandated warranties, is that engines are not
major weapon systems as defined by Section 2403. It is only
the language in the DFARS Subpart 246.770-1, that expands the
warranty requirement by defining a weapon system as "a system
or subsystemm and lists propulsion systems for inclusion,
which makes the mandated warranties applicable to aircraft
engines.
2. Logistics Manageomnt
Although the structure of the acquisition program
management setup is different, the logistics management is
not. Much like a other major programs, engines have a
dedicated logistic support team headed by an Assistant Program
Manager for Logistics (APML) within the Aircraft Systems
Branch of the Logistics Management Division (AIR-410). Under
the cognizance of the Assistant Commander for Fleet Support
and Field Activity Management (AIR-04), the APML manages all
aspects of engine logistic support Ofrom soup to nuts".
3. Component Imprvvement Program
Another unique aspect of the Navy aircraft engine
program management which needs to be discussed is the
Component Improvement Program (CIP). The CIP applies
specifically to aircraft engines and plays a vital role in
improving the availability of mature systems in the fleet.
Funded through research and development funds, the purpose of
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CIP is to identify and correct emerging engineering and
logistics problems. This effort is obviously directly affected
by the role warranties are expected to play in addressing
performance problems in the post-acceptance period. The
economic relationship between CIP and warranties will be
expanded upon in Chapters III and IV.
4. Fleet inventory Management
The Navy Type Comnmanders (TYCOMs) are responsible for
the overall inventory management and distribution of aircraft
engines and modules used by the operational units under their
cognizance. Assisted by the Aircraft Engine Management System
(AEMS) computer program, the staffs are responsible for
monitoring the availability of all engine systems assigned.
They assist in determining depot workload and distributing
engines for repair within the three intermediate maintenance
levels. These managers strongly support the overall engine
program. Because they are the customer's liaison, their
participation in engineering and logistic management reviews
ensures the Fleet's requirements are adequately represented.
5. Maintenance management
The maintenance management system for aircraft engines
is different than that of most repairable items and as such
has a significant impact on warranty administration. In
addition to the organizational and depot levels of
maintenance, there are three levels of intermediate
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maintenance support. They are designated as first-degree,
second-degree or third-degree maintenance facilities and their
capabilities range from complete engine repair (CER) to
limited, respectively. Their capabilities are tailored
depending on the number and type of aircraft supported and the
needs of the Fleet. Obviously, logistic considerations include
the size of the facility, transportation, support equipment
and manpower. Additionally, because they are TYCOM-managed
assets, activities which are directed to send an engine or
module to the next higher level of intermediate maintenance do
not incur a charge to their aviation depot level repairable
(AVDLR) maintenance budget.
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III. ICONOMIC PRINCIPLZS OF WARRANTIES
This chapter presents the economic principles that apply
to the issues of weapon system warranties. It elaborates on
the theoretical differences between warranties as they are
used in weapon system procurement and as are used commercial
applications. It explains the classification of warranty types
as a result of their function and their applicability for use
in weapon system production contracts. Additionally, it
discusses how warranty costs are determined and their impact
on Life Cycle Cost (LCC).
A. WARRANTY TTZORY
1. Warranty Defined
The word "warranty" has been expressed in many
different ways. In fact, Section 2403 uses the word
*guarantee". For all intents and purposes, the word warranty
and guarantee are considered interchangeable. In the context
of DoD weapon system acquisition, the definition that was
developed and adopted by the IDA for its report was:
A legally binding guarantee - usually explicit but in
certain cases implicit- whereby a contractor, with or
without an explicit payment, agrees to remedy defects in
design, manufacture, workmanship, materials or performance
existing at a specific time or emerging over a specific
period in a weapon system. It may, in addition, provide
positive incentives to exceed target specifications in
these characteristics, or penalties if specified targets
are not achieved.(Kuenne, 1987)
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The term "defectsm, as used in the definition above
refers two distinct types of defects. The first, which is
referred to as a *patent" defect, is a condition or
characteristic that is found through the inspection or
acceptance process to not be in compliance with the contract
requirements. The second type is referred to as a "latent"
defect. It is so called because it is a defect that exists at
the time of acceptance but does not become apparent until
sometime after.
2. Warzanties in Weapon Systm Procurement
The economic theories that explain the roles and
relationships of the warranties used in weapon system
procurement include the economics of uncertainty, insurance
theory, and the principal-agent theory. The differences
between the economics of warranties cormonly used in
commercial applications and those used in the procurement of
weapon systems by the DoD are significant.
In commercial applications, the risk and associated
costs of a warranty are spread out, incrementally, over a
large number of customers, who have little or nothing to do
with the design, development or specifications of the product
they purchase. This is obviously not true in the case of major
weapon systems bought by the DoD. When a contractor enters
into a warranty agreement with the DoD, the risks and the
costs associated with that warranty are assumed by only two
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parties, the government and themselves.
It can, therefore, be established that the effective
use of warranties in weapon system procurement centers around
the distribution of risk and the level of uncertainty.
According to economist Frank H. Knight there is a difference
between risk and uncertainty. In his book "Risk, Uncertainty,
and Profito he explains that risk is based on the probability
outcomes and can be determined mathematically by the variance
of the outcomes as compared to the predicted and therefore be
insured against. Uncertainty on the other hand, relates to
unique events and results in a situation where the outcome can
only estimated subjectively. More important, either party's
ability to assume risk has the greatest bearing on the
effectiveness of the warranty (Kuenne, 1987).
The academic works and economic theory reviewed
support the notion that the federal government, as an entity,
is much better able to absorb the loss if a weapon system does
not function as requested in the post-acceptance period than
is the prime contractor. In economic terms, the contractor is
more Orisk-aversew. It follows then that, the government
should not be encouraged to buy Oinsurancew from any
contractor. To quote the IDA Paper, "There is, therefore, a
perverse element in the purchase by DoD of insurance from
contractors who (as a group) have been shown in empirical
studies to be quite risk-averse.0
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3. CLASShFZCkTZOU OF NWARANTY TYP38
Warranties can be classified by the function they perform.
In general, warranties serve three basic functions in the
procurement of weapon systems; assurance, insurance and
incentive. Each type of warranty, or function, has its own set
of implications and effects discussed below.
1. ASBURANCZ: The most basic of warranty functions. As the
word suggests, it Oassures" the DoD that the delivered
product complies with the design and manufacturing
specifications and conforms to the materials and
workmanship requirements of the contract. Its effective
period ends, with respect to patent defects, at
acceptance and for latent defects after some reasonable
period of time thereafter.
2. INSURANCI: Another basic function. All warranties provide
some measure of insurance. Even those clauses which are
more closely related to the assurance function provide
some measure of protection against the risk or cost of
repair or replacement. This function really becomes
significant when the clause covers an extensive period of
time beyond acceptance.
3. INCENTXVU: The incentive function, usually a negative
one, is present in all warranties to some degree as well.
This is particularly true when the contract language
provides explicit rewards or penalties associated with
meeting or exceeding specific performance goals or
targets.
Most of the literature written on weapon system warranties
emphasizes the use and effects of assurance warranties. The
use of incentive warranties has had some historical success in
obtain better operating performance in certain Reliability
Improvement Warranties (RIW). Despite this fact, the current
use of incentive warranties in production contracts is
limited. There is very little consideration given to the use
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of insurance warranties. In fact, the original aWarranty
Handbook* (Balaban, 1986), used at the Defense Systems
Management College, does not even discuss insurance
warranties. This omission is appropriate because of the unique
relationship between the DoD and the weapon system contractors
with respect to design of the product and the nature of risk.
C. WARRA'NTY COSTS
This section introduces the concepts and theory associated
with warranty costs and focuses on the concept or notion of
the *no-costo warranty.
Weapon system warranty costs are real. Borne either by the
contractor or the government, they represent a substantial
investment and should not be taken lightly. Balaban's analysis
of data available from recent warranty programs indicated that
a "typical* warranty meeting the minimum Section 2403
requirements costs the government approximately two and one
half percent of the total hardware cost for each year the
warranty is in effect. This is high when compared to the
contractor's actual warranty cost which he estimated at only
one and four tenths percent of hardware cost per year.
(Balaban, 1994) If the programs that he analyzed are an
accurate representation, then the up-front costs associated
with buying warranties for major weapon systems could be
several billion dollars a year.
Several elements make up the total warranty cost. It
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should be clear when discussing warranty costs what that cost
includes. For continuity purposes the basic definitions used
by Mr. Balaban are para-phrased below.
1. Contractor Warranty Cost: the dollar value included in a
contract for the contractor to supply the warranty.
2. Contractor Warranty Price: the contractor warranty cost
plus profit.
3. Total Warranty Cost: the contractor warranty price plus
additional Government cost to administer the warranty.
As the IDA Paper warranty definition indicated, the
payment a contractor receives for entering into a warranty
agreement may not be explicit. When the cost of a warranty to
the government is not negotiated separately, as is the case
when the Navy pursues a Ono-costO warranty, it does not mean
that the contractor warranty cost is zero. What it does mean
is that the Navy does not allow for any additional explicit
costs.
According to the ASN Warranty Policy memorandum,
it may be reasonable to consider through additional profit
the added risk to a contractor for cost which may be
incurred in satisfying the conditions of a warranty.
The suggestion made by this statement, that the cost
associated the added risk of a warranty be applied through
additional profit, supports the notion of implicit payment of
the contractor warranty costs. It is obvious that this is
truly not a mno-costm warranty. Unfortunately, without an
explicit representation of this cost to the government, the
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contractor warranty cost and contractor warranty price appears
to be zero. Additionally, when the contractor warranty price
is not discernable it is virtually impossible to conduct a
realistic warranty cost-benefit analysis.
1. Assurance Warranties
At the time of acceptance, the DoD has the right to
receive from the contractor a system that meets the
specifications that were contractually agreed upon.
Accordingly, no additional price should be paid for a warranty
that guarantees a product that meets the configuration
specifications and performance requirements of the production
contract. To do so would be to pay for the same risk twice;
first, implicitly in the price of the contract, and second in
the price of the warranty. Again, this does not mean that the
warranty is free. It simply means that all costs associated
with the risk of correcting patent defects discovered during
inspection or acceptance testing and latent defects for some
"reasonable" period of time afterward should be included in
the cost of the item.
2. Insurance Warranties
A warranty whose primary function is to insure the
government against future costs will bear some additional
cost. The amount of cost associated with an insurance warranty
is based on the risk-averse nature of the contractor and the
risk associated with meeting the terms of the warranty
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specification with respect to the duration of the period
covered and the variability of outcomes.
3. Inmentive Waznties
The costs associated with incentive warranties are
associated with the ability of the contractor to affect an
increase in the quality of specifically requested parameters.
Often associated with the "win-win* scenario, the government
and contractor assume the relationship of principal and agent,
respectfully. Through the use of the profit motive, the
government seeks to provide incentives to the contractor to
improve quality.
D. T= "NO-CO•?WaRMWIMT
The Navy has been openly criticized by several OSD
personnel interviewed in this thesis research for its use of
the Ono-cost" warranty. This section will discuss the theory
of the Ono-cost" warranty and the effect of its use by the
Navy. This se-tion focusses on material obtained during an
interview with Mr. Harold S. Balaban on 24 February, 1994.
During our discussion (Balaban, 1994), Mr. Balaban stated
that the "no-cost" warranty issue paper was written in
anticipation of a formal request for analysis that never
materialized. Excerpts from an unpublished paper written by
Mr. Balaban in October of 1985 have been included here because
of their particular relevance and applicability. It was
provided to the author in its original, unedited format. It
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adds a good perspective to this controversial issue.
The services have responded to the legislative
requirements and almost every covered equipment has a
warranty that meets the law's basic requirements. While
the real benefits of this legislation remain to be
determined, it became very clear that the warranties will
not be secured free. ... the idea of a "no-cost" warranty
has become prominent in some circles. It is the author's
contention that this idea in most cases today is not
realistic and, in fact, could very well be counter
productive.
The rationale for such a policy has some logical basis.
Here is Mr. Balaban's explanation.
In a typical military procurement, the government has
told the contractor what it wants and, through the Full
Scale Engineering Development phase, has paid the
contractor to develop the product. Therefore, there is no
reason to pay additional monies for a warranty which
provides contractual assurance that the contractor meets
stipulated performance and reliability requirements that
he has already been paid to meet.
SHowever, Mr Balaban quoted one Government business manager
as saying *the Government pays for everything so a *no-cost"
warranty is only a myth.0 As stated in the section above on
warranty costs, any warranty must involve some administrative
costs, so the "no-cost" aspect of the warranty refers to the
contractor's warranty cost. The problem you encounter with the
logic of a "no-cost" warranty is what Mr Balaban refers to as
the mno-costo paradox. He describes it by telling the
following story:
Assume that all factors point to a Ono-cost" warranty;
therefore, one is written for a six month period to cover
conformance to design and manufacture defects in
workmanship and stated essential performance requirements.
The contractor agrees, but just prior to signing the
contract, a young government contracting intern suggests
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that if a six month warranty is good wouldn't a one year
warranty be bet er? And wouldn't a two or three year
warranty period .e even better? Clearly, at some point
the contractor tzces a stand and insists on covering his
increased risks.
If you agree to the theory that warranty costs increase
with warranty duration, then it is clear that there is no such
thing as a true "no-cost* warranty. Warranties may appear to
be at no cost, only because the contractor has figured a way
to *bury* the costs associated with the risk for warranty of
short duration somewhere else in the contract. The other
reason might be that the perceived risk associated with the
warranty specifications is so small that the contractor is not
worried about it.
As stated earlier, the idea of a Ono-cost" warranty can
have merit. There are certain conditions for which a "no-cost"
warranty is logical. In such cases, the Government should not
pay for conformance to specifications which it has previously
paid for in both the development and production contracts. The
other argument made is that by forcing the expected costs of
uncertain technology into the purchase price of a system by
means of a warranty, it provides the government a means of
capturing the true costs. The system cost can therefore be
accurately matched against proposed benefits (Kuenne, 1987).
2. WARRKNXZS AND LIM CYCLE COSTS
To be certain, warranties, either implicit or explicit,
have an effect on the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) of a weapon
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system. Measuring the effect of a warranty on the LCC is not
an exact science. To assist the Program Manager, several cost
-benefit analysis models are currently used within NAVAIR.
AIR-524 has the responsibility for maintaining these models
and conducting the actual cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA).
The models attempt to ascertain the cost effectiveness of
the warranty through standard LCC analysis methodology
developed to define and document the effect. The purchase of
a warranty is deemed to be cost-effective if the calculated
life cycle cost estimate with a warranty is less than or equal
to the life cycle cost if no warranty was purchased. It is
obvious in the Navy's case where a mno-costo warranty policy
has been adopted that the outcome of this analysis will always
favor the adoption of the warranty.
A warranty CEA is performed by comparing the cost of
purchasing a warranty with the benefits accrued over a
system's useful life. The benefits received from the use of a
warranty can be categorized into three general areas. They are
those benefits that result from expected events, benefits that
result from unexpected events and intangible benefits. Each
category will be explained further.
The benefits that result from expected failures being
covered by the warranty come primarily in the form of reduced
maintenance costs. All systems fail at some expected rate.
Warranties clauses that cover the costs associated with these
types of expected failures fall into this first category.
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Warranties that attempt to relieve the Program Manager of need
to provide for either the Navy's own internal HorganicH
maintenance support capability or commercially provided
maintenance support are frowned upon by legal council
(Townsend, 1994).
Benefits also result from unexpected events, such as an
item which displays an unforeseen reliability problem.
Failures of a random nature occurring at a rate greater than
the expected reliability of the system are categorized as
unexpected as well. Failure to meet selected essential
performance requirements (EPRs) that extend over a long period
of time is another example of unexpected failures.
Coverage for these items can often be categorized as an
insurance warranty. The actual dollar value, and therefore the
cost of protection provided by a warranty for unexpected
failures, is a function of the aversion to risk. A Program
Manager who is willing to assume the risks associated with
unexpected failures or defects may place a small dollar value
on the benefits derived from such a warranty.
The last category includes those intangible benefits that
result from the use of a warranty. They include the incentive
to the contractor to provide a quality product because of the
potential cost and risk of a warranty requirement as well as
the ability of the Navy to operate without the risk of an
unexpected catastrophic failure. The value of such intangible
benefits is, once again, a function of aversion to risk.
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Once determined, the value of each type of benefit is
included in the warranty cost analysis and the comparison is
drawn.
As stated earlier, the warranty cost effectiveness is
determined by first comparing the weapon system life cycle
costs with a warranty to the same system without a warranty.
The costs to be considered in a warranty LCC analysis can be
broken down into five categories:
1. Warranty price: This is the actual price paid to purchase
the warranty from the manufacturer. It is the negotiated
dollar figure stipulated on the contract that serves as
payment for all the manufacturer's warranty costs
including administration, repair and any other corrective
action required under the terms and conditions of the
warranty.
2. Warranty administration: This is the estimated cost for
the government to maintain a warranty contract. It
includes such costs as those in instituting special
procedures, and the administration of warranty claims.
3. Non-warranted repair actions: This is the estimated costs
for repair actions not covered by the warranty, or
repairs on systems whose individual warranty has expired.
4. Unprocessed claims: This is the estimate for all claim
actions not properly exercised or executed.
5. Other corrective action: This estimate covers the
government's cost to make any other corrective action
necessary. They would include the cost of engineering
changes not covered under the terms of the warranty and
those that are incurred after the warranty has expired.
There are numerous variables considered in the current CEA
models being used. The following represents a sample of some
of the more widely used service-provided variables:
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1. Equipment economic life: The period of time the system is
expected to be in inventory.
2. Discount rates: The rate used to account for the time-
value of money.
3. Escalation rates: the inflationary or deflationary
effects on costs over time.
4. Constant dollar base: The value of a dollar, based on a
given date, used to ensure consistency throughout the
analysis.
5. Usage rates: The estimated usage expected on a per-system
basis over time (ie., hours of use per month).
6. Valid claim rate: The historical percentage of successful
claim actions for all past claims initiated.
7. Repair cost: The estimated cost to repair the item, given
the logistics and maintenance support plan.
It must be re-emphasized that the actual values used in
the formulation of the CEA represent the service's best
estimates and are not necessarily what will occur in the
future.
The following represents a partial list of variables that
the contractor must provide for the model. These are mostly
estimated values.
1. System reliability: This is usually an estimate of the
mean time between failures of the system.
2. Warranty fixed costs: The costs incurred by the
contractor to establish a warranty program regardless of
the number of claims.
3. Variable repair cost: The average expected per unit cost
to effect a repair action covered under the terms of the
warranty.
4. Variable costs for other corrective actions: The average
expected costs in correcting deficiencies other than
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repair. It includes the cost of preparing and
implementing engineering change proposals (ECPs), and
other such remedies as appropriate.
In accordance with the DFARS Subpart 246.7, the terms and
conditions of a particular weapon system warranty can be
Otailoredo by the contracting officer to ensure that the
warranty is *cost-effectivem. From a review of the variables
used in the performance of the CEA, it can be seen that the
terms and conditions of the warranty will undoubtedly have a
direct impact on the Component Improvement Program (CIP)
discussed earlier.
F. %AMRANTINS AND TER COIWOZT XKPROVT PROGRAM (CZP)
As introduced in Chapter II, the CIP was established to
address many of the same emerging technical problems impacting
system performance, reliability and availability covered by
production contract warranties. If both programs cover the
same problems, the real question here is which one does the
job better and why.
The CIP uses actual Fleet usage data to obtain information
on current system degraders and performs both engineering and
life cycle cost analysis to determine the effectiveness of any
action before it is taken. Resources are then allocated in
current year dollars based on urgency of need, customer demand
and expected return on investment. These funds can be use to
fund either commercial or Navy efforts to provide solutions to
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problems that surface during the post acceptance period and
are seen as very low risk.
Occasionally, unexpected reliability problems or latent
defects surface within the first six months to one year of a
new system's fleet operation. These failures are most often
covered by standard warranty clauses covering freedom from
defects in materials and workmanship, and conformance to
design and manufacturing specifications. As an assurance
warranty, the cost of providing remedy to such failures is
normally included in the cost of the production contract
either explicitly or implicitly.
The type of warranty that would most likely duplicate the
efforts covered by the CIP is an insurance warranty. As
presented earlier, economic theory suggests that the use of
insurance warranties is the least effective of the three types
of warranties used by the government. This is particularly
true for the DoD, not only because of the economic principles,
but also because of the impact of the policies and
administrative rules that apply to weapon system warranties.
The analysis of these factors will be presented in Chapter IV.
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XV. AIUALYSZS
This chapter presents the findings of the economic
analysis of the mandated weapon system warranty requirements
set forth in Section 2403, the FAR and the DFARS both in
theory and in practice. The outcome of the policy analysis
conducted on the current DoD/DoN warranty guidance directives
is presented as well. The chapter concludes with an assessment
of the warranty program management from all levels within the
DoD that impact the NAVAIR engine Program Managers in the
development of warranties that are compatible with the engine
and aircraft acquisition strategy.
A. ZCOCSEC ANALYSZ8
1. The Law (10 U.S.C. 2403)
This section will individually review each of the
major provisions of Section 2403 in order to better analyze
their economic characteristics and determine the overall
effect of the law. First of all, Section 2403 requires the DoD
to obtain a written guarantee from the prime contractor that
contains three basic elements: conformance to design and
manufacturing requirements; freedom from defects in materials
and workmanship; and conformance to essential performance
requirements (EPRs) specifically delineated in the contract.
The first two elements, design and manufacture, and
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materials and workmanship, merely represent a codification of
standard DoD practices and do not pose any new or meaningful
consequences. They are essentially assurance warranties.
Because these types of warranties simply assure that the
government gets what it paid for, separate line-item pricing
is not considered appropriate (Kuenne, 1987). This inclusive
pricing method is appropriate only if the duration of the
warranty period is reasonable. The period covered must be long
enough to protect the government from latent defects
discovered during the initial operating period but not be so
long as to take on the characteristics of an insurance
warranty.
The law's third mandated element, conformance to EPRs,
represents a new and additional requirement. The use of EPRs
extends the requirement to maintain performance standards into
the post-acceptance phase. EPR clauses are normally
categorized as either assurance or insurance warranties but
can be structured as an incentive warranty as well. The
categorization of an EPR as an insurance warranty is based on
the economic principles of uncertainty and is dependent upon
three factors. First is the duration of the warranty, second
is the contractor's level of control over the product quality
during the warranty period and third is the difference in
extent of the contingent liabilities in the event of a failure
in the post-acceptance period as compared to those discovered
during the inspection and acceptance procedures. The liability
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differential would include such things as the costs of
shipping and handling of warranted systems to and from the
contractor's repair facility, and the retention of contractor
personnel necessary to handle any failures or redesign efforts
that may be required. As such, what specifications are chosen
to be EPRs and how the clauses are written in the warranty are
the sources of the greatest potential economic impact.
Whether Congress intended EPRs to reflect the
operational capabilities (OCs) or reliability,
maintainability, availability characteristics (RMACs) of the
weapon system is a continued source of debate (Kuenne, 1987).
The law authorizes the Secretary of Defense to determine
whatever characteristics are considered "to be necessary for
the system to fulfill the military requirement for which the
system is designed". Many of the warranties reviewed as part
of this study contained both OCs and RMACs as EPRs.
The potential impact to the system's life cycle cost
if RMACs are not met is significant. Unfortunately, the
uncertainty associated with maintaining the specified level of
performance for an extended period of time beyond acceptance
is extremely high as well. Accordingly, RMAC EPRs are less
efficient as they tend to fall into the category of insurance
warranties because of the three factors mentioned earlier;
warranty duration, level of contractor control, and difference
in contingent liabilities. The risks associated with
maintaining a level of performance for OCs, which are
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rigorously tested and proven during system development, are
more readily discernable. The duration of the EPR warranty
clauses associated with the vast majority of OCs is less than
that of RMACs and can be categorized as assurance warranties.
So it is seen again that which specifications are chosen to be
included as EPRs can have a significant difference in the
economic effects of the warranty.
One of the more economically significant provisions
found in Section 2403 is the one that authorizes the
negotiation of specific details of the warranty including
reasonable exclusions, limitations and time duration. By
authorizing the negotiation of the specific details of the
warranty, the law allows the DoD and the Program Manager the
latitude to implement a warranty that -fits- the needs of the
program. It is through this tailoring action that the type of
warranty is determined and the cost effectiveness of the three
required elements in the warranty are affected.
The law does not specify which type of warranty is to
be used. Accordingly, it has little impact on the economic
efficiency of the warranty itself. It is important to remember
that it is the type of warranty used, or the function it is
intended to perform (assurance, insurance, or incentive) and
the risk-averse nature of the parties involved that has the
biggest impact on warranty cost and effectiveness.
The economic efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the
different warranty types, drawn from the analysis and research
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conducted as part of the IDA Paper (Kuenne, 1987), are
summiarized below:
1. Assurance warranties are an integral part of the
production and delivery of the systems, and their costs
cannot be separated from the costs of production. The DoD
should be careful not to pay twice for the right to
receive what was contractually agreed to in the contract.
2. Insurance warranties which attempt to shift all or a
major portion of the risk of substantial loss in the
post-acceptance period to the prime contractor are not
cost-effective for the DoD.
3. Incentive warranties can be an effective instrument to
encourage the contractor to meet or eý'r:ýed target
parameters when the contractor has control over those
characteristics and is responsive to the monetary
incentives offered.
With regard to remedies, the law allows the Secretary
of Defense the discretion to require the contractor to take
prompt corrective action to correct the failure at no
additional cost or to pay any reasonable costs incurred by the
government to do so. The first alternative can create
considerable additional risk for the contractor if the period
of the warranty extends s-'mificantly beyond the production
schedule. This is particularly true if redesign is determined
to be required. Historically, once the production line is shut
down, artisans and engineers are reassigned to other programs
or let go. In order to cover warranty requirements in the
post-production period, the contractor might be required to
carry those personnel on its staff in a less efficient
capacity or contract for services on an as-needed basis. In
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either case, as an additive requirement these costs would have
to be included in the contractor's warranty cost.
When the second remedy alternative of reimbursing the
government is chosen, neither the DoD nor the program office
is assured of receiving direct compensation for expenditures
undertaken in correcting a warranty breach. In fact, the
standard procedures established in the FAR require that any
reimbursement received as warranty compensation be forwarded
to the Treasury Department for deposit in the General Fund.
When this is the case, there is no incentive for the Program
Manager or the Contracting Officer to pursue such
reimbursements. Fortunately, provisions in the law and
initiatives taken within the DoD attempt to alleviate this
situation and properly incentivize the program office to
pursue and manage a more effective warranty.
The law permits the DoD to reduce the price of any
future contract for a weapon system or other defense equipment
with the contractor to compensate for any payment due. The
Program Manager's ability to receive adirect compensation"
through the reduction of its future contract prices for a
warranty that was paid for out of the program's limited
procurement appropriation funding is considered a critical
incentive element. Another initiative aimed at correcting this
incentive problem was related to the researcher in an
interview with Ms. Susan Grant, from Business Management
Directorate of the Office of the DoD Comptroller. She
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explained that the Comptroller's Office had recently succeeded
in using warranty reimbursement paid to the Treasury as
justification for supplemental appropriations for a particular
program. (Grant, 1994).
Whether or not any of these provisions provide the
Program Manager the proper incentives depends on the systems
acquisition strategy. For example, if the duration of the
warranty extends well beyond the planned production schedule,
then there is little or no opportunity for the Program Manager
to recoup any of the limited program procurement funds spent
on an expensive warranty through the reduction future contract
prices or reimbursement.
The last provision of the law covered in this section
is the one governing waivers. Section 2403 authorizes the
Secretary of Defense to waive any or all of the required
warranty clauses if they are found not to be cost effective or
the waiver is necessary in the interest of national defense.
By doing this, the law makers have provided the DoD and its
Program Managers the means to avoid entering into any
unproductive warranty agreements and the ability to determinet
effectiveness on its own terms. To date, only two major weapon
systems have successfully processed waivers (Brooks, 1994).
The requirement to notify all of the interested committees in
Congress makes the process particularly laborious. The
majority of Program Managers view this unnecessary program
visibility as high risk and therefore opt to pursue other
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alternatives.
So it can be seen that it is the DoD's interpretation
of the law with regards to the Congressional intent of EPRs,
the articulation of specific warranty terms and conditions,
and the influence of the reimbursement procedures and the
system's acquisition plan on the Program Manager's incentives
that have the most significant impact on the economic effects
of a weapon system warranty. In theory, the DoD has the
ability and the latitude to develop, write and execute
effective warranties with minimal adverse economic impact or
inefficiency.
2. The PAR and DFARB
The warranty sections in both the FAR and the DFARS
reduce some of the potential economic inefficiencies of
Section 2403 by reducing ambiguity, providing guidance and
allowing for even more self-determination. It is important to
recall that the FAR covers all government procurement actions;
not just weapon systems. According to Subpart 46.7, Warranties
(Appendix D), the use of warranties is not mandatory but when
one is obtained it should be cost-effective.
The FAR gives the agency or department issuing the
contract the authority to include warranties and requires
Contracting Officers to consider various factors and the FAR's
general guidelines when determining if the use of a warranty
is appropriate. In and of itself the wording of the FAR has no
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major impact on the cost effectiveness of a warranty. There
is, however, the potential to avoid inappropriate warranties
if the Contracting Officer has a good grasp of the factors
they are charged to consider and the economic impact of using
them.
Conversely, the amplifying direction given in the
DFARS, Subpart 246.7--Warranties, has significant potential
impact on the economic efficiency of weapon system contracts
(Appendix E). Subpart 246.770 of the DFARS covers the policies
and procedures for weapon system warranties and includes all
of the basic provisions found in Section 2403. By allowing the
cost of a warranty to be included in the item's price, Subpart
246.703 allows the warranty cost to be hidden and therefore
precludes any useful cost analysis.
This can be seen in the Navy's contracts that do not
include a separately priced line item for the cost of a
warranty. This practice was adopted as a result of the 1986
warranty policy guidance from the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy Pyatt (Appendix I). A recent change in Navy contracting
policy does now permit separate cost accounting for the cost
of contractor warranty administration.(Townsend, 1994)
The DFARS Subpart 246.770-2 requires that a warranty
identify redesign as a potential remedy. This provision, which
is included in the multi-service generic aircraft engine
warranty (Appendix C), exposes the contractor to significantly
greater risk, particularly for EPR warranty clauses. The Navy
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management views this provision as a requirement f or the
contractor to provide "no-cost" engineering change proposals
(ECPs). The redesign provision is a serious concern to the
Navy Program Managers because of the potential cost to the
program to fund such an effort. As will be seen in the section
on aircraft engine warranties, the contractors are equally
aware of the uncertainty and potential costs involved in a
redesign effort and strive to limit their liability to cover
such costs in the warranty.
Provisions for redesign havoý been recently negotiated
in the T-45 program reflect this point. According to CDR
Wagner, the T-45 Assistant Program Manager for Logistics
(APML), in recent contract negotiations with McDonnell
Douglas, the contractor was willing to pick up only the costs
of redesign and those associated with implementing any changes
required in the production line for future deliveries. They
were not willing to pay the costs associated with any retrofit
action required for spare components in the Navy inventory
(Wagner, 1994).
The DFARS Subpart 246.770-3 expands on the Section
2403 provision concerning the tailoring of warranty terms and
conditions. It permits Contracting Officers to limit the
contractor's financial liability if it is necessary to make it
cost-effective and to negotiate the duration of performance
warranties. This can result in the Contracting Officer taking
a short-range economic perspective and is not conducive to
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reducing a weapon system's total life cycle cost.
When a Contracting Officer is in negotiations, he/she
is representing the Program Manager. Restrained by financial
resources, they often are placea in a position where they are
forced to buy as much warranty as they can afford (Wagner,
1994). Their focus is forced to be on the availability of
current year procurement funding, in this case Aircraft
Procurement, Navy (APN). They do not always have the
information necessary to make an assessment of the impact that
the tailoring action will have on future year Operations and
Maintenance, Navy (O&MN) or Research and Development (R&D)
funding.
According to the DFARS, Subpart 246.770-7, in order to
assess the cost effectiveness of a proposed warranty, the
services must perform a cost-benefit analysis that considers
both the quantitative and qualitative costs and benefits of
the warranty. It goes on to list a number of costs and
benefits to be considered. In the Navy's case the most
important cost component of this analysis, the cost of
warranty acquisition, is considered to be zero. This fact has
led to a somewhat indifferent perspective among program
management and contracting personnel regarding the importance
or significance of conducting a cost-benefit analysis. This
perspective was evident during an interview with the Program
Manager from AIR-536 responsible the Rolls-Royce F405 engine.
When asked if it was possible to review the results of the
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warranty cost-benefit analysis on the new contract for F405-
RR-402, the Program Manager indicated that there was no
warranty cost-benefit analysis filed. (Dabney, 1994)
It is truly necessary that the Contracting Officer
understand the nature and use of the system being procured, as
well as the acquisition strategy and logistic support plan.
With this information and an understanding of the trade-offs
between the potential costs and benefits, and the difficulty
of administering and enforcing a warranty, they can accurately
assess the value of the specific warranty language used.
D. POLICY ANALYSIS
This section presents the analysis of the current policy
and directives issued from both Department of Defense and
Department of the Navy governing weapon system warranties.
1. Secretary of Defense
As presented in Chapter II, The Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Procurement Policy supports a
repeal of the current law mandating weapon system warranties.
Accordingly, as one would expect they have maintained
basically a "hands off policy with regards to the way in
which the services manage their warranty programs. This is
evidenced by the lack of specific guidance put forth from its
level. As mentioned in Chapter II, the newly issued DoD 5000
series instructions which govern the Acquisition Program do
not devote any coverage to warranties. Has this policy been
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effective? Obvious problems have arisen from the lack of
guidelines standardized across the services for developing,
negotiating, administering and determining the cost
effectiveness of weapon system warranties.
The current policy and position has contributed to the
diversity of how the services handle warranties and the
general confusion over the issue of their cost effectiveness.
This can be seen in simple ways such as the lack of consensus
among the services and agencies within the DoD with regard to
their position on the law and desirability of warranties as
reported in the 800 Panel Report. Much of the current
political activity surrounding weapon system warranties is
based on this issue as well.
The emphasis of the Glenn Bill (Appendix D) was to
task the DoD by amendment to the current provisions of Section
2403 to provide the guidance necessary to alleviate much of
this confusion. Although the majority of people involved in
the political arena do not fully understand the economic
nuances of weapon system warranties, they do understand the
concept of quality. Many of them see warranties as some sort
of *hammer" that will guarantee that they get a quality
product from the manufacturer. Accordingly, they see the DoD's
recommendation to repeal the current statute as a reluctance
to take charge of this program and to enforce quality
standards on the weapon system contractors. This is definitely
not the case.
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In a recent interview with the Director of Defense
Procurement, Ms. Spector said that the primary reason the OSD
does not support the current law is that it simply has not
been effective in bringing about the quality and cost
efficiencies expected. This point is true. As it stands, the
law certainly cannot, and does not, ensure that the DoD
obtains a quality product. Furthermore, historically,
production weapon systems procured with the mandated warranty
clauses have cost the government more than the benefits they
have provided (Balaban, 1994).
Ms. Spector did, however, reiterate the myriad of ways
the DoD acquisition program emphasizes accountability and
ensures quality in weapon systems procurement. She noted that,
in addition to the extensive training Program Managers and
Contracting Officer receive, the program management review
process provides for in depth system reviews every step of the
way. She did acknowledge however, that there currently is not
a requirement to review warranty plans or provisions as part
of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) review process. By
including the requirement to review the warranty plan as part
of the DAB review, there would be an opportunity to identify
potential problems before they manifest themselves.
The difficulties associated with warranty
administration have been pointed out by both the GAO and the
DoD Inspector General and acknowledged by the OSD.
Unfortunately, continuing to focus on the need for improved
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warranty administration is like a physician prescribing a
medication that addresses a patient's symptoms without
treating the illness itself. Far too much effort has been put
forth by countless people in search of better warranty
administration.
The Joint Aeronautical Commanders Board sponsored a
sub-group that has been working for months just on developing
the appropriate wording to be used aircraft engine warranties.
Its efforts have not begun to deal with the effectivenels
issues of warranty duration and application of particular
EPR's. It is interesting to note that the Army thinks the
issue of developing effective weapon system warranties is so
important they have teamed up with The Society of Logistics
Engineers (SOLE) and put together a three-day warranty
training seminar. As a product of the Joint Army Industry
Warranty Working Group (JAIWWG), the seminar is designed to go
beyond the current DSMC Program Managers Course which is
required as part of DAWIA to educate acquisition personnel.
In conclusion, the OSD warranty policy is not
effective. What is needed to remedy this problem is the
establishment of simple and clear guidelines that apply to all
services, that these guidelines insure the economic
considerations of warranties are part of the weapon system
development and production and, finally, that an established
formal review process be instituted.
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2. Secretary of the Navy
As introduced in Chapter II, the significant formal
policy guidance from the ASN staff was contained in Pyatt's
letter in 1986 (Appendix I). Although the memorandum supports
the use of the warranty clauses mandated by Section 2403, the
discussion on relevant warranty costs has had a profound
effect on how the Navy does business. The impact can be seen
in NAVAIR as they continue to pursue *no-cost" warranties and
are unable to perform useful cost-benefit analyses. Some of
the negative aspects of the Ono-cost" warranty policy
anticipated by Mr Balaban in his unpublished report (Balaban,
1985) prior to the Navy's adoption of this policy have
materialized. Summarized below they are:
1. Warranty terms and conditions will be limited. You get
what you pay for.
2. True warranty costs may be hidden in other line items.
The Navy does not really know what it is paying for and
meaningful cost-benefit analysis will not be possible.
3. If the "no-cost" warranty places a contractor in serious
financial jeopardy, he may decide to go to court. If they
can convince the court that the Navy required a "no-costs
warranty even though the conditions for such a warranty
did not exist, then they are likely to win.
In essence, the Py-tt memorandum did not mandate the
use of a "no-costs warranty, but the end effect was the same
as if it had. This has proven to be one of the biggest
stumbling blocks with regard to the Navy's ability to perform
any reasonable warranty analysis. As a result the Navy has
entered into many contracts unaware of the true financial
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implications of the warranty and therefore unsure of the life
cycle cost impacts.
3. Naval Air Systs Canuuad
The current NAVAIR warranty policy guidance contained
in NAVAIR NOTICE 4855 dated 17 May 1989 (Appendix J) does not
accurately translate the intent of the Pyatt memorandum. By
establishing the policy to *pursue a no cost warrantym NAVAIR
has further exacerbated the problem of trying to develop and
administer an effective warranty.
This *no-costO position when coupled with the latitude
given to Contracting Officers to tailor required warranty
clauses has resulted in warranties that are not cost-
effective. These warranties are typified by significant
explicit limitations on financial liabilities, warranty
duration and reduced performance levels. Specific examples of
these will be presented in the following section on aircraft
engine warranties.
C. PROGRAM MANdLGMQT AS 8R88MWT
This section prese-ts the findings of the program
management assessment. The political nature of the Dod'
acquisition arena made it necessary to incorporate a review of
the current DoD and DoN weapon system warranty programs with
respect to compliance with legislative intent. This was done
as an attempt to identify and to assess the strengths and
weaknesses of the overall program. The review takes into
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account the current military policy and directives governing
warranties and the procurement review procedures. It takes
into consideration the structure of the organization and the
training programs for acquisition professionals as well. The
findings of the economic analysis were used in conjunction
with the policy analysis and the extensive personal interviews
conducted with program management personnel to develop this
assessment. The program deficiencies noted and recommended
changes were discussed with the affected parties and their
comments are provided.
1. Congrsslional Intent
Mandating the use of warranties in weapon system
production contracting came at a time when the issue of weapon
system procurement was Nexperiencing one of its periodic
episodes of intense concern and policy innovation.n
(Kuenne, 1987) The Congressional intent was to somehow
legislate requirements that would address its concerns and
attain improved system performance and resource economy.
During the McNamara era, the genesis of system analysis, the
ever increasing complexity of weapon systems development and
acquisition epitomized the obvious need to integrate the
procurement process. The systems analyst viewed the entire
weapon system procurement process from research and
development to manufacture and support as an iterative,
integrated process with trade-offs between cost, schedule and
66
performance. The role of the warranty legislation was then to
legislate the consideration of warranties as a tool whose
optimal use could be determined by mathematical methodology
and contribute to the goal of Oproducing higher quality
systems with minimal life cycle costs.O(Kuenne, 1987)
2. Secretary of Defense
The OSD's warranty program management fails to ensure
what was intended by Congress. Although the use of weapon
system warranties has been credited to a certain extent with
producing higher quality systems, they certainly have not been
attributed with minimizing life cycle costs (Balaban, 1994). It
seems as if the focus of the OSD warranty program has been to
minimize the impact of the current warranty legislation and
ward off any further attempt to impose legislative direction
instead of optimizing the effectiveness and efficiency of the
warranties used. This is not to say that the DoD has not
complied with the law. On the contrary, it must be noted that
all weapon system programs reviewed have been found to be in
compliance with the basic requirements established by Section
2403. This level of compliance can be credited to the
service's internal systemic review process for major weapon
systems. So can the lack of efficiency.
The majority of deficiencies noted by the GAO and
others in DoD warranty administration can be attributed to the
lack of standardized procedures for conducting cost-
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effectiveness analysis. Comnents in the 800 Panel Report and
the wording of the proposed amendment of Section 2403 in the
Glenn Bill address the need for these standardized procedures
and guidelines. There is also a lack of any systemic review
process at the OSD level which reviews the warranty plan as
part of the overall acquisition strategy for major weapon
systems. Although Program Managers are required to participate
in the DAB review process, there is currently no requirement
to present the program's warranty plan as part of either the
acquisition strategy or the logistic support plan. This would
be an ideal opportunity for a warranty plan review. It would
significantly enhance the Program Manager's motivation for
executing an economically efficient warranty.
In spite of the direction to consider total life cycle
costs, contained in both Section 2403 and the FAR/DFARS, the
Contracting Officer is often pressured by the Program Manager
to do otherwise. This is due primarily to the Program
Manager's span of financial control and accountability and,
secondarily, to how the system evaluates and rewards the
Program Manager's performance. With regard to financial
control, it should be understood that weapon system warranties
are paid for up front in the production contract out of
procurement funding for a requirement that may never
materialize. In the case of Navy aircraft engines they are
funded out of the Aircraft Procurement Fund, Navy (APN).
Although the Program Manager is responsible for funding of
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interim logistic support during the initial fleet
introduction, all ILS requirements once Navy organic support
is established are paid for out of O&MN controlled by AIR-04.
The motivation to reduce the up-front warranty cost to the
program is obvious. The Program Manager's dilewma is whether
to buy quality or quantity. Should the PM decide on quantity,
the program will most likely not be responsible for paying the
bill for the reduced quality assurance.
Program Managers are evaluated and rewarded by how
much money they control, how many weapon systems they buy and
how much capability they get for the dollar spent during their
tour of duty. This point was made particularly evident on a
recent edition of the CBS news program 060 Minutes. They
reviewed the case of an Air Force Program Manager working in
the Air Force Space Command. Responsible for MILSTAR, a
satellite system that tracks ICBMs, the PM was faced with a
decision to either upgrade the existing system or continue an
ongoing effort to design and develop a new one. When he made
the decision to pursue the upgrade, which was determined to be
the most cost-effective and would greatly reduce the funding
required as well as the budgetary authority under his control,
he was relieved of his command after only four months in the
job. He was selected for early retirement within the year.
Although this is an extreme example, it demonstrates the fact
that the evaluation and reward system for Program Managers
occasionally runs counter to general expectations (CBS, 1994).
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On a lesser level, when a Program Manager is faced with a
decision to pay a high premium for a warranty that would hold
the contractor accountable for the performance specifications
delineated in the production contract or limit the
contractor's warranty liability in order to afford the
quantity of systems established in the Acquisition Plan, the
PM will opt for quantity. This decision, either on the part of
the Program Manager or the Contracting Officer, is not made
out of ignorance. The Defense Acquisition Workforce
Improvement Act (DAWIA), introduced earlier requires both
Program Managers and Contracting Officers to receive the
necessary education and training on issues such as how to
develop and write cost-effective warranties as prerequisites
to assuming their positions.
Several of the references used in conjunction with
this study were developed specifically for the Program
Management Course at the Defense Systems Management College
(DSMC) in Ft. Belvoir, Virginia. They are thorough and
comprehensive works and represent a significant strength of
the OSD warranty program. Although the DoD is fortunate to
have such an excellent warranty text, it is not presented in
the training syllabus as an integral component of the weapon
system acquisition strategy. According to Mr. Bob Fout of MKI,
the author of the latest warranty training book used at DSMC
"Warranty Guidebook," the warranty training offered at DSMC
"*appears to be an afterthought. He stated in a personal
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interview with the researcher that it was his impression that
"they kind of throw you the book on your way out the door. As
if to say, 'oh by the way, here is everything you ever wanted
to know about warranties'." In fact, the Acquisition Strategy
Guide (ASG) used at DSMC was published in July 1984 and does
not reflect section 2403 requirements. According to Professor
Calvin Brown, the Director of the Program Management Course at
DSMC, the school is aware that the ASG is outdated and in need
of an update to include the warranty statutes. He indicated
the difficulty of addressing the issue stems from the fact
that procedures are not standardized and the services do not
agree on how to handle warranties. It is also interesting to
note that the latest version of the DSMC Program Manager's
Notebook, which covers virtually every aspect of acquisition
and includes listing of all applicable reference material,
does not discuss warranties. This point was made to Professor
Brown as well. He indicated that warranties were not included
because there was little or no guidance applicable to all
Program Managers from OSD and it would be better handled at
the service level (Brown, 1994).
The reason, of course, that the OSD has not put forth
any guidance is because its current focus is on appealing the
current legislation and warding off any future legislative
direction regarding DoD acquisition. In several meeting and
discussions with OSD personnel from both the Office of
Acquisition Reform and the Office of Defense Procurement the
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focus and energies of this group were observed to be on
supporting initiatives that would reduce the level of
Congressional oversight and administrative burdens placed on
DoD acquisitions. Ms. Teresa Brooks provided the author with
numerous internal DoD memorandums documenting its position in
support of a repeal of the current law and its efforts to
overturn any legislative effort that did not provide relief
from the "cumbersome Congressional notification requirements*
established by Section 2403. Needless to say, this does little
or nothing to ensure that the warranties being developed and
negotiated today are the efficient and effective instruments
that Congress intended them to be.
According to Mr. Sal Guli from the Office of the
Inspector General of the Department of Defense (DODIG), his
organization disagrees with the OSD perspective and program
management focus. (Guli, 1994) It was that difference that led
to the testimony given before Congress by Mr. Derek Vander
Schaaf in March 1994 strongly supporting the retention of the
warranty provisions included in the Glenn Bill S.1587. If
adopted, Section 2402 of the Bill would require the Secretary
of Defense to establish guidelines for warranty waivers,
administration and cost-effective analysis.
In conclusion, it can be said that there is an
apparent lack of consensus regarding warranties within the
DoD. The overall program management focus appears to be on the
reduction of Congressional oversight of the procurement
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process and not on the effective management of the mandated
weapon system warranty requirements.
3. Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations
This section of the warranty program management
assessment includes aspects from both the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy (ASN) and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
spheres of influence. As presented earlier, the ASN warranty
directive, SECNAVINST 4330.17, tasked the CNO with
establishing procedures to ensure that warranties are obtained
for weapon sy.zems that meet the thresholds established by
higher authority. In response to this tasking, the Deputy
Chief for Logistics (N4) included the review of warranties as
part of the Logistic Review Group (LRG) audits conducted on
all major Navy programs. Although sponsored by N4, the LRG
audit board has maintained representation from the program
resource sponsors in N8 as well. This is important as many ot
the logistic issues discussed as part of the LRG, particularly
warranties, have significant resource implications. (Fink,
1994)
This is the only comprenensive review procedure
established in the Navy which evaluates the extent to which
the warranty approach used is compatible with the Integrated
Logistic Support Plan (ILSP) and the Acquisition Plan (AP) for
the system. It is considered to be a very effective forum for
the debate over warranty issues that affect individual
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programs. There has been some concern raised over the future
effectiveness of the LRG audit because the VCNO is considering
a proposal to shift responsibility for convening the review
for all programs, including major weapon systems, down to the
Systems Command level (Eaton, 1994).
One of the more ineffective aspects of the warranty
program was in the area of warranty data collection and
analysis. Although the ASN directive calls for the
establishment of a system for the collection and analysis of
actual warranty claims data, and tasks OPNAV with compiling an
annual report, there was no evidence found that this was being
done. The lack of interest from the OSD level in addressing
the warranty issue from a cost-effectiveness basis has
apparently reduced the visibility and demand of any such
reporting requirements.
The overall warranty program at the ASN and OPNAV
level is in need of review. The review should address
deficiencies in the data collection and analysis aspect of the
program and stress the importance of a weapon system warranty
plan assessment as part of the ILS review process.
4. Naval Air Systems Command
Since the NAVAIR matrix management system structure
has been superimposed over the program, the NAVAIR warranty
program management problems have become as complex as the
organization itself. In accordance with NAVAIRINST 13070.7
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(Appendix H), the lead role in warranty programs is assigned
to the Assistant Commrander for Engineering (AIR-05). Other
appropriate responsibilities are assigned to the Assistant
Commnander for Logistics/Fleet Support (AIR-04), Contracts
(AIR-02), Office of Counsel (AIR-OOC) and the Comptroller
(AIR-OB). Within AIR-05, the Product Integrity and Production
Engineering Division, AIR-516 headed by Mr. Dick Findley, is
assigned responsibility for management of the warranty
program. In a phone interview, Mr Bob Tourville, the AIR-516
point of contact, elaborated on the division's high
frustration with trying to manage a program for which they had
little or no control. Control in this case means not only
decision making authority but funding authority as well. In
essence, AIR-516 has neither and expressed its candid desire
to be relieved of the administrative burden of the overall
program management responsibilities (Tourville, 1994).
The Cost Analysis Division (AIR-524) representative
Dr. Kang Hu, likewise voiced his frustration with the current
system. (Hu, 1994) Although AIR-524 currently has three models
available for the computation of the life cycle cost impact of
warranties, their effectiveness is limited. In a phone
interview Mr Allan Pressman, the Section Head for Propulsion
Systems (AIR-52453) explained that the models available for
analyzing aircraft engine warranty life cycle cost have
varying degrees of complexity and sophistication but they are
basically useless without an accurate contractor warranty
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price.
One of the more obvious NAVAIR Warranty Program
strengths observed by the researcher was Mr. Jim Cleer from
the Logistics and Maintenance Policy Division (AIR-411). As
the former AIR-04 Warranty Program point of contact, his
personal involvement and depth of knowledge was credited by
many in the program for correcting a multitude of problems
associated with warranty administration within the naval
aviation community. During an interview with Mr. Cleer the
researcher had the opportunity to discuss the scope of his
role as the AIR-04 warranty POC. He explained AIR-04's
position on the new "life management" approach to warranties
that would reduce the uncertainty associated with the
establishing operating life limits for systems beginning
production. This approach, which considered the statistical
significance of the data available to establish the base
operating life lower limits used in a warranty, could
significantly enhance the efficiency of warranties being
developed for new weapon systems.
Additionally, he spoke about the shared responsibility
of screening all NAVAIR procurement requests (PRs). This
internal review process was conducted to insure the mandatory
warranty requirements were included and, from an AIR-04
perspective, that the clauses used made sense and were
compatible with the logistic support systems available. The
effectiveness of this process can be argued but, at a minimum,
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this procedure at least ensured that cognizant knowledgeable
personnel have a chance to review the contracts.
Since the initial interview, Mr. Cleer has been
assigned to a new program and division within NAVAIR. With his
departure, the warranty program management responsibilities
previously covered by AIR-411 were transferred to the Naval
Aviation Maintenance Office (NAMO) in Patuxent River,
Maryland. The effectiveness of managing a program of this
nature with active duty personnel subject to periodic rotation
from a remote site is suspect. In a phone interview with the
researcher CPT Steve Choate, USMC, the new Warranty Program
Manager at NAMO (Code 414-1), described some of the
difficulties he had encountered in executing his new
responsibility. He added that he had very little activity with
the Warranty Program since taking it over and that the
responsibility of screening the Prs had remained within
NAVAIR.
Another obvious program strength was the inclusion of
a warranty review as part of the LRG audit process. AIR-04
chairs the LRG audits for all NAVAIR sponsored systems. Their
participation in this process, with or without the OPNAV
staff, enables an internal review of the comparability of the
warranty plan with the ILSP and AP.
In conclusion, the warranty program within NAVAIR is
also in need of review. The issues that should be addressed
include: AIR-516's ability to exert control over the execution
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of warranties and manage the program, AIR-524's difficulties
in providing useful cost analysis, the delegation of AIR-04's
role of policy management to NAMO, and the continuation of the
LRG audit process. The next chapter discusses the analyses of
several aircraft engine warranties.
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V. AIRCRAI? ZU E WARI&W!'T ANALYSES
A. FOCUS OF ANALYSIS
Originally it was hoped that a detailed post-award
aircraft engine warranty cost analysis would be possible
despite the Navy's policy on obtaining Eno-costs warranties.
Unfortunately, the problems encountered in determining actual
warranty costs precluded that endeavor. Therefore, the
analysis in this chapter focusses instead on the economic
effects of integrating the aircraft engine warranty
development and administration into the acquisition strategy.
It also looks at the compatibility of the mandated warranties
with the function they are intended to perform; that is, to
produce higher quality weapon systems with minimum life cycle
costs. The analyses take a very critical look at the Navy's
use of essential performance requirements (EPRs) for two
reasons. The first is to determine the effect of EPRs on the
nature or type of warranty. The second is to understand why
the government has been generally unsuccessful in its attempts
to obtain the anticipated remedy for items included under EPR
clauses.
1. Essential Pozfozmnco Requiremnts
What exactly is an "essential performance
requirement"? The most commonly used EPRs in aircraft engine
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production contracts relate to thrust, specific fuel
consumption (SFC), shaft horsepower, surge, and life
expectancy. It is the derivation and application of specific
operational life expectancy requirements that has the greatest
potential impact on the warranty's economic efficiency. In
fact, in the case of aircraft engines, it can be argued that
the inclusion of operating life limits or life expectancy as
an "EPR" might not even be appropriate. The arguments made for
this point are elaborated upon later in the section that
considers the Rolls-Royce F402.
2. Uncoftainty, Risk, and Statistical Siguificance
The uncertainty that stems from the inability of
either the contractor or the government to accurately predict
what the actual life of any new system will be has the most
profound effect on the generation and assumption of risk. To
understand why an accurate prediction of the expected
operating life of a complex dynamic component like a new
engine is not possible, one must consider the statistical
significance of the data available to make such an estimate.
The data collected throughout the developmental and
operational tests and evaluation (DOT&E) of the engine and
aircraft weapon system development is from a small sample of
engines. Even in the most thorough engine test and evaluation
programs, like the F414 which will accumulate over 10,000
engine operating hours before the engine is incorporated into
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an aircraft, the sample will be only 14 engines. Not only is
the sample population size small, but no testing program can
possibly simulate all aspects of the actual operations of the
aircraft and propulsion systems. Even though the data
collected from all testing is accurate and complete, the
confidence interval for the expected life will be large and
hence an accurate estimate of expected life is not possible.
It is only from actual historical fleet usage data that
accurate operating life estimates can be established. The life
management approach to warranties being considered by NAVAIR
reflects an understanding of this concept.
3. Progran History and 8ystem Life Cycle
The chapter first looks at two Rolls-Royce engines.
The F405-RR-402 used in the T-45A aircraft and the F402-RR-408
being used in the AV-8B Harrier display some significant
differences in the level of warranty integration with the
systems life cycle. It was apparent that the Navy personnel
assigned to both of these programs viewed Rolls-Royce as being
cooperative about warranties. This relationship with the
production contractor is one of many important historical
considerations to consider in warranty negotiations and will
be expanded upon later in this chapter. The importance of this
historical relationship is expanded upon in the analyses of
the General Electric engines reviewed later in the chapter.
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B. ROLLS-ROYCR 7405-RR-402
Before getting into any engine warranty analysis, it is
important to understand the aircraft acquisition plan and the
basics of the acquisition strategy. The T-45A aircraft and the
F405 engine are part of the T-45TS Training System. Bought
from McDonnell Douglas Aircraft on a sole source contract as
a non-developmental item (NDI) and completely supported by
contractor logistic support (CLS), the T-45A Goshawk is indeed
a unique aircraft program. The NDI concept encourages the
military to buy equipment "off-the-shelfs whenever possible.
The concept has been embraced by the politicians as yet
another way for the DoD to reduce the high costs of developing
new weapon systems. The Navy intends to support the F405
engine via CLS for the life of the program as well. This makes
the F405 unique from every other engine in the Navy inventory.
The development and procurement of a suitable engine for
the Navy's T-45A has been a complex and involved process. Like
its predecessor, the British Aerospace Hawk, the T-45A
Goshawk, which is manufactured in the U.S. by McDonnell
Douglas, was originally powered by the Rolls-Royce F405-RR-400
engine. Designed by Ardour, a prominent French aerospace
engineering firm, the original F405-RR-400 (Ardour Mark 861-
49) engine performed well on all initial Navy tests except the
aircraft carrier landing pattern where it was found to be
underpowered. The engine problems were attributed to the
increased weight of the Navy's T-45A. The beefed up landing
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gear and undercarriage required to support carrier operations
added over 1,000 pounds to the design weight of the original
Hawk. McDonnell Douglas and Rolls-Royce replaced the -400 with
the -401 which had the increased thrust necessary to meet the
aircraft operational performance requirements.
Once the engine performance problems were made public,
other companies threw their hat in the ring. Since 1987,
Garrett has pursued the T-45 program with the hopes of
replacing the F405 with its F124. In 1990, the Defense
Acquisition Board (DAB) directed the T-45 program to
investigate the feasibility of an alternate engine.
Accordingly, the Navy announced its intention to conduct a
competition for the production aircraft engine based on
performance and cost. The candidates that passed source
selection criteria were the Rolls-Royce F405-RR-402, an
enhanced version of che F405-RR-401, and the Garrett F124.
Although Rolls-Royce has the incumbent's advantage, its
original life cycle cost estimates were high. They have since
taken steps to reduce these costs and increase warranty
coverage.
In a recent conversation with the researcher, CDR Wagner,
the T-45 APML, indicated that the future of the engine
competition is uncertain due to a funding problem caused by
Congressionally imposed budgetary reductions (Wagner,1994).
Regardless of what the outcome of the competition may be,
the Navy has moved ahead and followed through on its original
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intention to Obreakouts the engine. "Breakouto simply means
that, in contrast to the previous procurement practice where
the engine was purchased along with the aircraft under a
single contract, the F405-RR-401 is being purchased directly
from Rolls-Royce and provided to McDonnell Douglas as
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE). It is the differences in
the engine warranty coverage contained in the original limited
rate initial production (LRIP) contracts with McDonnell
Douglas and the breakout contract with Rolls-Royce that are
the focal point of this analysis.
It must be noted that whenever the Navy does an engine
breakout, the contract administration and overhead costs are
paid directly by the Navy. Additionally, the Navy assumes the
risks of managing a successful engine program. The risks
include those associated with not only the engine performance
but the delivery schedule as well. Historically, this has
provided the prime contractor an avenue to blame the
government for a multitude of aircraft production and
performance problems. When the exact nature of a problem
cannot be traced, it is relatively easy for the contractor to
blame it on the GFE and charge any costs back to the Navy.
When an engine is procured by the Prime Contractor as part of
the aircraft program, as was the case with F405, any problems
that arise in either performance or delivery are for the Prime
and its subcontractor to work out. Regardless of the
additional risks, the Navy's policy is to breakout the
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procurement of engines for production aircraft.
There are 35 T-45A aircraft in the Navy inventory which
were produced under development and LRIP contracts. The
currently approved and budgeted inventory objective of T-45A
is 218 aircraft, the remainder to be produced under production
contracts. The inventory objective for engines is expected to
be approximately 300. There will be over 90 aircraft delivered
with F405-RR-401 engines installed by the time a final engine
is chosen and incorporated into the production line. Currently
there is no plan to retrofit the final production engines into
the earlier aircraft. This decision will force the Navy into
the requirement to support two different engines for the same
aircraft.
Supporting two different engines produced by the same
manufacturer is not a big problem. On the other hand, the cost
of supporting two totally different engines manufactured by
different companies is a different story. If the final engine
chosen is the Rolls-Royce 402, its high degree of commonality
with the current 401 engine will certainly make it a less
expensive option than trying to support both the Garrett F124
and the F405-RR-401. In the final analysis, it may be too
costly to maintain support for two completely different
engines, as the CLS for the 401s already in inventory must be
continued for the usable life of the engines.
The majority of problems encountered in the T-45A engine
acquisition program stem from not competing the engine
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contract from the very beginning. Treating the engine as part
of an NDI, "off-the-shelf" weapon system package, when design
and performance improvements were anticipated was a costly
mistake in terms of both dollars and time. A separate
competitive engine acquisition plan started at the beginning
of the program may have well precluded program delays. It is
with this understanding of the T-45 program's history and
acquisition strategy that the engine's warranties are
evaluated.
The original aircraft LRIP contract was broken down into
three Lots. Beginning in FY88 with Lot I, the warranty
provided the basic coverage for all three of the elements
required under Section 2403 including: conformance with design
and manufacturing requirements, freedom from defects in
material and workmanship, and conformance to essential
performance requirements. The time period covered by the
warranty was 290 flight hours or twelve months after
acceptance c the aircraft, whichever comes first.
Interestingly, the warranty did not delineate any specific
EPRs, just the flight hour requirement. The remedies
provisions included coverage for redesign and the cost of
transportation. There were no financial limitations placed on
the warranty.
The coverage provided under the contract for Lots II and
III is identical in all respects except for duration. In each
successive contract the period of coverage was extended from
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290 flight hours or 12 months in Lot I to 360 flight hours or
12 months in Lot II and 480 flight hours or 12 months in Lot
III. All three flight hour goals are well within the 60-hour
per month upper limit established in the development
specification. The average flight hours for aircraft in the
Fleet are 30 hours per month. There were no limitations or
exceptions associated with the increase in flight hour
coverage. The cost of the warranty was not separately
negotiated so there is no warranty price data available. The
warranty can be clearly categorized as an assurance warranty.
This is because of the period of coverage, the level of
contractor control and the minimal cost differential between
providing remedies in the pre- and post-acceptance period.
The simplicity of this warranty is its strength.
Additionally, the fact that both the aircraft and the engine
were under CLS gives the contractor the maximum control
possible over obtaining the performance goals established by
the contract. This warranty is an excellent candidate for the
Navy's "no-costm warranty. Additionally, it should be noted
that the redesign effort required to upgrade the 400 to the
401 configuration was paid for by RDT&E funding under the
aircraft development contract.
The warranty included in the FY-94 GFE breakout contract
of the F405-RR-401 is "a horse of a different colorn. The
period of coverage for both conformance to design and
manufacturing requirements, and defects in material and
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workmanship is 36 months or 1000 flight hours after
acceptance, whichever occurs first, with the exception of cold
section life-limited parts which are covered for 2000 flight
hours after acceptance.
The use of EPRs was greatly increased. They include the
following requirements:
1. Maximum allowable thrust deterioration will be no more
than 6.5% for 1000 flight hours after acceptance.
2. Maximum allowable specific fuel consumption deterioration
will be no more than 5.5% for 1000 flight hours after
acceptance.
3. Operation without surge for 1000 flight hours or 36
months, whichever occurs first.
The warranty then goes on to individually list each major
hot section component and provide life limit lower bounds in
terms of hours, cycles and counts and specifies the end of
their warranty period to be when the first of any of theses
operating life specifications is obtained. As if this were not
enough, the warranty contains a final clause that requires the
engine to meet the specification requirements not delineated
in the warranty for a period of 48 months of operation or 2500
flight hours, whichever is longer, after final acceptance. At
an average engine utilization rate of 30 hours per month this
period would be approximately seven years.
With these increased periods of coverage it was not
surprising to see changes in the terms of the remedies offered
and the establishment of specific financial liabilities. The
88
first to go was the shipping and handling. The contractor's
responsibility was reduced to furnishing materials to the
government at the original point of delivery or the
contractor's plant. This is significant when considering the
plant is in the United Kingdom.
The liability limitations are as complex as the clauses
themselves. Basically, Rolls-Royce established a limit of 2
million pounds sterling for redesign and qualification if the
government buys 20 engines. This financial limit allows for a
pro-rated adjustment up or down based on the number of engines
actually procured under the contract. The cost are
specifically to be considered exclusive of profit and if the
costs exceed the limit they will be shared equally by the U.S.
Government and the contractor.
The warranty has a distinctively different approach from
the one used in the aircraft LRIP contract. In this warranty
there was a concerted effort on the part of the government to
extend the period of coverage significantly into the post-
acceptance period. The technical nature of such a contract
warranty is better suited for a program like the T-45A which
is completely supported by contractor personnel than for a
combat aircraft engine, as it would be difficult to administer
by active duty personnel.
The fact that the contractor sought relief from the
virtually unlimited risk and corporate liability indicates
that the nature and economic characteristics of the FY94
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engine breakout contract warranty was a significant change
from its predecessor. The EPR clauses found in this new
contract warranty can be accurately depicted as an insurance
warranty.
C. ROLLS-ROYCR 7402-RR-408
As stated earlier, the problems experienced with the
procurement and support of the Rolls-Royce F402-RR-408 Pegasus
engine, used in the Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier aircraft,
indicate that the use of arbitrary operating life EPR
warranties in engine production contracts might be
inappropriate. Contracted for in May of 1988, the 408 is the
latest of three Rolls-Royce engines to be used in the AV-8B
Harrier. Preceded by the F402-RR-406 and the 406A, the 408 has
been plagued by problems, including some serious enough to
shut down the production line. One of the more significant
problems experienced has been with the inability to attain the
warranted operating life of the engine hot section. According
to Jim Carrol, the engine Program Manager in AIR-536, Rolls-
Royce is working very hard to deliver the product it promised.
(Carrol, 1994)
One of the promises Rolls-Royce made was that the 408
engine would have a 1000-hour hot section. The problem is that
they are only getting 600 hours out of the HP Turbine blades.
Right now Rolls-Royce is expending tremendous resources in an
effort to correct the problems. Fortunately for the Navy, the
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work is being covered under the warranty. When asked by the
researcher what kind of impact this "severe* problem was
imposing on aircraft availability, the answer given by the
Steve Clark, the engine APML from AIR-410, was ONone! * (Clark,
1994) This was difficult to understand. How could this be? The
life limits of the new 408 engine hot section were critical
enough to be considered an Nessential performance
requirement". Why then was there no impact on the aircraft
availability? This question led to several interesting
discussions with program representatives throughout NAVAIR.
It was explained to the researcher that the Navy and
Marine Corps had originally gone to Rolls-Royce requesting
that they do something to improve upon the thrust of the
original 406 and 406A engines. The operator's wanted an engine
with more thrust. After careful consideration, Rolls-Royce
indicated that although it could not achieve the level of
thrust improvements desired with its new engine, it could get
significantly better life from its hot section. What ensued
was a life-cycle cost analysis to justify the procurement of
the 408 based upon the improved reliability of the turbine.
The increase in life expectancy and reduced life cycle
costs were used as marketing tools by Rolls-Royce. The entire
engine world seems driven to prove that it is possible to
reduce the life cycle cost of an engine by squeezing more life
out of the hot section. The Navy program management folks
basically said, 'Put your money where your mouth is and we got
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ourselves a deal". Rolls-Royce answered the call and signed up
to a contract with a warranty that was supposed to Ohold their
feet to the fire'. (Carrol, 1994)
The F402-RR-408 engine has been unable to achieve the 1000
hour hot section operating life promised in its warranty. The
current average hot section operating time before repair is
approximately 600 to 700 hours. So one would expect this
significantly reduced operating life to eventually affect
aircraft availability. Fortunately for the Harrier program
office, the ILSP was developed to support the 406 which was a
500-hour engine. Accordingly, it is difficult to understand
how the Navy could require Rolls-Royce to stand behind this
operating life performance specification estimate when it is
obviously not NessentialO to the operational availability of
the aircraft.
The actual terms of the 408 warranty include all the
clauses required by Section 2403. The warranty requires the
engine to be free from defects in material and workmanship,
and to conform to design and manufacturing requirements for
300 flight hours or 12 months after the first flight of the
engine, or 3 years after acceptance, whichever comes first.
The EPRs include meeting requirements established for
individual engine components. These components listed in the
warranty included specific operating life limits calculated in
engine flight hours, Engine Monitoring System (EMS) life
counts or cycles as well as calendar dates:
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1. Thrust values and specific fuel consumption specification
requirements for 1000 engine flight hours, equivalent
engine EMS life counts or six (6) years after acceptance,
whichever comes first.
2. Operating periods for any hot section part of 1000 engine
flight hours, equivalent EMS life counts or six (6)
years, whichever comes first.
3. Operating periods for any cold section part of 2000
engine flight hours, or EMS cycles, or ten (10) years
after acceptance.
4. Operation free of non-recoverable or recoverable surge
for six years after acceptance or 1000 flight hours,
whichever occurs first.
The rights and remedies offered are standard and include
provisions for redesign. They establish specific cash limits
for liability associated the timely return of repaired parts
and the incorporation of redesign parts. Exceptions and
conditions are established in which the government will bear
the cost of transportation to and from the contractor's plant
and caps the financial liability of meeting any warranty costs
at 10.5 million pounds sterling. Should the costs exceed that,
they will be equally shared between the government and the
contractor.
This warranty, much like the one negotiated for the F405
breakout, significantly extends the coverage into the post-
acceptance period. This aspect, coupled with the limited
control of the contractor to ensure the specifications are
met, significantly shifts the risks to the contractor and is
therefore representative of an insurance warranty.
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As an interesting side note, the program management
personnel interviewed by the researcher are fully aware of the
financial limitations associated with warranty costs. They
expressed some concern that they might be getting a bill to
cover their portion of the cost beyond the 10.5 million pounds
for which they are liable. It was evident that they were not
fully aware of the actual current costs charged to the
warranty account and it appeared as if they were afraid to
ask. Again it can be seen that any attempt to shift the risk
to the contractor is bound to be met by requests for
limitations or exceptions. If there were not any limitations,
the procurement cost would have to include the exorbitant cost
of such a warranty. The request to establish liability limits
are ready indicators that the specification parameters
stipulated have forced the nature of the warranty to change
and therefore exceed the realm of a Ono-cost" warranty.
The next three sections look at engine products produced
by General Electric. As stated earlier in this chapter, the
relationship a company shares with the government is an
important aspect in the negotiation of a warranty. This is
made evident in the differences in the warranties.
D. GENERAL ELNCTRIC F404-GZ-400/402
This section looks at the historical problems associated
with the General Electric F404-GE-400 used in the McDonnell
Douglas Hornet, F/A-18A/B & C/D. The F404 program began in
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1975. General Electric began production of the F404 in 1980
and, by the end of March 1990, had shipped over 1,900 engines.
The F404 enhanced performance engine has been designated as
the F404-GE-402. From the beginning the approach u~e for the
F404 development was different and emphasized operational
suitability and reliability, as well as performance and
weight. The use of cost plus incentive fee development
contracts for reliability and maintainability and an alternate
or second-source contractor for production were the type of
initiatives embraced by the program to get the best possible
product at a given cost.
With regard to warranty use, the early contracts for Lots
I through III provided no explicit warranty coverage. The
warranty coverage for Lots IV through IX provided for basic
materials and workmanship, and design and manufacturing, from
the time of acceptance until the engine was installed in an
aircraft (McLaughlin, 1994). Beginning in 1985 with Lots X and
XI, the Navy adopted a more comprehensive warranty that met
the newly mandated weapon system warranty requirements. So the
condition here is one in which the engine development
statement of work (SOW) was written before the use of weapon
system warranties became mandatory. This condition is
considered to have a significant impact on the final
negotiated cost of a warranty (Balaban, 1985).
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1. 7404-G0-400 Lot XI
The warranty for the Lot XI contract included all the
clauses required by Section 2403, including clauses covering
EPRs whibh were extremely complex. The warranty included
requirements to meet the following specifications:
1. Delivered free from defects in materials and workmanship,
and conform to design and manufacturing requirements for
a period of 200 flight hours after acceptance.
2. Maximum deterioration limits on thrust, specific fuel
c sumption, acceleration/deceleration as well as meeting
s*cifications for starting altitude and time to
stabilized idle thrust for a period of 100 engine flight
hours, 300 operating hours or two years, whichever occurs
first.
3. Operating period for any hot section part requiring
repair or replacement of six years or 75% of the design
specification expressed in terms of Equivalent Full
Thermal Cycle (EFTC). EFTC equates to a change of engine
power from idle to intermediate or above and back to idle
as mathematically determined in the Engine Monitoring
System (EMS).
4. Operating period for any cold section part for ten years
or 75 % of the design specification for operating life
expressed in terms of Equivalent Low Cycle Fatigue Cycle
(ELCFC). ELCFC is an accumulation of engine power changes
calculated as follows:
ELCFC = FLCFC - (PLCFC - FLCFC) (KB) where;
"* FLCFC = Full Low Cycle Fatigue Cycle = a change in engine
power from off to intermediate or above and back to off.
"* PLCFC = Partial Low Cycle Fatigue Cycle = a change in
engine power from 12,800 rpm to 15,500 rpm and back to
12,800 rpm; and
"* KB = Damage factor defined differently for each part
listed. The KB factor listed for the Stage 1 Fan Disk is
0.045.
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5. Protection against surge problems for 1500 engine flight
hours or 5 years, which ever comes first.
The rights and remedies portions of the warranty were
standard and provide all engineering and hardware necessary to
complete the redesign, qualification testing, and bench
testing for repeated warranty breaches for all EPRs.
Additional provisions require the contractor to provide all
parts and labor to incorporate the redesign for any part that
has a life of half of what is specified and any surge breach.
In addition to the normal provisions found in the
Exceptions and Conditions portion of the warranty regarding
proper maintenance and operations, negligent installation by
non-contractor personnel, substitution of non-contractor
parts, Battle Damage and FOD, it requires the government to
bear the cost of transportation to and from the contractor's
plant. The government is also required to fund and conduct any
full scale development and qualification testing and provide
the engines necessary for the testing. Lastly, stipulations
concerning statistical life calculations exclude parts
delivered by Pratt and Whitney or suppliers other than General
Electric.
The last provision covered in this analysis of NAVAIR
and GE's first engine warranty to comply with the newly
mandated coverage is the most indicative of its change in
nature. General Electric's desire to protect itself from the
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uncertainty and risk associated with this warranty was clearly
expressed in the Limitation of Liability. It specified that
"the limitation of liability for all remedies contemplated by
paragraphs B.3 and B.4 shall be $8,500,000.00" Paragraphs B.3
and B.4 are the provisions concerning life limits for hot and
cold section components. Unlike the Rolls-Royce contracts that
offer a cost sharing provision for all limits on EPRs, this
warranty firmly and absolutely limited General Electric's
financial liability over operating life EPRs.
This warranty serves as an early and excellent example
of the economic effects of requiring the contractor to
guarantee the operating life of any engine component
significantly into the post-acceptance period. Specifications
given in terms of ELCFCs and EFTCs and whichever comes first
are clear attempts to limit the period of liability. Further
limitations are added which require the contractor to pay for
parts and labor of any redesign requirement only if the
achieved life is less than half of what is specified in the
warranty which is set at 75% of the original design
specification. In essence, the redesign warranty is applicable
to only 37.5% of the design specification. This is indicative
of the contractor's intent to charge the government for any
redesign efforts involved with components that achieve greater
than 37.5% of operating life design specification. The final
stroke is the financial cap established in the Limit of
Liability paragraph. These contractual efforts clearly
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indicate the contractor's awareness of the economic effects of
uncertainty and risk associated with operating life EPRs and
are indicative of an insurance warranty.
2. F404-GI-400 Lot XII
In the wake of the performance problems experienced in
the Fleot with the F404 and the necessary reduction in the
operating life limits of numerous components the terms and
conditions of the warranty written for the Lot XII contract
make for an interesting comparison. The provisions for
delivery free from defects in material and workmanship, and
conformance to design and manufacturing requirements were
expanded to include all specificat-on requirements of the
contract for a period of 300 engine operating hours. Engine
operating hours represent all hours of operation both before
and after acceptance. This warranty period is therefore
equivalent to an operating period of less than 10 months.
The way the EPRs are specified indicates an attempt to
limit the contractor's liability as well:
1. Thrust deterioration specifications were relaxed from
within 98 and 97% of specified values in Lot XI to a not
to exceed deteriorcrtion of 5%. The operating period
changed from 100 engine flight hours, 300 engine
operating hours or two years, to 625 operating hours.
2. Specific Fuel Consumption (SFC) deterioration limits were
changed to a not to exceed value of 5% of specification
for 625 operating hours as well.
3. Hot section life limits introduced the use of the B10
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Weibull life distribution for the hot section as a
determining factor of contractual compliance with the
EFTC values specified in the warranty which are 75% of
design specification. B10 Life is defined in later GE
contracts as: Rated life, the time by which 10% of the
specified parts will have failed.
4. Cold section life limits require the use of the BO.1
Weibull distribution for structural life be applied to
the ELCF values specified in the warranty which are 75%
of design specification. BO.1 Life is defined in later GE
contracts as: Rated life, the time by which 0.1% of the
specified parts will have failed.
5. The final stipulation limits the contractor's exposure to
risk by requiring that they be notified in the event of
any warranty breach of hot section operating life within
five years and any cold section operating life within ten
years after the last engine/module tendered for delivery.
The addition of the repair of all "secondary damage"
to the remedies covered under material and workmanship, design
and manufacturing was considered a big plus on the part of the
government. The *secondary damage" clause gave the government
an avenue to collect against "damage to parts within the
engine caused by the rupture of a part which is incorporated
in that engine or by an engine section malfunction." The term
as defined in the warranty specifically excludes Odamage to
other engine or any other property external to the instant
engine or any consequential damages.*
With regards to remedies of EPR breaches which require
redesign, the contractor agrees to provide only the hardware
necessary to eliminate the cause of the breach for each engine
which has accrued at least 300 operating hours since
acceptance and stipulates that the government will fund any
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design and development work necessary for qualification of a
modification. It also requires that if, after correction
action is taken, it is determined that a breach did not occur,
then the government will compensate the contractor to pay for
any work completed in the effort.
With all of the technical specifications negotiated
and duration periods defined, General Electric closes the door
on its exposure to unlimited risk in the Limitation of
Liability paragraph which stipulates that *The contractor's
liability for remedies reported under paragraph B.2 (all EPRs)
shall not be greater than 10% of the total contract prices. It
is evident in the wording of this warranty that the contractor
has taken further steps aimed at reducing its risk and
potential liability associated specifically with EPRs which
significantly extend the period of coverage into the post-
acceptance period. The obvious lack of concern for the other
warranty clauses confirms that they function as an assurance
warranty. Conversely, the extensive efforts to technically and
contractually limit the terms of the EPRs is indicative of an
insurance warranty.
Z. GUNZRAL ,LUCTRXC F11O-GZ-400
The General Electric F110-GE-400 is an Air Force managed
engine being used in the Navy F-14D aircraft. The original Air
Force production contract was signed in December 1984 before
Congress enacted either Section 794 or 2403. According to the
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IDA Paper, mit provides a good example of one of the more
sophisticated warranties from the pre-mandated era". (Kuenne,
1987) In a follow-on contract in 1986, the Navy procured 292
engines from General Electric and has procured an additional
60 engines in a separate buy. According to Mr. Karl Matson,
the GE Fl10 Program Manager, the procurement price of the Fl10
is approximately $3.44 million per copy. (Matson, 1994)
Although similar in many respects to the original Air Force
contract warranty, the economic characteristics of the Navy's
first Fl10 contract warranty are distinctly different. The
compatibility of this warranty with the Navy's Fl10 engine
acquisition strategy and the F-14D program is evaluated on its
own merit.
The Navy F110-GE-400 contract warranty has several unique
characteristics. First, although negotiated in the post-
mandated era, there is no specific design and manufacturing
clause and second, the performance specifications listed in
the warranty are not referred to as EPRs. The warranty
specifies the operating life limits in terms of Total
Accumulated Cycles (TAC). TAC= LCFC + FTC/4 + CIC/40. FTC and
LCFC are the same as previously defined above in the F404
discussion. Cruise Intermediate Cruise (CIC) is the equivalent
of a cycle from cruise to intermediate and back to cruise
power settings as measured by the Engine Monitoring System
(EMS). The warranty does provide for the following:
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1. Freedom from defects in material and workmanship,
conformance to the drawings in the current parts list,
and any condition rendering an engine unusable or
unserviceable or causing it to operate in other than
within maintenance limits, for a period of two years or250 engine flight hours or 290 engine operating hours,
whichever comes first.
2. Thrust, SFC, afterburner light-off, acceleration anddeceleration, and altitude starting engine stabilization
as specified in the engine specification for a period of250 flight hours or 290 engine operating hours or twoyears from acceptance, whichever comes first.
3. Hot section parts operating without failure equiring
repair or replacement for a period of five y s or 3000
TAC.
4. Cold section parts operating without requiring repair forfive years or 3000 TAC; without experiencing failure or
requiring replacement for eight years or 6000 TAC.
5. Operation surge free for five years or 3000 TAC after
acceptance which ever comes first.
The remedies provide for breaches of warranty items listed
in paragraph 1. above were limited to just providing the
replacement parts required to eliminate the cause of the
breach. For the several performance specifications listed in
paragraph 2. above, the remedies provide full engineering and
hardware necessary to complete the redesign, development and
qualification testing, parts and labor as well technical data
revision for repeated breaches which have a significant
adverse impact on the operability or readiness and are caused
by design deficiency.
The hot section warranty remedies include replacement
parts to eliminate the breach, engineering and redesign
hardware, as well as development and qualification testing
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support for parts having a B10 life without repair of less
than 3000 TAC. In addition, parts and labor and technical data
are included for any B10 life of 1500 TAC or less.
The cold section warranty remedies are similar in all
respects to the hot section except it uses the BO.1 life
determination and the extended life limits associated with the
cold section specifications. The remedies for the surge
warranty are the same as those governing the other paragraph
2. performance specifications. It specifies that all
development and qualification testing for any redesign will be
funded or conducted by the government and that the government
will provide the necessary engines.
The remaining paragraphs include the standard exceptions
and conditions found in most engine warranties but the
limitations of liability are very explicit. The warranty
states that the contractor's liability for any remedy shall be
no greater than the sum of the value calculated from the
following equationw where L is the limit of liability and N is
the number of engines procured under the terms of the
contract:
1. For the aggregate of paragraph 1. remedies:
L = (N/720 x $61.1M)
2. For the aggregate of paragraph 2. remedies:
L = (N/720 x $48M)
3. For the aggregate of paragraph 3., 4., and 5. remedies:
L = (N/720 x $45M)
Even this early contractual attempt to extend the
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period of warranty into the post-acceptance period was met
with a very calculated limit of financial liability negotiated
in behalf of the contractor. This is once again indicative of
an insurance warranty.
F. GEN AL LTURIC F414-63-400
With the historical background of engine warranties
provided thus far, the analysis now focuses on the warranty
approaches being considered for use with the General Electric
F414-GE-400 engine now in development for use in the new
McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 E/F. This analysis was based on data
and material obtained during phone and personal on-site
interviews conducted with program management representatives
from both the Navy and General Electric Aircraft Engines
(GEAE).
The F414 development effort through Engineering and
Manufacturing Development (E&MD) is estimated to cost over
$700 million. What began in 1987 with the first series of
optimization studies was a program "structured to minimize
development risko. The Program Objectives and Milestones
(POA&M) chart is included as Figure 1. There is an obvious
positive attitude towards the program throughout the Navy F414
staff. With aircraft production not scheduled to begin in
2001, the program management from AIR-536 believe that there
is ample time and testing in the engine's development schedule
to ensure success. Mr. Dan Squire, of AIR-536, informed the
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F414 Engine Program Structured to
Minimize Development Risk
I dnd C81181001Y 12 13 14 15 W0 V W W
P =1 N.~ (137d1901)
F414 Pr-EiMO .
Me -WW Taft 'A3L!-
F414 W•_WD u.. A-
Fmi'rpg. . .--
Design ReiewA A AiA
FlIgWTed fgt sus
= I
Eadry F414 Development Effort De=0nste
Low Risk Design -2 Yeom Before FWt FIght
Figure 1. F414 Development Plan POA&M
researcher that there will be over 10,000 hours of testing
conducted under the development contract prior to the first
aircraft test flight, scheduled for late in calendar year
1995. When queried with regards to the essential performance
requirements criteria expected in the production contract, Mr.
Squire indicated that the Navy was expecting to pursue thrust
retention and specific fuel consumption within 2% of
specification for 2000 flight hours. He added that the Navy
had contracted with GEAE to develop and build an engine with
a 2000-hour hot section and a 4000-hour cold section. He
explained that the longer the period between required removal,
the cheaper the life cycle cost would be. When asked by the
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researcher if these specifications were realistic and
obtainable given the history of life limit reductions faced by
the F404 program, he indicated that he believed they were.
(Squire, 1994)
The rational for this optimism was the program's use of
Damage Tolerant Design (DTD) requirements. The Low Cycle
Fatigue (LCF) criteria previously used assumed the components
were all defect free. The new DTD criteria accounts for
allowable defects in its determination and, in essence, abeefs
upo the reliability of the engine. This, of course, comes at
some cost, as there is always a trade off with every design
decision. In this case it came in the form of added weight.
According to Mr. Kevin Field, the GE F414 Program Manager,
approximately 42 additional pounds were attributed to the DTD
requirement (Field, 1994). He added that even though GE had
not received any relief from the maximum weight specification
of the engine, they were able to make up the difference in
other areas.
The estimated per unit cost of the F414 is $2.3 million
based on the 250th unit. (Field, 1994). The proposed warranty
has provisions for the listing of selected EPRs as a separate
attachment to the basic warranty. The cost and efficiency of
the warranty will depend on which EPRs are finally chosen and
how they are applied. As has been the case in the warranties
reviewed, the operating life EPRs are expected to have the
most significant impact on the warranty cost and efficiency.
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The warranty approach being considered for the F414 is an
adaption of the life management approach discussed earlier. A
separate F414 Life Management Plan is intended to be a an
attachment to the warranty as well. This approach adopts a low
risk, easily obtainable warranted service life for the first
production Lot based on the proven engine performance to date
and the statistical significance of the data available through
the development phase (McLaughlin, 1994). The program then
requires the contractor to upgrade the warranted service life
coverage for the entire inventory of previously accepted
engines to the most recently negotiated service life
identified as an EPR in the warranty of each subsequent Lot.
This approach has some real merit in the way that it
minimizes the uncertainty associated with early predictions of
service life. The potential contractor liability is
significantly reduced and the government only asks the
contractor to sign up to incremental increases in service life
based on achieved service life. This changes the situation
from one of uncertainty to one of definable risk. Although
this is a step in the right direction, there might still be
cause for concern. The economic nature of the warranty is
still subject to change if the clauses are worded in such a
way as to create an insurance function.
The warranty approach proposed for the F414 also intends
to include the use of some incentive fee for criteria that are
yet to be determined. It includes provisions for secondary
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damage, analysis of defects and failures, redesign, and splits
the shipping costs; contractor in CONUS, government to CONUS.
The proposed warranty approach does take into account the
majority of "lessons learned" regarding aircraft engine
warranties. One notable exception was in the area of
determining EPRs early in the E&MD phase. In a recent
conversation with Mr. Kevin Field, the GEAE F414 Navy Program
Integrator, GE still did not have a definitized list of EPRs
from the Navy. This delay precludes any efforts the contractor
may undertake during development to reduce the risk associated
with the specified performance criteria. Additionally, he
indicated that there was no service life listed in the
production specification. If this is true, it could pose a
serious problem when determining EPRs.
As explained by Mr. Dave Pauling, AIR-5362 Branch Head,
the Navy has experienced problems in the past when performance
specifications, which were delineated in Section 3
(Requirements) of the development contract, are not included
the Section 3 of production contract specification. It had
been almost common practice for the contractor to build
production engines to a qualified parts list developed as a
result of qualification during development. The real problem
with working to a parts list surfaced when the Navy began
experiencing engine performance levels below the design
specification and pursued resolution via the warranty. They
thought they had contracted for an engine that met the design
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specification when, in fact, the parts list in the production
contract took precedence over the performance specification
given during development. This has resulted in an initiative
to ensure the design specification is listed in Section 3 of
the production contract as well. (Pauling, 1994) This is
critical to the success of the Navy's desire to effectively
contract for EPRs because, according to the NAVAIR Office of
Counsel, the Navy cannot legally apply an EPR specification
which is not called out in Section 3 of the production
contract (Townsend, 1994).
Although the F414 represents. one of the most comprehensive
warranty approaches ever to be developed, there is still a
potential for significant inefficiencies based on the late
determination of EPRs, duration of operational life coverage,
required specifications not in the production contract, and
limitations of liability established at the final stage of the
contract negotiation. The need to have a warranty fully
integrated with the acquisition strategy is clear.
G. COMCLUSIONS
The preceding aircraft engine warranty analyses focussed
on the economic characteristics of warranties and the specific
clauses or approaches used in the engine production contracts.
As a consequence the following conclusions can be stated.
* All the warranties reviewed, with the exception of the
FI10, complied with the three basic elements of the
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required warranties; defects in materials and workmanship,
conformance to design and manufacturing requirements, and
conformance to EPRs.
"* The compatibility of the warranties with the acquisition
strategy and logistics support plan for the aircraft and
engines varied.
"* The lack of adequate warranty cost information has
resulted in the program abandoning the use of engine
warranty life cycle cost analysis models.
"* There were more significant incompatibilities discovered
in the warranties written shortly after their use became
mandated.
"* The greatest amount of uncertainty and risk in the
warranties is in regards to EPRs.
"* The greatest amount of uncertainty and risk associated
with EPRs is in the use operating life limits.
"* Contractors will always attempt to protect themselves
contractually against EPRs which have a high degree of
uncertainty and expose the contractor to risk.
"* The use of the life management approach will reduce the
uncertainty associated with the use of operating life
EPRs.
The Navy's use of warranty to achieve the desired higher
quality systems at lower life cycle cost can certainly be
argued against given the historical problem associated with
operating life EPRs in particular. It is a simple case of *you
get what you paid for'. It is truly unfortunate that the Navy
does not know what it paid for. Because of this fact, a post-
award life cycle cost analysis using the current models
designed for that purpose was impossible. The lack of actual
warranty cost data did not undermine the above analysis,
however. There were sufficient, significant indicators found
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in the language and terms of the actual engine contracts
reviewed to support the findings.
The cost-effectiveness problems associated with aircraft
engines can only be partially attributed to the nature of
uncertainty and the government's desire to insure against it.
These problems are be exacerbated by many other factors
including the belief of some of the managers in the engine
program *that an engine that lasts longer, costs less*. On
that note, Chapter VI presents a set of guidelines to assist
engine Program Managers in the development of warranties
integrated into an engine acquisition strategy.
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VI. INXINM WARRANTY INTEORATION GUIDZLIWNS
This chapter builds on the findings of the previous
chapters to establish a set of guidelines that can be used by
the aircraft engine systems Program Managers to develop future
warranties. It attempts to synthesize the information derived
from economic analysis of the current warranty requirements
mandated by law, regulations and current policies, the
effectiveness of actual aircraft engine warranties used in the
past, and the current program management strengths and
weaknesses. The goal of the guidelines is to assist the
program managers in evaluating the effectiveness of various
warranty approaches being considered and the successful
integration of warranties into an aircraft engine's
acquisition strategy.
A. BACKGROUND
Although, the concept of integrating warranties into a
weapon system's acquisition strategy is not new, it is
particularly difficult to accomplish successfully. According
to the DSMC Acquisition Strategy Guide (ASG), warranties were
addressed as one of the *Strategic Issues and Alternatives"
because of 'recent emphasis by Congress' (Nelson, 1984). The
ASG encourages Program Managers to consider warranties as an
applicable element in developing both the design strategy and
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business strategy for their weapon systems. The ASG failed,
however, to tie the importance of warranties back to the
strategic element entitled "program objectives, constraints,
and priorities". It is in this element, which is comprised of
sub-elements for technical performance, operational
capability, production cost and life cycle cost, where
warranties have the most effect.
Although the ASG does not include any of the Section 2403
requirements, as it was published prior to the federal mandate
of weapon system, it is still being used at in the Program
Management Course (PMC) at DSMC. Additionally, it does not
cover any of the Navy warranty policy guidance. In practice,
even when following the early guidance provided by the ASG and
the current guidance presented in the FAR and DFARS, the
warranty procurement cost and system life cycle cost
associated with the warranty clauses required by Section 2403
can vary depending upon approach. Therefore the potential
benefits that would result from a standardized set of
guidelines on the efficient use of resources are significant.
B. WARRANTY AND SYSM L7ZE CYCLE
The first question that should be asked by the PM is "when
is the best time to address warranties in the weapon system
life cycle?8. The answer to this, of course is, *Up front, and
early!'. The importance of considering warranties as an
integral part of the engine acquisition strategy from the
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onset cannot be understated. The original DSMC 'Warranty
Handbook" (Balaban, 1986), and the new *Warranty Guidebooks
(Fout, 1992) both confirm this point. According to the
"Warranty Guidebook" the Program Manager is responsible for
planing, coordinating and integrating the warranty *as early
as humanly possible.* It goes on to state 'The warranty must
be consistent and compatible with the operational and
logistical concepts". In general, the guidance in the current
DSMC "Warranty Guidebooks provides an excellent foundation for
the successful integration of the Navy's aircraft engine
warranties into the acquisition strategy.
The engine Program Manager needs to include warranty
considerations during the Concept Exploration and Definition
Phase studies conducted on the engine system performance,
reliability and life cycle cost estimates. The PM must also
understand that any decisions made on the engine configuration
and design can affect both the warranty approach and the
future ILS of the system. This consideration of warranties
early in the engine system life cycle is seen as the first
step towards the successful integration the aircraft engine
warranty into an acquisition strategy.
The next important step in the successful integration of
the warranty is the development of the initial warranty
provisions and identification of the EPRs expected to be
applied in the engine production contract. This should be
accomplished during the Demonstration and Validation (DEMVAL)
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phase and completed prior to the Milestone II review. The EPRs
selected must be consistent with the technical specifications
and operational characteristics delineated in the Operation
Requirements Document (ORD) and support the Mission Need
Statement (MNS) of the aircraft.
Although a formal a review of the engine warranty program
is not required as part of any of the formal DAB Milestone
reviews, if applicable, the sooner the contractor is aware of
the specifications and terms expected to be used in the engine
production warranty, the sooner they can begin to work towards
reducing its risk of not achieving the specifications desired.
Another reason why it is so critical to identify EPRs during
DEMVAL is so that any test requirements required to implement
the warranty can be included in the Test and Evaluation Master
Plan (TEMP). The TEMP, which is also developed during DEMVAL,
is reviewed as part of the Milestone II review process and as
such is formalized prior to proceeding into the Engineering
and Manufacturing Development (E&MD) Phase.
During E&MD is 8where the rubber meets the roada. This is
where the preliminary data is collected and analyzed. During
this phase the warranty feasibility assessment should be
completed and the final provisions refined for inclusion in
the production contract request for proposal (RFP). This is




Another important facet for the PM to consider in
developing a warranty is the engine system's development and
procurement history. Ignoring or omitting certain historical
aspects from consideration can significantly affect the cost
and efficiency of the warranty and are therefore seen as a key
element in the integration of a warranty into a successful
acquisition strategy. The historical considerations made can
encompass many aspects, such as the development contract start
date, the use of alternate source contractors, changes in the
warranty terms, conditions and specifications, the
technological advancements and the contractor's past
performance and reputation. These particular aspects will be
addressed below because of their significance and potential
impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the warranty
under development.
1. Historical Factors, Influence On Warranty Cost
One of the first historical aspects that should be
considered by the PM is when the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development contract was written. If it was written prior to
1 January 1985, when the federal mandate to include warranties
on all major weapon system production contracts went into
effect, it can have a profound effect on the contractor's
exposure to risk. The significance of this can be seen in the
"Historical Factors' in Warranty Cost" chart presented as
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Table I. Adapted by the researcher from a matrix developed by
Mr. Balaban to assess the validity of the Navy's Ono-costm
assumption (Balaban, 1985), the chart is based on three
important factors related to a weapon system's procurement
history. The three factors used are:
1. When the development contract was written.
2. Whether the production contractor is the same as the
development contractor.
3. The terms and specifications used in the production
contract warranty as compared to those used in the
development contract statement of work (SOW).
Table 1. HISTORICAL FACTORS' INFLUENCE ON WARRANTY COST
Warranty Cost
Post-1985 EMD Start Pre-1985 EMD Start
PK = DK PK not DK PK =DK PK not DK
W<=DSOW Low Medium Medium Medium
to High
W>=DSOW Medium High High High to
to High _Very High
LZGEBD
EMD Engineering and Manufacturing Development
PK Production Contractor
DK Development Contractor
W Warranty Terms and Conditions
DSOW Development Contract Statement of Work
According to Mr. Balaban, the entries used in his matrix were
subjectively determined but represented a reasonable
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assessment of the acquisition environment.
The first historical factor focusses on whether the
development contractor was aware the engine would be subject
to the federally mandated production contract warranties. If
the development contract was written after January 1, 1985,
then the contractor knew the engine was subject to the Section
2403 warranty requirement 1 If the development contractor was
considered likely to get t z production contract as well, then
there would be an incentive for them to design the equipment
so that the exposure to warranty risks were minimal.
Additionally, if the specifications and EPRs are established
prior to entering E&MD, whatever work was required to meet the
future warranty challenge could be priced into the development
contract.
The second factor takes into consideration that the
contractor who develops a weapon system is not always the one
and only contractor to get a production contract. With the
emphasis on competition in DoD acquisition, many systems today
are produced by alternate source contractors. Aircraft engines
are no exception. The DFARS only allows the exemption of
alternate source contractors from essential performance
requirements until after the first ten percent of the
anticipated total production quantity has been produced.
In essence, a situation is created where one
contractor is actually being required to guarantee the engines
they produce meet the performance and design specifications
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developed by another. If the alternate source contractor is
required to meet the same warranty requirements, including
redesign as a remedy if required, then they are exposed to
greater risks than the risks to the contractor who was both
the developer and producer. Since risks equate to costs, it
can be expected that the warranty cost for a alternate source
contractor will be higher.
The last factor considered are the terms, conditions
and specifications of the warranty. If the production contract
warranty terms and conditions are new to the contractor or the
specifications used are more stringent than those found in the
development contract's SOW specifications, then the
contractor's exposure to risk is greater. This applies to
specifications used in conjunction with all the required
warranty clauses: conformance to the design and manufacturing
requirements, freedom from defects in materials and
workmanship, and essential performance requirements (EPRs) as
well.
From Table I then, if the engine development contract
was written after 1985, the production and development
contractor are the same, and the warranty terms and conditions
are the same or less stringent or than the specification in
the development contract SOW, then the contractor's exposure
to additional risk as a result of the warranty is considered
to be low. Therefore, the expected cost of the warranty would
be low as well. Low in this case is considered to be less than
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or equal to two percent of the purchase price for each year
the warranty is effective. Conversely, if the engine
development contract was written prior to 1985, the production
contractor is not the developer, and the production contract
warranty contains terms and conditions that are new or more
stringent than those used in the development contract SOW
specification, then the contractor's exposure to additional
risk as a result of the warranty is considered to be high. The
expected cost of a warranty under these conditions will range
from high to very high or greater than six percent of the
purchase price per year.
As seen in the preceding chapter, the majority of
engine systems procured in the years that followed the
enactment of the law had development contracts that were
signed prior the adoption of Section 2403 requirements.
Because the new warranty requirements increased the
contractor's exposure to risk for these systems, the true
contractor's warranty cost would be expected to be moderate.
This would result in an additional cost to cover the warranty
of approximately four percent of the purchase price per year
at best even if the terms of the warranty were consistent with
those established in the development contract SOW and the
weapon system producer was the developer as well. If the
conditions were different then the true contractor's warranty
cost would be even higher still.
The importance of understanding the risk implications
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surrounding an engine's historical development and procurement
when establishing the terms and conditions of the warranty is
cannot be understated. Table I can be used by engine program
managers early in the weapon system acquisition cycle to
subjectively estimate what the true contractor's warranty
costs should be based on several factors taken from the
engine's development and procurement history.
2. Technological Advaanaents
The history of technological advancements and the
level of technological advancement required to attain the
lofty design goals established in a typical aircraft engine
development contract need to be considered in as important
aspects in the development of an effective warranty program.
In the history of modern engine development, the application
of advanced technologies have been continuously focused on the
ever elusive goal of attaining more operating life out of an
engine's hot section. If a dramatic shifts in the level of
technological sophistication is required to attain these
specifications the potential for uncertainty increases
significantly. Historically, one can track the increase in
operating life specification goals, the application of
advanced technology, and the corresponding efforts of the
contractors to protect themselves from increased exposure to
risk right up to the Navy's latest engine development effort,
the F414.
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The current design specification for the F414's hot
section operating life is 2000 hours. The cold section
operating life specification is 4,000 hours. Using the average
engine utilization rate of 30 hours per month, these
specifications represent engine operating periods of
approximately five and ten years, respectively, without
scheduled removal. F414 program management representatives
from both the Navy and GE are surprisingly optimistic that the
newly adopted damage-tolerant design criteria discussed in the
preceding chapter will assure the success of attaining these
goals. These operating life figures represent a quantum leap
from the currently achieved Fleet averages. In fact, the Navy
has been hard pressed to achieve a 1000-hour hot section
operating life promised in the newer tactical aircraft engines
during their development. Thus, it is imperative that the PM
consider the historical rate of technological advancement and
the level required to attain the engine's design specification
from a historical perspective when considering the appropriate
warranty approach for a new program.
3. Contractor Performance and Reputation
The last historical consideration discussed in this
section is the contractor's past performance and its
reputation. It is important for the engine PM to accurately
assess the contractor's past performance and consider its
reputation from previous warranty negotiations, compliance and
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overall corporate warranty philosophy as an integral part of
the warranty development. It was evident in the vast majority
of conversations between the researcher and both Navy and
contractor representatives that the past performance and
reputation of a company, with regards to honoring warranty
claims and cooperating in a collaborative effort to resolve
problems as they surface, is well known. As such, it should be
considered a critical element in determining the potential for
the success of a particular warranty approach.
This can be illustrated by the obvious differences in
corporate philosophy found in the limitation of liability
clauses written in the General Electric and Rolls-Royce engine
contract warranties reviewed in the preceding chapter. The GE
warranty philosophy establishes absolute limits of liability
for the future performance of its engines. In contrast, it is
evident from the wording found in the Rolls-Royce liability
limitations that the corporation is willing to take a shared
responsibility for the ultimate performance of its engine
products.
Many of the Navy personnel interviewed as a part of
this study attested to the craftiness and precision with which
GE approaches warranty negotiations and its reluctance to
"*bite the bulleto over warranty issues. In several interviews
between the researcher and now retired Navy Admiral Don Eaton,
he spoke of the oarrogancee of General Electric and its gaming
practices he observed as both the Commanding Officer of NAVPRO
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Lynn Massachusetts and AIR-04. (Eaton, 1994)
In contrast, it is interesting to note that the
General Electric's internal perspective of its corporation's
sincerity in accepting responsibility for its engine's
performance is quite the opposite. In a phone conversation
between the researcher and Mr. Karl Matson, General Electric's
FII0 Program Manager, he made a point of elaborating on the
company's willingness to work with the government on warranty
issues. He went on to explain how GE had spent between three
to four times the amount of money internally allocated within
GE from the purchase price of the engine for the resolution of
warranty issues with the Fl10. When asked to compare the Navy
with the Air Force with regards to warranty issues, he did
elaborate, however, on the extensive policy debates that had
occurred between the Navy and GE as part of discussions on the
topic and contract warranty negotiations and its differences
in treating warranty costs. Despite the many disputes over the
operating life reductions and various other performance
problems associated with the F404 program, Mr. Matson's
perspective was shared with the GE representatives from that
program as well.
What you see and what you get is not necessarily the
same. So it is very important for the PM and the Contracting
Officer to consider the contractor's past performance and
reputation in determining the appropriate warranty approach.
As stated earlier, there are many aspects that can be
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significant to the development of the right warranty approach.
This section elaborated on only a few that can affect the
integration of the aircraft engine warranty into an
acquisition strategy.
D. STATISTICAL SIGNXFXCANCU OF 3NGINE PZRFORNMANC DATA
The data collected during the engine's Developmental
Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) Phase must be
accurately analyzed and its relative statistical significance
assessed properly when establishing warranty performance
specifications. This is true for both operational
characteristics (OCs) and reliability, maintainability, and
availability characteristics (RMACs) specifications. It is the
use of sound statistical analysis methodology when developing
the control limits for operating life EPRs specifications, as
described in the life management approach, that can
significantly reduce the degree of uncertainty .
Several other methods have been used in warranty
development and negotiation in the past to deal with the high
degree of uncertainty and the costs associated with operating
life EPRs. Included for the PM's consideration, they are:
1. Do not include operating life EPRs in the warranty.
2. Negotiate financial limitations or caps on the amount the
contractor is liable to pay.
3. Use restrictive contractual language to limit the scope
of remedies available to the government.
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4. Reduce the operating life specification based on the
results of the statistical analysis performed on the
engine operating life data collected during DOT&E.
All of these have methods been successful in reducing the
uncertainty and the contractor's liability to meet the
operating life requirements established as EPRs. The early
F404 contracts employed method 1. and had no explicit
operating life EPR warranties. Although this goes against the
current Navy approach, it is possibly the most effective
economically. The problems with methods 2. and 3. is that they
are inefficient and the government representatives feel
"cheated" when the operational life specifications that were
established in the development specification are not met.
As a classic case in point, in a recent presentation he
gave at the Naval Postgraduate School Captain Don Berkebile,
USN, the Comptroller from COMNAVAIRPAC, told the *horror
story" of the F404 and its impact on the Fleet Flying-hour
Program (FFP). The FFP is responsible for funding both fuel
and repair parts for aircraft operations. According to Captain
Berkebile, the reductions made to the operating life or "life
limits" of various components within the F404 before they are
scheduled or "forced" to be removed for maintenance are being
blamed for a budget variance due to un-programmed maintenance
costs of over $58 million in FY94. The F404 life limit
reductions, the Captain was referring to, were issued by
NAVAIR in response to analyses conducted on engine failures
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experienced in the Fleet. The result was a significant
increase in the engine's depot level maintenance requirements
and costs. The Captain's anger and frustration over the
situation was obvious. He stated emphatically that "we should
take GE to court for breach of contract and force them to give
us the engine contracted for."
After comparing the life limit figures used in his
presentation with the specifications found in the production
contract warranties, the researcher determined that these
reductions had resulted in operating life limits that were
very close to the warranted operating life that was set at 75%
of design. When the Weibull distribution functions are applied
and the restricted remedies available to the government are
considered, it becomes evident that the Navy does not have
much of case and less to gain by taking GE to court.
The redesign remedies in the Lot XI contract are limited
to engineering and hardware support only. Parts and labor are
included only if the actual performance drops below half the
warranted life. Effectively, this makes the redesign threshold
for operating life at 37.5% of design. Additionally, a
financial limit of $8.5 million for all operating life
remedies is included.
That GE is concerned about the potential liability of
meeting operating life specifications established in the
warranty is evidenced by the fact that there are no
engineering redesign provisions in the Lot XII contract
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warranty at all. In fact, the warranty for Lot XII
specifically requires that any design and development work
necessary for qualification of a modification to eliminate the
cause shall be funded or conducted by the Goverrnment. The
point is that the government can not afford to pay the
requisite insurance premium necessary to fully cover the
contractor's risk of meeting highly uncertain specifications
like operating life. Accordingly, GE and the Navy employed
methods 2. and 3. listed above to limit the contractor's risk
and liability to within the program's cost constraints.
The last method, number 4 cited as above, refers to the
life management approach introduced and discussed in earlier
chapters. This approach is being planned for inclusion in the
warranty plan for the F414. In discussions with Mr. Patrick
McLaughlin, a NAVAIR Contracting Officer formerly assigned to
the F414 program, this approach appears to solve the majority
of the uncertainty problems associated with the establishing
realistic operational life specifications for use in the
warranty contracts early in the production phase. The problem
with this approach is that it does not offer the logisticians
a firm target for planning the requisite logistic support. The
life management approach is seen by many as an evolutionary
step in weapon system program management and a key to the
successful integration of engine warranty development with an
acquisition strategy. The real costs and benefits are yet to
be determined.
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Z. UMMZRTAINTY, RISK AND ZPR 8mULCTIOU
According to the ASG, the integration of warranty
development into the acquisition strategy is an aspect of cost
and risk sharing (Nelson 1984). The uncertainty, risk, cost
and effectiveness of an aircraft engine warranty can vary
dramatically depending on what specifications are chosen to
include and how the warranty is worded. This is particularly
true with regards to the EPRs.
On the one extreme, the Navy's "no-cost" warranty policy
may, in fact, be applicable if the proper EPRs are selected
and matched with the terms and conditions of the warranty and
the history of the engine development and procurement is
appropriate. On the other hand, for a warranty which uses
technically advanced EPRs and includes terms and conditions
having a high degree of uncertainty which could expose the
contractor to an inequitable share of risk, the cost could
reasonably run as high as 10 percent of total hardware cost
for each year the warranty is effective. The use of advanced
technology in engine system development programs like the F414
"uimplies the presence of large amounts of uncertainty and
information asymmetryn (Kuenne, 1987).
It must be understood that "there is no free lunch*. If a
engine system contractor is asked to assume a greater portion
of the risk, or sign up to an EPR or warranty clause that
contains a high degree of uncertainty, they will respond with
a higher warranty price, contract cost or seek specific
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financial limits of liability to protect the interest of the
company.
In order for a contractor to price a warranty, they must
assess the level of uncertainty and risk of the specific terms
and conditions in the contract. The contractor's estimate of
cost is undoubtedly the best way to determine the level of
uncertainty and risk associated with any particular EPR. The
fact that the Navy does not separately negotiate its
warranties often makes dete.mining their cost particularly
difficult. Given the lack of information, the next best way to
determine the expected cost is from observing and analyzing
the limits of liabilities established to protect the
contractor from level of risk and uncertainty.
Risks can be calculated mathematically based on the
probability distributions that are derived from historical
data and can be insured against and often result in a
specified dollar limit of liability. Uncertainty, on the other
hand, can only be subjectively estimated. Depending on the
contractor's sense of the degree of control in attaining
certain performance criteria," the contractor will seek to
limit liability of uncertainty through the imposition of
technical limitations and restrictive contractual language.
It appears as if there is a high degree of correlation
between risk and Operational Characteristics (OCs) as well as
uncertainty and Reliability, Maintainability, Availability
Characteristics (RMACs). This was evidenced in the way the
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engine contractors negotiated financial limitations, if any,
on warranties covering OCs, like specific fuel consumption or
thrust deterioration. Conversely, RMACs like operating life
found in the F404 and FIl0 warranties that included redesign
as a remedy have resulted in the contractor's negotiation of
a warranty having a complex technical determination of
warranty breach and limits to responsibility for aspects of
the redesign via restrictive contractual language, as well as
specific financial limitations. So, in the absence of
separately negotiated contractor warranty cost, NAVAIR engine
Program Managers can use the contractor's desire to negotiate
limits of liability as an indicator of the level uncertainty
and risk associated with those selected EPRs and seek to avoid
entering into any warranty that attempts to perform insurance
functions.
The impact of a warranty's effectiveness and true cost on
the total life cycle cost of a complex dynamic weapon system
like an aircraft engine is substantial. Understanding the
uncertainty and risk is associated with each warranty clause
is extremely important when determining warranty cost-
effectiveness.
F. AMRCRAFT INGII WARRANT COST ANALYSIS
According to recent discussions with engine Program
Managers and Contracting Officers it has become comnon
practice not to perform engine system warranty cost analysis.
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This has been attributed to the Navy Ono-costN warranty policy
and the inability of the current models used by AIR-524 to
account for the complexities of the warranties used. As a
result, the cost-effectiveness analysis of engine warranties
is often foregone (McLaughlin, 1994). Following the guidelines
below might prove to be a more effective way to approach this
situation.
NAVAIR engine Program Managers should continue to conduct
an analysis with the best information available. While it is
understood that the assumption of a free warranty precludes
the performance of an intelligent warranty cost-benefit
analysis, this does not mean that an analysis to determine the
warranties effectiveness cannot or should not be conducted.
1. Look at the Big Picture
A common sense review of the program's history and
future acquisition plan can be an effective means of
precluding costly and inefficient warranty approaches and
clauses. For example, if the program is still in development,
like the F414, consideration of the Life Management approach
will greatly reduce the level of uncertainty associated with
operational life EPRs. In contrast, with the a very limited
purchase, like the F402-RR-408, requesting coverage of
operating life EPRs well beyond the period of production adds
considerable additional cost to the warranty. This will
require Rolls-Royce to keep accountants and administrators to
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manage the business aspects of the warranty on the payroll and
might require retaining engineers and artisans in case any
warranty work is required as well.
2. Ree It Biple
Pursue the use of the simplest life cycle cost
analysis model available. Adapting the AIR-524 WARPC model to
the basic warranty provisions in the new generic aircraft
engine warranty and ensuring an estimate or the actual total
contractor's warranty cost is used should provide more than
adequate results. Although the current models available in
AIR-524 cannot account for all the complexities included in
the aircraft engine warranties used today, the manhours and
cost involved in developing such a model and performing that
sort of detailed analysis is prohibitive (AIR-5240 1988). AIR-
524 is aware that the engine Program Managers would like to
have engine warranty life cycle cost analysis models developed
that include separate operating life specifications for hot
and cold section components. Unfortunately, developing one
that will do that is not a high priority in (Hu, 1994).
The key to a better life cycle cost analysis is not in the
details, it is in the assumptions. Assumptions like the Navy's
"no-costO warranty need to be replaced with estimates or the
contractor's actual total warranty cost. Likewise, the use of
deterministic estimates of outcomes for potential benefits
should be replaced with probabilistic ones wherever possible.
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Remember, the more technical and difficult the analysis the
more it costs. Keeping it simple keeps it cheap.
3. Discontirne NAVA=R Waxranty Cost Fractice
Using the contractor's warranty administration cost as
an estimate for the contractor's total warranty cost in the
models is grossly misleading and should not be continued.
While it is understood that this is done because of the
current mno-cost* warranty policy and the fact that the
administrative cost is available because it is submitted as a
separate line item for contract negotiations, this is by no
means reflective of the total cost or liability associated
with the comprehensive aircraft engine warranties being
negotiated.
4. Got the Best Cost Data Available
Require the contractor to provide estimated warranty
cost figures as part of the development contract, issue the
production Request For Proposal (RFP) with a warranty option
or use Oshould-cost" estimates. Should cost estimates can be
derived based on the complexity and risk associated with the
warranty approach and the unit cost of the engine.
S. Include Warranty Life Cycle Cost Analysis Costs
Remember that performing a life cycle cost analysis
cost money. Accordingly, be sure to consider the performance
of warranty cost-analysis as another administrative cost
element of the Navy's warranty program when assessing the
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warranty's costs and benefits. This will incentivize the use
of simpler, less time consuming analysis techniques.
6. Do not Wuy Znsurance
Consider the economic inefficiency aspects of the
government buying insurance from a contractor, especially when
the contractor has little or no control over the system
achieving the required level of performance for the period of
the warranty. Avoid the use of any warranty clause that
attempts to insure the government against uncertainty as it is
not cost effective.
G. CONCLU8ZOC
Developing an effective efficient engine warranty is a
real art. How well the Program Manager and Contracting Officer
execute this responsibility depends on their understanding of
the importance of integrating the use of warranties as a
control tool throughout the engine system life cycle. They
must be aware of the many historical factors to consider and
employ sound statistical analysis practices, particularly in
establishing operating life performance specifications based
on data collected during the engine test and evaluation phase.
Finally, and probably most importantly, they must be aware of
the inefficiencies associated with the government insuring
itself against uncertainties and risks, and importance of
establishing essential performance requirements which support
the operational requirements of the engine and the mission
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needs of the aircraft it is intended to power.
The bottom line is, the more successful the Program
Management Team is at integrating warranties that motivate the
contractor to design, build and deliver an engine that
performs as expected and, perhaps, enhance the quality of the
engine produced in all measurable parameters, the more
effective the engine acquisition strategy will be.
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VIz. SU1AaRY, CONCLUSIONS AM lDRoCngTZOU
The primary objective of this thesis was to determine if
there was a better way to develop aircraft engine warranties
that would meet the federally mandated weapon system warranty
requirements. The focus of the analysis was to look at the
potential advantages of integrating the development of the
production contract warranty into an aircraft engine
acquisition strategy. The goal was to develop a common sense
approach that would maximize the effectiveness of the warranty
and minimize engine life cycle costs within the constraints of
the current political environment, warranty policy guidance
and program management requirements.
A. SUNKARY
Chapter II presented a chronological review of the issues
and events that have shaped the use of warranties in DoD
weapon system procurement. The discussion covered the politics
and congressional action surrounding all DoD weapon system
warranties in general, as well as the pertinent policy
guidance and program management requirements affecting the
development of Navy aircraft engine warranties in particular.
The chapter also introduced the role of warranties in an
acquisition strategy and program management and concluded with
a review of the Navy's aircraft engine program management.
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Chapter III reviewed the economic principles of warranties
and warranty costs. The concept of the "no-costm warranty was
introduced and the chapter closed with a discussion of the
impact of warranties on life cycle costs and the Component
Improvement Program (CIP). Chapter IV was the first of three
chapters dedicated to the analysis of weapon system
warranties. It presented the results of an economic analysis
of mandated warranty requirements found in Section 2403, the
FAR and DFARS, and an analysis of the current warranty policy
guidance as well. The chapter finished with an assessment of
the warranty program management at all levels within the DoD
and highlighted particular strengths and weaknesses.
Chapter V reported the findings of the individual analyses
conducted on the warranties for several major engine programs.
It tied the theory and economic principles of warranties
discussed in the Chapter III to the wording used in the actual
warranties. Each individual analysis looked at the
compatibility of the warranty with the engine acquisition
strategy, and in some cases, the aircraft acquisition strategy
as well. Chapter VI provided a set of guidelines that were
developed by the researcher to assist aircraft engine Program
Managers in the future development and integration of




The conclusions derived as a result of the research and
analysis are grouped into a similar order as the material was
presented in the thesis. This section also includes a review
of conclusions drawn from answering the primary and subsidiary
research questions asked at the beginning of the research
effort.
1. Economic Realities of Weapon System Wazranties
Despite the belief of some, warranties of any nature
have a cost associated with them. This may be either
explicitly or implicitly expressed in the contract, but indeed
"there is no free lunch!" furthermore, the price paid for
weapon system warranty may be to high from a life cycle cost
perspective. Warranties can dramatically affect the life cycle
cost of a weapon system. To be able analyze the life cycle
cost impact of a warranty it is necessary to price and
negotiate the cost of the production contract warranty
separately.
The economic efficiency of a v.eapon system warranty
depends not only on the cost but on the nature or type of the
warranty, the limitations of contractor liability, and the
nature of the remedies as well. The nature of the warranty
depends on the degree of uncertainty associated with the
specification, the level of contractor control, and the
duration of contractor's exposure to risk. The limitations of
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contractor liability can be imposed by qualifying the terms of
the breach or in actual financial limits set on any clause.
The nature of the remedies available affects efficiency of the
warranty as well. This was made apparent in the examples given
on redesign remedies and financial reimbursement as well given
in Chapter V.
The DoD's desire to execute warranties on
specifications having a high degree of uncertainty and to
extend the duration of weapon system warranties significantly
into the post-acceptance period causes the warranty to take on
insurance functions. The practice of the DoD purchasing
"insurance" in the form of a warranty from the weapon system
producer has been shown in studies like the IDA paper to be
inefficient because of the contractor's aversion to risk.
2. Congress and Politics
As the proportion of federal funds available for
allocation through discretionary spending programs continues
to shrink, Congress' desire to control this spending will only
serve to intensify the level of Congressional oversight and
involvement in DoD procurement. The OSD's continuing efforts
aimed at reducing the level of Congressional involvement have
wrongly focused its energies and strengths with regard to
weapon system warranties.
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3. The Law and Regulations
Nothing present in either the Law (10 U.S.C. 2403) or
the current FAR and DFARS warranty regulations would preclude
the development, negotiation or administration of an efficient
effective weapon system warranty. However, the latitude and
flexibility given to the Program Manager and particularly the
Contracting Officer does not prevent them from developing or
negotiating an ineffective and/or inefficient warranty.
4. DoD Warranty Policy GUidance
The lack of warranty policy guidance from OSD is the
result of the Department's political focus. This lack of
guidance has significantly hindered the Program Managers
potential to develop and administer effective efficient weapon
system warranties throughout the DoD. Additionally, the lack
of guidance makes the training of DoD acquisition
professionals in warranties as an integral part of the weapon
system's acquisition strategy less significant and more
difficult.
On the Navy side of the house, the ambiguity in the
ASN's warranty policy guidance has resulted in a
misinterpretation of its intent by the Naval Air Systems
Conmand as evidenced in NAVAIR INSTRUCTION 13070.7. The poor
direction and guidance can attributed to a number of problems
experienced by the Program Managers throughout the Navy.
NAVAIR's interpretation of ASN's warranty policy has resulted
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in a NAVAIR warranty policy that makes it virtually impossible
for Program Managers and Contracting Officers to perform a
reasonable financial analysis of the weapon system warranties
being developed or used.
S. Wazranty ProgramMsmgemnt
A weapon system warranty program does not exist at the
OSD level. The responsibility for managing warranties was
delegated to the service secretaries. The OSD's lack of
interest in the subject, short of avoiding any further
Congressional direction or political embarrassment, is evident
in the fact that warranties are not included in the DoD
Acquisition Directive and are not included as a required
element under the DAB review process.
Within the DoN, ASN (RD&A) does not manage a weapon
system warranty program per se either. In essence, they have
tasked the CNO with managing the program and, in effect, do
nothing in the day-to-day management of warranties.
The CNO N4 and N8 Staffs have been actively involved
in the management of the weapon system warranty program and
has included a warranty review as part of the LRG audit for
major programs. The effectiveness of their role will diminish
significantly if the responsibility for conducting the LRG
audit is delegated completely to the Systems Commands.
The NAVAIR Warranty Program lacks direction. AIR-516
has been vocal about its inability to exert control over the
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factions within NAVAIR that are actively involved in warranty
development, negotiation and administration. Their discomfort
in the role of Warranty Program Manager is certainly
understandable. To quote one Navy officer involved in the
program, *Managing a program like warranties out of AIR-516 is
like trying to herd cats".
The warranty cost analyses that are being conducted
are ineffective and misleading due to the practice of using
the contractor's warranty administration cost in the models as
the real costs of the warranties.
Finally, the shifting of the AIR-04 point of contact
for warranty management to NAMO at this time significantly
weakens the program.
6. Aircraft Ingune Warr•eties
The NAVAIR Propulsion and Power Division (AIR-536)
continues to be on the cutting edge of weapon system warranty
development and has gained tremendous insights as a result of
efforts to date and the difficulties encountered.
There continues to be a misconception that operating
life warranties which can be categorized as insurance
warranties are effective. Fortunately, AIR-536's plan to
incorporate the life management approach into the warranty
plan for the F414 will reduce the insurance characteristics of
the operating life EPRs. Depending on the final wording of the
warranty clauses themselves, the life management approach
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should significantly reduce the uncertainty and risk typically
associated with the early establishment of operating life
limits for dynamic engine components and will improve the
overall effectiveness of the warranty. The effectiveness of
this initiative is certainly limited by not having established
warranty specifications prior to entering DEMVAL. With the
F414 representing the lead program employing this approach,
its true effectiveness is yet to be determined.
7. General Conclusions
Although a detailed quantitative review using the most
current warranty cost-benefit analysis models employed by the
Navy and other services was not possible, the research and
analysis were enlightening. There is definite potential to
improve "The Systems at both the OSD and ASN level and stay
within the Congressionally mandated requirements. However, the
bipolar attitude of personnel within the DoD towards the
federally mandated weapon system warranties inhibits the
effective use of warranties as a risk management tool to aid
in producing higher quality systems at minimal life cycle
cost.
8. Primary Research Question
Several of the conclusions presented thus far were
realized as a result of attempting to answer the primary
research question which was:
N How can the Navy integrate the reuired warrantt ylauxes,
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including essential verformance requiresients (3.s) into
the aircraft engine acquisition strategy to mazinise
effectiveness and reduce life cycle cost?
To summarize then in answer to this question, the
engine Program Manager must fully understand and start the
warranty development process early in the engine system life
cycle and take into consideration the economic efficiencies of
the different warranty types as they relate to the EPRs chosen
and the limitations imposed on them by the political and
military environment. Despite the environment and the Navy's
unique accounting of warranty costs, a substantial amount of
effort has gone into improving warranty development, and there
are alternative means available to evaluate the warranty and
ensure aircraft engine warranties are as effective and cost
efficient as possible. The main goal of this thesis was to
develop a guide to assist Program Managers in assessing the
strengths and weaknesses of their integration of warranties in
the acquisition strategy. That goal was achieved. The guide is
presented in Chapter VI.
9. Subsidiary Resoearh Questions
N How does the Navy estinmate waranty costs and benefits?
With regard to costs, the Navy uses the cost of
warranty administration as an estimate of the contractor's
warranty cost. This practice is terribly misleading and should
be discontinued. The use of "should-cost" estimates for use in
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evaluating warranties when a specific procurement costs are
unknown might be useful.
* A". weapon systm wveranties cost-effective?
It depends on how much the Government pays, what the
true benefits received from the warranty are, and the nature
or function of the warranty written. Economic theory supports
the notion that it is more efficient for the government to be
a self insurer. Therefore, buying a weapon system warranty
which is written in such a way that it perform an insurance
function is not cost-effective. According to economic theory,
however, assurance and incentive warranties can be constructed
for weapon systems in such a way as to be cost-effective.
W hat are the logistic and lf cycle cost Impacts
associated with the different waranty t7pes?
As mentioned above, the insurance warranties are the
only type which are known not to be cost-effective for the
DoD. However, each individual warranty must be evaluated on
its own merit. An unfortunate consequence of the problems
associated with the warranty cost analysis assumptions is that
many of the NAVAIR programs do not actually perform the
required cost-benefit analysis of their warranties.
In general, the expected reduction in life cycle cost
from a corresponding reduction in the requirement for efforts
like CIP has not materialized from the use of weapon system
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warranties. Warranties have been ineffective in reducing the
impact associated with the reduction of the F404 life limits
as well. As such, they generally represent an additive cost
to the program and do not reduce the life cycle cost. The
researcher was unable to determine if there was any true
reduction in the life cycle cost of any engine program that
resulted from the employment of any specific warranty type.
What is the impact of the cuzrent political initiatives an
warranty policy and pzoram a gemnt?
The current political initiatives have done little to
influence the DoD warranty policy and program management. The
vast majority of senior DoD acquisition professionals
interviewed as part of this study are still opposed to the
federally mandated weapon system warranties. At the OSD/ASN
level, it is primarily because they resent being told by
Congress how to do business.
The only reason many Program Managers include
warranties in their programs is because they are required to
do so by law. They concede that if the warranty is found to be
ineffective or too expensive then it is more justification to
do away with them.
The Navy's adoption of the Ono-cost" warranty policy
was an attempt to reduce the impact of the mandated
requirements and has resulted in precluding the performance of
any realistic life cycle cost analysis.
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C. 3NTAOS
1. Secretary of Detexse
The Office of the Secretary of Defense should take an
active role in determining the best means for developing,
negotiating and administering weapon system warranties.
The OSD should sponsor the development of a
standardized set of guidelines for all services similar to
those recommended by the Glenn Bill that includes guidelines
for warranty development.
A review of the weapon system warranty plan should be
included as a required element of the DAB review process and
be conducted concurrent with the TEMP review for Milestones I
and II.
The DoD 5000 series instructions should be updated to
reflect the mandatory use of weapon system warranties.
2. Secretary of the Navy
The Office of Secretary of Navy should encourage the
OSD to establish a standardized set of guidelines for
developing, negotiating and administering weapon system
warranties as well as determining if pursuing a waiver is
appropriate.
The current SECNAV "no-costm warranty policy should be
changed to reflect the need for the separate pricing and
negotiation of warranties in weapon system contracts.
SECNAV INSTRUCTION 4330.17 should be changed to
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reflect the change in warranty pricing policy.
SECNAV should require OPNAV N4 to remain as the
convening authority for the LRG audit and the review of
warranties as part of that process.
3. Chief of Naval Operati•o=
The Chief of Naval Operations should overturn the
current recommendation under review to delegate the
responsibility of convening the LRG audit to the Systems
Commands and retain N4 as the convening authority for the LRG
audit and continue review of warranty plan as part of the
audit process.
N4 should oppose the use insurance warranties in
weapon systems production contracts because of their known
economic inefficiencies.
N8 should support the use of the life management
program approach for improvements for all weapon systems
including aircraft engines.
N8 should determine the appropriate funding source for
life management improvements (APN or RDT&E).
4. Coemander, Naval Air SMstems Command
The Commander, Naval Air Systems Command should
support the retention of N4 as the convening authority for the
LRG audit and continue to review the weapon system warranty
plan as part of the audit process.
The life management program approach should be
IS0
supported for all weapon systems including aircraft engines.
The NAVAIR warranty program manager should be within
AIR-04. As the Assistant Commander for Logistics and Fleet
Support and the leading NAVAIR member on the LRG audit, AIR-04
has the positional authority and program management
responsibility to effectively manage the warranty program.
The current warranty life cycle cost analysis models
and assumptions used in the analysis procedures should be
reviewed to determine the most effective means of analysis.
The use of insurance warranties in system production
contracts should be discontinued because of their known
inefficiencies.
D. THESIS STUDY RZCQUHDITZons
The researcher recommends that the following specific
areas for further research be conducted by students at the
Naval Postgraduate School.
"* Determine the most effective way to develop, negotiate,
and administer weapon system warranties that enhance
quality and reduce system life cycle costs in an effort to
assist OSD in the development of standardized guidelines
for all services.
"* Perform an analysis on the various warranty life cycle
cost models and techniques used throughout the DoD to
determine the most effective and efficient means of
performing such analyses.
"* Perform an analysis on the life management approach and
compare with Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) for
similarity and compatibility.
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APIDZZ A SUCZON 794
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 1984
SECTION 794
SEC. 794. 1. Except as otherwise provided in this section,
none of the funds appropriated by this or any other Act may be
obligated or expended for the procurement of a weapon system
unless the prime contractor or other contractors for such
system provides the United States with written guarantees:
a. that the system and each component thereof were
designed and manufactured so as to conform to the
Government's performance requirements as specifically
delineated
- in the production contract, or
- in any other agreement relating to the production
of such system entered into by the United States
and the contractor;
b. that the system and each component thereof, at the
time they are provided to the.United States, are free
from all defects (in materials and workmanship) which
would cause the system to fail to conform to the
Government's performance requirements as specifically
delineated
- in the production contract, or
- in any other agreement relating to the production
of such system entered into by the United States
and the contractor; and
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c. That, in the event of a failure of the weapon ystem
or a component to meet the conditions specified in
clauses a and b.:
- the contractor will bear the cost of all work
promptly to repair or replace such parts as are
necessary to achieve the required performance; or
- if the contractor fails to repair or replace such
parts promptly, as determined by the Secretary of
Defense, the contractor will pay the costs
incurred by the United States in procuring such
parts from another source.
2. A written guarantee provided pursuant to subsection 1.
shall not apply in the case of any weapon system or component
thereof which has been furnished by the Government to a
contractor.
3. The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirements of
subsection 1. in the case of a weapon system if the Secretary:
a determines that the waiver is necessary in the
interest of the national defense or would not be a3t-
effective; and
b. notifies the Committees on Armed Services and
Appropriations of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in writing of his intention to waive
such requirements with respect to such weapon system
and includes in the notice an explanation of the
reasons for the waiver.
4. The requirements for written guarantees provided in
subsection 1. hereof shall apply only to contracts which are
awarded after the date of enactment of this Act and shall not
cover combat damage.
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APPMDZX 3 8UCTZO1 2403
TITLE 10 Uniced States CODE
Section 2403
2403. Major weapon systems contractor guarantees
(a) In this section
(1) *Weapon System" means items that can be used directly
by the armed forces to carry out combat missions and that cost
more than $100, 000 or for which the eventual total procurement
cost is more than $10,000,000. Such term does not include
commercial items sold in substantial quantities to the general
public.
(2) "Prime contractoro means a party that enters into an
agreement directly with the United States to furnish part or
all of a weapon system.
(3) *Design and manufacturing requirementso means
structural and engineering plans and manufacturing
particulars, including precise measurements, tolerances,
materials, and finished product tests for the weapon system
being produced.
(4) 'Essential performance requirements", with respect to
a weapon system, means the operating capabilities or
maintenance and reliability characteristics of the system that
are determined by the Secretary of Defense to be necessary for
the system to fulfill the military requirements for which the
system is designed.
(5) *Component" means any constituent element of a weapon
system.
(6) "Mature full-scale productiono means the manufacture
of all units of a weapon system after the manufacture of the
first one-tenth of the eventual total production or the
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initial production quantity of such system, whichever is less.
(7) "Initial production quantity" means the number of
units of a weapon system contracted for in the first year of
full-scale production.
(8) "Head of an agencyu has the meaning given that term in
section 2302 of this title.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the head
of an agency may not after 1 January 1985, enter into a
contract for the production of a weapon system unless each
prime contractor for the system provided the United States
with written guarantees that--
(1) the item provided under the contract will conform to
the design and manufacturing requirements specifically
delineated in the production contract (or in any amendment to
that contract);
(2) the item provided under the contract, at the time it
is delivered to the United States, will be free from all
defects in materials and workmanship;
(3) the item provided under the contract will conform to
the essential performance requirements of the item as
specifically delineated in the production contract (or irn any
amendment to that contract); and
(4) if the item provided under the contract fails to meet
the guarantee specified in clause (1), (2), or (3), the
contractor will at the election of the Secretary of Defense or
as otherwise provided in the contract--
(A) promptly take such corrective action as may be
necessary to correct the failure at no additional cost to the
United States; or
(B) pay costs reasonably incurred by the United States
in taking such corrective action.
(c) The head of the agency concerned may not require
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guarantees under subsection (b) from a prime contractor for a
weapon system, or for a component of a weapon system, that is
furnished by the United States to the contractor.
(d) Subject to subsection (e) (1), the Secretary of Defense
may waive part or all of subsection (b) in the case of a
weapon system, or component of a weapon system, if the
Secretary determines---
(1) that the waiver is necessary in the interest of
national defense; or
(2) that a guarantee under that subsection would not be
cost-effective.
The Secretary may not delegate authority under this subsection
to any person who holds a position below the level of
Assistant Secretary of Defense or Assistant Secretary of a
military department.
(e) (1) Before making a waiver under subsection (d) with
respect to a weapon system that is a major defense acquisition
program for the purpose of section 139a of this title, the
Secretary of Defense shall notify the committees on Armed
Services and on Appropriations of the Senate and House of
Representatives in writing of his intention to waive any or
all of the requirements of subsection (b)with respect to that
system and shall include in the notice an explanation of the
reasons for the waiver.
(2) Not later than February 1 of each year, the Secretary
of Defense shall submit to the committees specified in
paragraph (1) a report identifying each wavier made under
subsection (d) during the preceding calendar year for a weapon
system that is not a major defense acquisition program for the
purpose of section 139a of this title and shall include in the
report an explanation of the reasons for the waivers.
(f) The requirement for a guarantee under subsection (b)
(3) applies only in the case of a contract for a weapon system
that is in mature full-scale production. However, nothing in
this section prohibits the head of the agency concerned from
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negotiating a guarantee described in subsection (b) (3), the
Secretary shall comply with the notice requirements of
subsection (e).
(g) Nothing in this section prohibits the head of the
agency concerned from---
(1) negotiating the specific details of a guarantee,
including reasonable exclusions, limitations and time
duration, so long as then negotiated guarantee is consistent
with the general requirements of this section;
(2) requiring that components of a weapon system furnished
by the United States to a contractor be properly installed so
as not to invalidate any warranty or guarantee provided by the
manufacturer of such component to the United States;
(3) reducing the price of any contract for a weapon system
or other defense equipment to take account of any payment due
from a contractor pursuant to subclause (B) of subsection
(b) (4);
(4) in the case of a dual source procurement, exempting
from the requirements of subsection (b) (3) an amount of
production by the second source contractor equivalent to the
first one-tenth of the eventual total production by the second
source contractor; and
(5) using written guarantees to a greater extent than
required by this section including guarantees that exceed
those in clauses (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (b)and
guarantees that provide more comprehensive remedies than the
remedies specified under clause (4) of that subsection.
(h) (1) The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out this section.
(2) This section does not apply to the Coast Guard or to
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.










(1) ACCEPTANCE - The act by which the Government assumes
for itself, or as an agent for another, ownership of the
identified Supplies. Acceptance occurs, for example, upon
execution by an authorized Government representative in the
Acceptance Block of the DD Form 250.
(2) CONSUMABLE - A component that is replaced regardless
of apparent condition during maintenance, inspection, or
repair. Consumable materials shall include filters, preformed
packings (0-rings), seals, gaskets and other engine items that
are discarded regardless of apparent condition LAW the engine
technical manuals. Consumable materials are identified by
source, maintenance, and recoverability (SM&R) coding.
(3) DEFECT - As used herein means any condition or
characteristic in any supplies furnished by the contractor
under this contract that is not in compliance with the
requirements of the contract.
(4) DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING REQUIREMENTS - Structural and
engineering plans and manufacturing particulars, including
precise measurements, tolerances, materials, and the finished
product tests as required by this contract for the Warranted
items being procured.
(5) ENGINE OPERATING HOURS - Total engine operating time
as determined by the engine monitoring systems. In the event
the engine monitoring system is inoperative, unavailable, or
data is incomplete, such time shall be calculated in a manner
such as per I fill in blank 1. or as reported by the flight
crew and recorded in the engine log book.
(6) FAILURE - The breakage of a part, malfunction of a
part or damage to a part which renders it unserviceable, or a
condition which causes or would cause a warranted item to fail
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to neet any characteristic required for operation. Although
"a failure may be an indication of a defect, a failure is not
"a defect by definition.
(7) FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE (FOD) - Damage to an engine
resulting from ingestion of material not installed within the
engine.
(8) REDESIGN - A change to design and manufacturing
requirements. Redesign shall include any testing required to
validate/qualify the proposed change as well any other effort
normally associated with an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP).
(9) REPAIR - To restore an engine or component to
serviceable condition.
(10) SERVICEABLE - Operational and acceptable for
continued use under the criteria established by the applicable
maintenance publications.
(11) SYSTEMIC FAILURE - A failure mode or
characteristic that is identified as being common to warranted
items delivered under contract. [Naer- a method Of
detezLinIna avstentc fstlurol
(12) WARRANTED ITEM - Any engine and all original
constituent components/modules/parts thereof delivered under
this contract, excluding Government-Furnished Property (GFP).
Warranted items also include all new Contractor-supplied or
contract -overhauled replacement components/modules/items as
may be installed on engines delivered under this contract to
remedy a defect in an original component/module/item.
(13) WARRANTED RESULTANT DAMAGE - Damage suffered
directly by or induced primarily in an engine item from a
warranted defect in an item provided by the Contractor. The
term excludes damage to other engines or any property external
to the instant engine or any consequential damages.
(b)COVERAGE AND PERIOD: Notwithstanding inspection and
acceptance by the Government of supplies furnished under this
contract or cny provision of this contract concerning the
conclusiveness thereof, the Contractor warrants:
(1) That at time of delivery and for I aDcifyr Mrlod I
any warranted item Originally delivered under this contract
shall conform to the design and manufacturing requirements.
(2) That any warranted item Originally delivered under
this contract shall be free from all defects in material and
workmanship at the time of its delivery to the Government and
for I specify period I.
(3) That any warranted item Originally delivered under
this contract, shall meet the essential performance standards
and requirements as specified below for [ specify Dezrlod 1.
(4) Any warranted items repaired/replaced pursuant to
this warranty are subject to the provisions of this clause for
the remaining period of the warranty on the warranted items
originally delivered.
(c) NOTIFICATION
(1) The Contractor shall be notified in writing of any
breach of the warranty set forth in "Coverage and Periodu
above including a description of the breach within [ DecIfy
D.rlod i, after discovery of the defect.
(2) Written notice may consist of any of the following: a
letter from the Contracting Officer or his duly authorized
representative, and/or I sMecify def~ciency report document or
maintenance document].
(3) Should the Contractor discover any breach of warranty
prior to receipt of Government notification, the Contractor
shall notify the Contracting Officer in writing within
[ sDecifyDeriod 1, after discovery of the defect.
(d) REMEDIES:
(1) GOVERNMENT ELECTION: In the event of a breach of
warranty, the Government shall decide which of the following
remedies shall be applied:
(i) CONTRACTOR REPAIR/REPLACEMENT: The Contractor
shall, at its election, either repair or replace the warranted
item. Items -. aired or replaced under this warranty shall be
Presented f.- G"vernment inspection at a location agreeable to
both parties.
a) The Government will deliver the warranted item
to the Contractor within [ fill In I days of discovery of a
warranted defect. Warranted items will be shipped to the
following contractor facilities:
[List Addresses]
b) The contractor shall repair/replace warranted
items within I f1l In I days from the date when both
notification and the item are received.
c) The Contractor shall repair/replace all items
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or components rendered unserviceable or destroyed in
correcting the warranted defect.
d) Upon Government direction from Contracting
Officer as authorized by FAR 51.101, the Contractor may
utilize Government stocks to effect repair and, as mutually
agreed, replace stocks used (with new, rebuilt, or serviceable
items of like value) within normal production lead-time.
(ii) GOVERNMENT REPAIR: In the event that
repair/replacement is undertaken by or through the Government,
the Government may elect from the following:
a) The Contractor shall provide all serviceable
components required to repair the warranted item in exchange
for unserviceable components, returned to the contractor's
designated facility.
b) Repair the warranted item using Government
assets and not return the unserviceable components to the
Contractor. In this event: f Insert reamdy ,
[P OR ZaHPLE:
1) Bquitable consideration amy be negotlated
between partles, or
2) An equitable downward adjustment to the
contract price shall be made of $ _ per unserviceable
warranted item replaced or repaired, not to exceed
$ for a single event.]
(iii) SYSTEMIC FAILURE: In the event it is determined
that a systemic failure exists and that failure was directly
caused by a warranted defect, the Contractor shall provide:
a) All engineering, hardware, and testing
necessary to complete a redesign as required to eliminate the
cause of the breach.
b) All items necessary to incorporate the
redesign in all engine and Components/items under warranty at
the time of notification.
c) All technical data (whether new, revisions, or
updating) occasioned by the redesign and retrofit.
(2) UNSERVICEABLE COMPONENT DISPOSITION: In lieu of
return to the Contractor's repair facility, the Government
may, with the Contractor's concurrence, scrap the
unserviceable component.
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(3) DISPUTES CLAUSE: Failure of the parties to agree
concerning the application of these remedies shall be subject
to FAR 52.233-1, "Disputes.0
(4) PROCEDURES REGARDING NON-WARRANTED REPAIRS: If, upon
Preliminary analysis of the component/part, the cause of
failure is not within the Parameters of the warranty or if
Non-warranted repairs must be performed in conjunction with
those repairs inclusive of the warranty, Contractor shall stop
all Non-warranted work and contact the Contracting Officer for
further direction.
(e) VERIFICATION/VALIDATION: Contractor shall have access to
data and defective hardware as reasonably necessary to perform
warranty breach validation/verification.
(f) TRANSPORTATION AND RISK OF LOSS: Transportation of
defective supplies to the Contractor's designated repair
facility and back shall be via Government Bill of Lading with
the Government assuming risk of loss to the supplies in
transit. The risk of loss of any such item while in the
Possession of the Contractor shall be Governed by the
"Government Property* clause.
(g) MARKING:
(1) For each aircraft, missile, or engine delivered, the
Contractor shall Provide complete, accurate, and legible
warranty information in the Miscellaneous History Section of
the Aircraft/Aeronautical Equipment Service Record as part of
the acceptance of each aircraft, missile, or engine. The
warranty page(s) shall be marked as "PERMANENT RECORD* and
include, as a minimum, the following:
(i) "WARRANTED ITEM"
(ii) Manufacturer or entity providing the warranty
(iii) Contract number
(iv) Expiration of the warranty. (NOTE: If expiration
is for a calendar Period of time and/or hours/cycles of usage,
the marking must Provide a firm expiration. Stating that
warranty will expire ox" months from acceptance does not, in
itself, Provide clear guidance to equipment user).
(v) National Stock Number, Part Number and Serial
Number.
(2) When Aeronautical Equipment Service Records (AESR),
Module Service Records (MSR), Equipment History Records (EHR),
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or Scheduled Removal Component (SRC) cards exist for warranted
equipment, warranty information shall be marked in the same
manner as delineated in the previous Paragraph.
(3) For supplies accepted conditionally, or under special
Conditions, the applicable logbook record documents shall
specify any exceptions to acceptance, including work to be
completed, material to be installed, and defects or non-
conformances to be corrected.
(4) All equipment items, not covered by the above logbook
record cards, shall have a warranty label affixed to/or part
of the equipment identification plate. It shall be a
bold/bright color easily identifiable and accessible to the
user. Information shall be indelible, legible and contain as
a minimum, the following:
(i) ,WARRANTED ITEM: in bold letters at least twice
as large as other information;
(ii) Expiration of warranty. (Note: Guidance
previously delineated in above marking paragraphs shall be
followed).
(5) All shipping containers shall be marked in accordance
with MIL-STD-129
(h) LIABILITY:
(1) The limitation rights and coverage set out in this
warranty shall govern the liability and rights of the items
for warranted failures during the Period of warranted coverage
of items. Rights/liabilities granted in limitation of
liability clauses in FAR 52.246 shall be given full effect
when warranty coverage expires or is inapplicable. Except as
Otherwise Provided in FAR 52.246, items returned to the
contractor are governed by government property clause in FAR
52.245 except the loss, damage, or destruction of warranted
items caused by and occurring during rework, repair, or retest
shall remain the responsibility of the Contractor.
(2) Contractors liability for resultant damage shall be
limited to warranted resultant damage as defined herein.
(3) LIMITATION OF LIABILITY: Contractor's total liability
under this warranty shall not exceed [ fill In amount 1.
(i) EXCLUSIONS:
(1) The Contractor shall have no Obligation to Provide
warranty remedies with respect to any supplies warranted
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hereunder to the extent that the defect arises or results
from:
(i) Foreign Object damage (FOD), unless ingested at
Contractor's plant;
(ii) Battle damage or combat damage;
(iii) Acts of sabotage or vandalism;
(iv) Acts of God; such as flood, hurricane, tornado,
earthquake, lightning, etc.,
(v) Aircraft crash, hard landing, or any fire,
accident or explosion where such event is not caused by a
warranted defect in an item;
(vi) Improper Government or third party
transportation, storage, handling, inspection, maintenance,
repair, alteration, operation, installation, overhaul or
replacement;
(vii) Experimental tests as applied to the engine or
aircraft which would cause the engine to exceed the
performance specifications;
(viii) Operation of the engine or aircraft outside of
intended use or flight envelope as defined in the engine
specifications.
(ix) Items, components, modules or subassemblies or
any other products or supplies not acquired or procured
directly from the Contractor;
(x) Erosion (including sand, volcanic ash) or
corrosion (including hot corrosion) in excess of the engine
specification not due to defects in material and workmanship.
(xi) Electro-Magnetic Interference beyond the engine
specification requirements.
(2) Contractor's warranty shall not extend to cover:
(i) Replacement of consumables during routine
operational maintenance of the engine.
(ii) Items, components, modules, subassemblies or
any other products or supplies not acquired or procured
directly from the Contractor (break-out parts).
(j) DISCLAIMERS:
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(1) This warranty is for the benefit of the Government
alone and is not transferable to third parties without the
written agreement of the Contractor.
(2) The Contractor's liability for costs and repair is
conditioned upon availability and rent-free use of facilities,
tooling, and equipment identified in any Government Furnished
Property - Rent Free Use provisions of this contract. Any
decrease, substitution or withdrawal of said property may
entitle the Contractor to an equitable adjustment.
(3) The rights and remedies of the Government and
Contractor provided in this clause are in addition to, and do
not limit, any rights and remedies the Government and
Contractor may have under any other clause or provision of
this contract.
(4) The Government's rights under this contract because of
latent defects, fraud, or such gross mistakes as amount to
fraud are not limited by this clause.
(5) The warranties expressed herein are in lieu of any
implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or fitness for a
particular purpose.
166
APPZUDZX D GLIAM DXLL S. 1587
167
O: SCO \SC093 5s,7 S.L.C-
2-40
1 Subtitle E-Administration of Con-
2 tract Provisions Relating to
3 Price, Delivery, and Product
4 Quality
5 PART I-ARMED SERVICES ACQUISITIONS
6 SEC. 2401. PROCUREMENT OF CRITICAL AIRCRAFT AND
7 SHIP SPARE PARTS; QUALIrY CONTROL
8 (a) REPEAL.---Section 2383 of title 10, United States
9 Code, is repealed.
10 (b) CLERICAL AMEXDM.,E'XT.--The table of sections
11 at the beginning of chapter 141 of such title is amended
12 by strikdng out the item relating to section 2383.
13 SEC. 2402. CONTRACTOR GUARANTEES REGARDING WEAP-
14 ON SYSTEMS.
15 Section 2403(h) of title 10, United States Code, is
16 amended-
17 (1) by redesignating paragraph (2) as para-
18 graph (3); and
19 (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the follow-
20 ing new paragraph (2):
21 "(2) The regulations shall include the following:
22 "(A) Guidelines for negotiating contractor guar-
23 antees that are reasonable and cost effective, as de-
24 tenrined on the basis of the likelihood of defects and




1 "(B) Procedures for administering contractor
2 guarantees.
3 "(C) Guidelines for determining the cases in
4 which it may be appropriate to waive the require-
5 ments of this section.".
6 SEC. 2403. REPEAL OF REQUIREMENT FOR COMPLETE DE-
7 LIVERY OF SUBSISTENCE SUPPLIES AT SPE-
8 C[IC PLACE UPON INSPECTION.
9 (a) ARMY CONTRACTS.-
10 (1) REPE.A.L.-Section 4534 of title 10, United
11 States Code, is repealed.
12 (2) CLERICAL A-AEN-DIWENT.-The table of sec-
13 tions at the beginning of chapter 433 of such title
14 is amended by strildng out the item relating to see-
15 tion 4534.
16 (b) AIR FORCE CONTRACTS.-
17 (1) REPExL.-Section 9534 of title 10, United
18 States Code, is repealed.
19 (2) CLERIC.L A.MENDMENT.-The table of sec-
20 tions at the beginning of chapter 933 of such title
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PART 4.--QUALrIY ASSURPANCE 4&0103
under the inseco provisio of the conu-ct be preju- co-,amw ad the Govennent for defective items e s e-
diced vi mad (2) to fow 9Aliy performance.
(b) Geneay, a waanty should provide-
46.SOS Transfer of tle ad risk of los (1) A contacsual right for the corection of defects
(a) Tule to supplies shall pass to the Government upon noawuhstanding any other requirement of the conract
formal acceptance, regardless of when or where the pertaining to accepumce of the supplies or services by
Government takes physical possession, unless the conu-w= the Governmet and
speciically provides for ealier pasmsge of tide (2) A stared period of time or use, or the occmience
(b) Unless the conrct specifically provides otbhewise, of a specified event, after acceptance by the
risk of loss of or damage to supplies shall remain with the Government to assert a conracnial right for the orec-
contractor until, and shall pass to the Government upon- im of defects.
(1) Delivery of the supplies to a caurier if trnnsporta- (c) The benefits to be derived hen a wranty must be
tion is f.o.br oigin: or commensurate with the cost of the warranty to the
(2) Acceptance by the Government or delivery of the Government.
supplies to the Government at the destinaton specified
in the contract, whichever is later, if tansportaon is 46.703 Critemma for use of warranties.
f.o.b. destination. The use of warranes is not mandatory. In determining
(c) Pargraph (b) above shall not apply to supplies that whether a warrunty is appropriate for a specific acquisiton.
so fail to conform to conract requirements as to give a the contracting officer shall consider the following facs
right of rejection. The risk of loss of or damage to such (a) Nature and use of the supplies or services. This
nonconforming supplies remains with the comractor until includes such fors a&-
cure or acceptance. After cure or acceptance. paragraph (b) (1) Complexity and function:
above shall apply. (2) Deg=e of developmenct;
(d) Under paragrph (b) above, the conractor shall not (3) State of the art:
be liable for loss of or damage to supplies caused by the (4) End use:
negligence of officers, agents, or employees of the (5) Difficulty in dect•g defects before acceptance:
Government acting within the scope of their employment. and
(e) The policy expressed in (a) through (d) above is (6) Potential harm to the Government if the item is
specified in the clause at 52.246-16. Responsibility for defecdve.
Supplies. which is prescribed in 46.316. (b) Cost. Warranty costs arise from-
(1) The conuacr 's cr-e for accepting the deferred
SUBPART 46.6-.MATERIAL INSPECTION AND liabiliy created by the warranty; and
RECEIVING REPORTS (2) Government adminisration and enforcement of
the warranty (see puaapp (c) below).
Agencies shall prescribe procedures and instructions for (C) Aniraon and enoorcemnt. The Government's
the use. preparation, and disuibuton of material inspecdo ability to enforce the warranty is essential to the effective-
and receiving reports and commercial shipping =ss of any waranty. Them must be some assrn that an
document/packing lists to evidence Government inspection adequate adminisative system for reporting defecs eaists
(see 46.401) and acceptance (see 46.501). or can be established. The adequacy of a repomng system
may depend upon such facors as the-
SUBPART 46.7-WARRANTIES (1) Nanmie ad complexity of the item;
(2) Tocation and proposed use of the item.
46.701 Definitions. (3) Stoae tim for the ie
"Acceptance" (see 46.101). (4) Disance of the using activity from the source of
"Correction," as used in this subpart. means the elimina- ft item
tion of a defect. (5) Difficulty in establishing existence of defects;
"Warrntry, as used in this subpart, means a promise or and
affirmation given by a contractor to the Government (6) Dicuy m tacig responsibility for defects.
regarding the nature. usefulness, or condition of the sup- (d) Trade practue. In many instances an item is cus-
plies or performance of services furnished under the con- tomarily warranted in the tade, and, as a result of that
U=Lac .e. the cost of an iemn to the Government will be the
same whether or not a warranty is included. In those
46.702 General instances, it would be in the Government's interest to
(a) The principal purposes of a war-aty in a Government include such a warranty.
contar am (1) to delineate the rights and oblipgtons of the (e) Reduced requirenmnts. The conowcor's c€narge for
46-9
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assumppion of added liability may be partially or Complete- (iii) If express warrnties are included in a con-
ly offset by reducing the Government's contract quality tract (except contracts for commercial items), all
assurance requitmenus where the warrnty provides ade- implied warrant-a of mrchanbility and fiaess for
quaie assurance of a satisfactory product, a pricular purpose shall be negated by the use of
specific language in the clause (see clauses 52.2,-
46.704 Authority for use of warmatie. 17. Wam-ny of Supplies of a Noncomplex Nature.
The use of a warranty in an acquisition shall be 52.246-18. Warranty of Supplies of a Complex
approved in accordance with agency procedur Nature: and 52.246-19. Warranty of Systems and
Equipment under Performance Specifications or
46.70S Limitations. Design Criteria).
(a) Except for the waranties in the clauses at 522A6-3. (2) fRomdies. (®) Nomally. a warranty shall provide
Inspection of Supplies-Cost-Reimbmaenent. and 52.2A6- as a minimum that the Government may (A) obtain an
8. Inspection of Research and Development-Cost- equitable adjustment of the conact, or (B) direct the
Reimbursement. the contracting ofair= shall not include contractor to repair or replace te defective iems; at the
warranties in cost-reimbursement contracts, unless autho- contractor's expense.
rized in accordance with agency regulations (see 46.708). (Hr) If it is not pracical to diect the contractor to
(b) Warranty clauses shall not limit the Government's make the repair or replacement, or. because of the
rights under an inspection clause (see Subpart 46.3) in mela- nature of the item, the repair oryeplacement does not
tion to latent defects, fraud, or gross mistakes that amount afford an appropriate remedy to the Government. the
to fraud. warranty should provide alternate remedies. such as
(c) Except for warranty clauses in construction con- authorizing the Government to-
tracts, warranty clauses shall provide that the warranty (A) Retain the defective item and redu=e the
applies notwithstanding inspection and acceptance or other contract price by an amount equitable under the
c€auses or terns of the contract. ccw _e or
(B) Arrange for the repair or replacement of the
46.706 Warranty terms and conditions. defective item. by the Government or by another
(a) 7o facilitate the pricing and enforcement of war- source, at dte contractor's expense.
ranties. ",e contracting officer shall ensure that waraties (iii) If it can be foreseen that it will not be prmi-
clearly state th- cal to mtrn an item to the contractor for repair, to
(1) Exact nature of the item and i-.s components and remove it to an alternate source for repair, or to
charatristics that the c•ntaor warants replace the defective item. the warranty should pro-
U-) Extent of the contractor's warranty including all vide that the Government may repair, or require the
of the contractor's obligations to the Government for contractor to repair, the item in place at the conrac-
breach of warranty: t's expense. The contract shall provide that in the
(3) Specific remedies available to die Governmenc and circumstance where the Government is to accomplish
(4) Scope and duration of the warranty. the repair, the contractor will furnish at the place of
(b) The contacing officer shall consider the following delivery the material or parts, and the istallation
guidelines when preparing warranty terms and conditions: itstructiors required to successfully accomplish the
(1) E£emn of comiracwr obligations. (i) Generally. repair.
the contractor's obligations under warranties extend to Civ) Unless provided otherwise in the warranty.
all defects discovered during the wuranty period, but do the contractor's obligation to repair or replace the
not include damage caused by the Govermnent. When a defective item, or to agree to an equitable adjusunent
warranry for the entire item is not advisable, a warranty of the contract. shall include responsibility for the
may be required for a particular aspect of the imem that costs of furnishing all labor and material to (A) rein-
may require special protecion (e.g.. installation. compo- spect items that the Government reasonably expeccd
nents. accessories, subassemblies. preservano packag- to be defective, (B) ac=omplish the required repair or
ing. and packing. etc.). replacement of defective items and (C) test, inmpe
(ii) If the Government specifies the design of the package, pack, and mark repaired or replaced
end item and its measuements, olerances. mairials, (v) If repair or replacement of defective item is
tests. or inspection requirements. the conracwtor's require, the contractor shall genermlly be required by
obligations for correction of defects shall usually be the warranty to bear the expense of transportation for
limited to defects in material and workmanship or returning the defective item from the place of deliv.
failure to conform to specifications. If the ery specified in the contract (irrespective of the fo.b.
Government does not specify the design. the warran- point or the point of acceptance) o the connactor's
ty extends also to the usefulness of the design. plant and subsequent return. When defec:ive itens
46-10
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me retuned to dhe contractor ham other than ft 46L.07 Pricag upt of r•ed-pic cemuive contract
plwe of delivery specified in the conva. or when wamrrandes.
the Government exercises alternate remedies, the If a fixed-price incebive contract conains a warranty
c ontractor's liability for transponauon charges (we 46.708). dte etimated cast of the wanranty to the con-
incurred shall not exceed an amount equal to dte cost r-actor should be considered in establishing the incentive
of transportadon by the usual commercial method of target pc and die ceiling price of the contract. All costs
shipment between the place of delivery specified in incurmd or estimated to be incurred, by the conactor in
the contract and the contractor's plant and subse- complying wah the warranty shall be considered when
quent return. establishing the total final price. Contractor compliance
(3) Duraion of h warrany. The time period or With the warrnMy After the mbliSlunent of fth total final
duration of the warranty must be clearly specified and price shall be au no additional cost to the Goverunme.
shall be established after consideration of such factor
as i) the estimated useful life of the item. (in) the 46.708 Warrand of data.
nature of the item including stoage or shelf-life, and Warramies of data shall be developed and used in accor.
(iii) trade practice. The period specified shall not danc with agency regulatdo.
extend the contractor's liability for patent defects
beyond a reasonable time after acceptance by the 46.709 Warranties of commercial items.
Government. If a warranty of commercial iems is appropriate. the
(4) Notice. The warranty shall specify a reasonable contracting officer may include a warranty of supplies
time for furnishing notice to the contacr regarding the clause modified for commercial items (see the clause at
discovery of defects. This notice period, which shall 52.246-17. Warranty of Supplies of a Noncomplex Natur.
apply to all defects discovered during die wa-anty peri- Alternate I. and 52.246-18, Warranty of Supplies of a
od. shall be long enough to assure that tde Government Complex Nature. Alternm I). More apropate warranry
has adequate time to give notice to die contractor. The language may be included if the contracting officer deter-
contracting officer shall consider die following (actos mines thai the Government's planned usage of the item is
when establishing the notice period: inconsistent with the item's normal usage, or that
(i) The time necessary for the Government to dis- Governmen specifications have subsw,•ially altered the
cover the defectL item. The Government may adopc the contractor's standard
(ii) The time reasonably required for the commercial warranty if the contracting officer determines
Government to take necessary administrative steps it is not incMsitt with the rights that would be afforded
and make a timely report of discovery of the defects the Government under a warranty of supplies clase (see
to the conractor. the clauses at 52.246-17. Warranty of Supplies of a
(iii) The time required to discover and report Noncomplex Nature, and 522A6-18. Warranty of Supplies
defective replacements. of a Complex Nature) or other tam of the contract.
(5) Markings. The packaging and preservation
requirements of the contract shall require the contracwr 46.710 CoonrAct clauses.
to stamp or mark the supplies delivered or otherwise The clauses and alernates prescribed in this section may
furnish notice with the supplies of the existece of the be used in solicitations and contracts in which inclusimon of
warranty. The purpose of the markings or notice is to waruanty coverage is appropriate. However, because of dte
inform Government personnel who store, stock. or use many situations that my icfluence the warranty terms and
the supplies that the supplies are under warranty. condidions appropriate to a particular acquisio, the con.
Markings may be brief but should include (i) a brief tracing officer may vary the terms and condioms of the
statement that a warranty exists (ii) the mbstance of dte clauses and alternates to the exaenm necessary. The alter-
war-any, (ii) its duration, and (iv) who to notify if the am pes•ribed in this section address am clauseg howev-
supplies are found to be defective. For commercial er, the c=onions petaining to eich alternate must be coa-
items (see 46.709), the contractor's trade practice in sidered if the terms and conditions am varied to meet a par-
warranty marking is acceptable if sufficient information ticular need.
is presented for supply personnel and users to identify (a)(l) The contracting officer may insert a clause
warranted supplies. substantially thde se as the clau a 52.246-17. Warranty
(6) Consistency. contacting officers shall ensure of Supplies of a Noncomplex Nane in solicitaions and
that the warranty clause and any other winianty condi- contracts for noucomplex items when a fixed-price supply
tions in the contract (e.g., in the specifications or an contact is contemplated and tde use of a warranty clause
inspecdon clause) are consistent. To the extent pracuca- has been approved under agency procedures.
ble. all of the warranties to be contained in dte contract (-) If commercial items are to be acquired, the con-
should be expressed in the warranty clause tracung officer may use the clause with its Alternate L
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() If at is de•uable to spdy that m sary wats. ed. de conracting ank may us de claus *w as
pomrnau incident w =ection or replaement will be a Alimusi IL.
die Government's exes (as might be die cum if, for (4) If it is anticipated ht recovery of tie warranted
example. the cost of a warmnty would oduewis be pro- item will involve considerable Government expense
luhbuve). the connacung officer may ue the clause wish for disassembly aid/ reamssembly of liner ims. hem
its Alwmae U. contracting officer may use the clause with its
(4) If the supplies canot be obtained born anot Atsam 13L
sour=e the connacmng officer may use; th lause with (d) TiM conractng offcer may bnsrt a clause subsm-
its Alernae I3L daily the same as the clause at 52.2A6-20, Warranty of
(5) If a fixed-price cnanuve contact is conrmuplaL- Services, in soltitans and conrasm for svices when a
ed. the conracng officer may use the casm with its fixed-prm coamoct for a-vice is caaotmplaed and the
Alternate IV. use of wmany cdause has boe approved ider agency
(6) If it is anticipated doth recovery of the warranted procedues wless a came subsuniafly the same as the
items wil involve considerable Government expense daus at 52.246-19. Waranty of System and Equipment
for disassembly and/or nssembly of larger items. the r Performance Specifications or Design Crite., has
contracting officer may use the clause with its been used.
Alternate V. (eXI) The conaw•u o•cer may insert a clause sub-
(bXl) '"he conu=ng officer may inhm a clause sub- mstinaily de same as the chaus at 52.2A6-21. Warranty of
st3dally we sane as the clause at S2246-18. Warranty of Constrction. in solicitations and contacts wheta a fixed-
Supplies of a Complex Natum in solicitations and con- price consrucoan const (see 46.705(c)) is conr'usplazed
cacis for deliverable complex items when a fixed-price and the use of a warranty claise has been approved ,,rder
supply or research and development coanact is contmpla- agency procedure
ed and the use of a warranty clause has been approved (2) If the Government spifies in the coan-ra the use
under agency procedures, of any equipment by "band name and mode'l" the con-
(2) If commercial iems am to be acquired, the con- racan o.w may u the cimue witd is Alternate L
t-acung officer may wue the clause with its Alternate L
(3) If it is desirable to specify that necessary vaus- SUBPART 464J-CONTRACTOR LIABILITY FOR
portaton incident to cmrection or replacement will be at LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO PROPERTY OF THE
the Govenumen's expense (as might be the case if, for GOVERNMENT
example. the cost of a warranmy would otherwise be pro-
hibtuve). the coanta€ung officer may use the clause wish 4A.OO Scope of subplrt.
its Alternate IL This subpart prewibes policies and procedures for lir-
(4) If a fixed-price incentive conuact is connemplat- itng conu-atr iiability for loss of or damage to property
ed. the contracting officer may use die cdlxa with its of the Government that (a) occurs after accepac and (b)
Alw e M. results from defects or deficenciw s in the supplies deliv-
(5 If it is anticipated that recovery of dte waranted red or services performed.
item will involve considerable Government expense for
disassembly md/or reassembly of larger ims, te con- 4601 ApplicabilIty.
awcung officer may use the clause with is Alternate IV. (a) The sbpar applies w coon=o other dims those for
(cX)) The conaacung officer may insert a claue sub- (1) aumomaic daa proceasing. (2) tlecommunications (3)
stantally tse same as the clause at 52.246-19, Warranty of comss-truc. (4) achimect-aeneer swvces and (5) main-
SyMsMs and Equipment under Performance Specifications mnance and rehabiliwion of real property. This subpart
or Desig Criteria, in solictadows and contracts when per- does not apply w iems priced at or based on catalog or
formance specificitions or design am of major imporwc; market prices ecept as ndct in 46.80,.
a fixed-price supply. servic or rese-rch and development (b) See Subp•rt 46.7. Warranties. for policies and prace-
convact for systems and equipment is conemplate& and dures concerning conua•cm liability caused by noncon-
the use of a warranty clause has been approved under agen- forming technical data.
cy procedures.
(2) If it is desirable to qey that necesary nuns- 46.• 2 Deflaition.
portmnon incident to correction ot replacement will be a "High-value iem," as used in this subpart mans a con-
the Government's expense (as might be die cme if, for tract end item that (a) has a high unit cost (normally
example, the cout of a warrnty would otherwise be pro- exceding 3100.000 per uni, such as an arca2 an air-
hibtuve), the contracting officer may use the clause with craft inew, a communicamo system, a computer system.
its Alternat L a missile, or a ship. and (b) is designated by the conu-icng
(3) If a fixed-price incWeruve con=act is congemplat- officer as a high-value is'm.
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"Acceptance," as defined in FAR 46.701 and as used in this subpart and in the warranty clauses
at FAR 52.246-17, Warranty of Supplies of a Noncomplex Nature: FAR 52.246-18. Warranty
of Supplies of a Complex Nature; FAR 52.246-19, Warranty of Systems and Equipment
Under Performance Specifications or Design Criteria: and FAR 52.246-20, Warranty of
Services, includes the execution of an official document (e.g., DD Form 250, Material
Inspection and Receiving Report) by an authorized representative of the Government.
"Defect." as used in this subpart. means any condition or characteristic in any supply or service
furnished by the contractor under the contract that is not in compliance with the requirements of
the contract.
246.702 General
(c) Departments and agencies shall establish procedures to nack and accumulate data on
warranty costs.
246.703 Criteria for use of warranties.
The use of warranties in the acquisition of weapon systems is mandatory (10 U.S.C. 2403)
unless a waiver is authorized (see 246.770-8).
(b) Cost.
Contracting officers may include the cost of a warranty as part of an item's price or as a
separate contract line item.
246.704 Authority for use of warranties.
The chief of the contracting office must approve use of a warranty, except in acquisitions for--
(I) Weapon systems (see 246.770);
(2) Commercial supplies or services (see FAR 46.709):
(3) Technical data. unless the warranty provides for extended liability (see 246.708);
(4) Supplies and services in fixed price .type contracts containing quality assurance
provisions thut reference MIL-I-45208. Inspection System Requirement, or
NtIL-Q-9858, Quality Program Requirements; or
(5) Supplies and services in construction contracts when using the warranties that are
contained in Federal. military, or constrction guide specifications.
246.705 Limitations.
(a) Warranties in the clause at 252.246-7001. Warranty of Data. are also an exception to the
prohibition on use of war."anties in cost-rei-mnbursement contra=rs.
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246.706 Warranty terms and conditions.
(b)(5) Markings.
Use MIL Standard 129, Marking for Shipments and Storage. and M.L Standard 130.
Identification Marking of U.S. Military Propery, when marking warranty items.
246.708 Warranties of data.
Obtain wan'anties on technical dam when practicable and cost effective. Consider the factors in
FAR 46.703 in deciding whether to obtain warranties of technical data. Consider the following in
deciding whether to use extended liability provisions-
(1) The likelihood that correction or replacement of the nonconforming datam or a price
adjustment, will not give adequate protection to the Government; and
(2) The effectiveness of the additional remedy as a deterrent against furnishing
nonconforming data.
246.710 Contract clauses.
(1) Use a clause substantially the same as the clause at 252.246-7001, Warranty of Dam, in
solicitations and contacts that include the clause at 252.227-7013. Rights in Technical
Data and Computer Software, and there is a need for greater protection or period of
liability than provided by other conu=act clauses, such as the clauses at-
(i) FAR 52.246-3, Inspection of Supplies--Cost-Reimbursement;
(ii) FAR 52.246-6. Inspection-Time-and-Material and Labor-Hour,
(iii) FAR 52.246-8, Inspection of Research and Development--Cost-Reimbursement; and
(iv) FAR 52.246-19, Warranty of Systems and Equipment Under Performance
Specifications or Design Criteria.
(2) Use the clause at 252.246-7001, Warranty of Dam, with its Alternate I when extended
liability is desired and a fixed price incentive contract is contemplated.
(3) Use the clause at 252.246-7001. Warranty of Dam. with its Alternate II when extended
liability is desired and a firm fixed price conract is contemplated.
246.770 Warranties in weapon system acquisitions.
This section sets forth policies and procedures for use of warranties in contacts for weapon
system production.
246.770-1 Definitions.
As used in this section-
(a) "At no additional cost to the Government" means-
(1) At no increase in price for finr fixed price conrac:s:
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(3) At no increase in estimated cost or fee for cost-reimbursement contracts.
(b) "Design and manufacturing requirements" means structural and engineering plans and
rmanufactunng particulars, including precise measurements, tolerances, materials and
finished product tests for the weapon system being produced.
(c) "Essential performance requirements" means the operating capabilities and maintenance
and reliability characteristcs of a weapon system that the agency head determines to be
necessary to fulfill the military requiremer
(d) "Initial production quantity" means the number of units of a weapon system contacted
for in the first program year of full-scale production.
(e) "Mature full-scale production" means follow-on production of a weapon system after
manufacture of the lesser of the initial production quantity or one-tenth of the eventual
toal production quantity.
(f) "Weapon system" means a system or major subsystem used directly by the Armed
Forces to carry out combat missions.
(1) The term includes, but is not limited to, the following (if intended for use in
carrying out combat missions)-
(i) Tracked and wheeled combat vehicles;
(ii) Self-propelled, towed and fixed guns. howitzers and mortars;
(Iii) Heficopters;
(iv) Naval vessels;
(v) Bomber, fighter, reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircaft;
(vi) Strategic and tactical missiles including launching systems;
(vii) Guided munitions;
(viii) Military surveillance, command, control, and communication systems;
(ix) Military cargo vehicles and ai-rcraft
(x) Mines;
(xi) Torpedoes;
(xii) Fe control systems;
(xiii) Propulsion systems;
(xiv) Electronic warfare systems: and
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(xv) Safety and survival systems. (
(2) The term does not include-
(i) Commercial items sold in substantial quantities to the general public (see FAR
15.804-3(c)); or
(ii) Spares. repairs, or replenishment pats; or
(iii) Related support equipment (e.g.. ground-handig equipment, training devices and
accessories, ammunition), unless an effective warranty would require inclusion of
such items.
246.770-2 Policy.
(a) Under 10 U.S.C. 2403, departments and agencies may not contract for the production
of a weapon system with a unit weapon system cost of more than S100,000 or an*
estimated total procurement cost in excess of S10 million unless-
(1) Each contractor for the weapon system provides the Government written
warranties that-
(i) The weapon system conforms to the design and manufacturing requirements in
the contract (or any modifications to that contract),
(ii) The weapon system is free from all defects in materials and workmanship at the
time of acceptance or delivery as specified in the conwract; and
(iii) The weapon system, if manufactured in mature full-scale production, conforms
to the essential performance requirements of the contract (or any modification to
that contract); and
(2) The contract terms provide that, in the event the weapon system fails to meet the
terms of the above warranties, the contracting officer may-
(i) Require the contractor to promptly take necessary corrective action (e.g., repair,
replace, and/or redesign) at no additional cost to the Government;
(ii) Require the contractor to pay costs reasonably incurred by the Government in
taking necessary corrective action, or
(iW) Equitably reduce the contract price: or
(3) A waiver is granted under 246.770-8.
(b) Contracting officers may require warranties that provide greater coverage and remedies
than specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection, such as including an essential
performance requirement warranty in other than a mature full-scale production contract.
(c) When the contract includes an essential performance requirement warranty, the warranty
must identify redesign as a remedy available to the Government.
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(1) The period during which redesign must be available as a remedy shall not end
before operational use. operational testing, or a combinaton of operational use
and operational testing has demonstrated that the warranted item's design has
satisfied the essential performance requirements.
(2) When essential performance requirements are warranted in contracts with alternate
source contractors, do not include redesign as a remedy available to the
Government under those contracts until the alternate source has manufactured the
first ten percent of the eventual total production quantity anticipated to be acquired
from that contractor (see 246.770-5).
246.770-3 Tailoring warranty terms and conditions.
(a) Since the objectives and circumstances vary considerably among weapon system
acquisition programs, contracting officers must tailor the required warranties on a case-
by-case basis. The purpose of tailoring is to get a cost-effective warranty in light of the
technical risk, or other program uncertainties, while ensuring that the Government still
acquires the basic warranties described in 246.770-2. Tailoring shall not be used as a
substitute for acquiring a warranty waiver.
(1) Tailoring may affect remedies, exclusions, limitations, and duration provided such
are consistent with the specific requirements of this section (see also FAR
46.706).
(2) Clearly relate the duration of any warranty to the contract requirements and allow
sufficient time to demonstrate achievement of the requirements after acceptance.
(3) Tailor the terms of the warranty, if appropriate, to exclude certain defects for
specified supplies (exclusions) or to limit the contractor's liability under the terms
of the warranty (limitations).
(4) Structure broader and more comprehensive warranties when advantageous or
narrow the scope when appropriate. For example, it may be inappropriate to
require warranty of all essential performance requirements for 2. contractor that did
not design the system.
(b) DoD policy is to exclude any terms that cover contractor liability for loss. damage. or
injury to third parties from warranty clauses.
(c) Ensure acquisition of subsystems and components in a manner which does not affect the
validity of the weapon system warranty.
246.770-4 Warranties on Government-furnished property.
Cont'acting officers shall not require contractors to provide the warranties specified in 246.770-2
on any property furnished the contractor by the Government. except for--
(a) Defects in installation;
(b) Installation or modification in such a manner that invalidates a warranty provided by the
manufacturer of the propertv: or
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(c) Modifications made to the properTy by the contractor. (
246.770-5 Exemption for alternate source contractor(s).
Agency heads may exempt alternate source contractor(s) from the essential performance warranty
requirements of 246.770.2(a)(1)(iii) until that contractor manufactures the first ten percent of its
anticipated toal production quantity.
246.770-6 Applicability to foreign military sales (FMS).
(a) The warranty requirements of 246.770-2 are not mandatory for FMS production
contracts. DoD policy is to obtain the same warranties on conformance to design and
manufacturing requirements and against defects in material and workmanship as it gets
for U.S. supplies.
(b) DoD normally will not obtain essential performance warranties for FMS purchasers.
However, where contracting officer cannot separately identify the cost for the warranty
of essential performance requirements, the foreign purchaser shall be given the sarie
warranty that the United States gets.
(c) If an FMS purchaser expressly requests a performance warranty in the letter oxi
acceptance, the Government will exert its best efforts to obtain the same waranty
obtained for U.S. equipment. Or. if specifically requested by the FMS purchaser,
obtain a unique warranty.
(d) The costs for warranties for FMS purchasers may be different from the costs for such
warranties for the Government due to factors such as overseas transportation and any
tailoring to reflect the unique aspects of the FMS purchaser.
(e) Ensure that FMS purchasers bear all of the acquisition and administrative costs of any
warranties.
246.770-7 Cost-benefit analysis.
(a) I" assessing the cost effectiveness of a proposed warranty, perform an analysis which
considers both the quantitative and qualitative costs and benefits of the warranty.
Consider--
(1) Costs of warranty acquisition, administration, enforcement, and user costs, and
any costs resulting from limitations imposed by the warranty provisions;
(2) Costs incurred during development specifically for the purpose of reducing
production warranty risks;
(3) Logistical and operational benefits as a result of the warranty as well as the impact
of the additional contractor motivation provided by the warranty.
(b) Where possible, make a comparison with the costs of obtaining and enforcing similar
warranties on similar systems.
(c) Document the analysis in the contract file. If the warranty is not cost effective, initiate a
waiver request under 246.770-8.
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246.770-8 Waiver and notification procedures.
(a) The Secretary of Defense has delegated waiver authority within the limits specified in 10
U.S.C. 2403. The waiving authonrv for the defense agencies is the Assistant Secremary
of Defense (Production and Logistics). The waiving authority for the mnilitary
departments is the Secretary of the department with authority to redelegate no lower than
an Assistant Secretary. The waiving authority may waive one or more of the weapons
system warranties required by 246.770-2 if--
(I) The waiver is in the interests of national defense; or
(2) The warranty would not be cost effective.
(b) Waiving authorities must ma.k- the following notifications or reports to the Senate and
House Committees on Armne- Services and Appropriations for all waivers--
(1) Major Weapon Systems.
For a weapon system that is a major defense acquisition program for the purpose
of 10 U.S.C. 2432, the waiving official must notify the Committees in writing of
an intention to waive one or more of the required warranties. Include an
explanation of the reasons for the waiver in the notice. Ordinarily provide the
notice 30 days before granting a waiver.
(2) Other Weapon Systems.
For weapon systems that are not major defense acquisition prog-rams for the
purpose of 10 U.S.C. 2432, waiving officials must submit an annual report not
later than February 1 of each year. List the waivers granted in the preceding
calendar year in the report and include an explanation of the reasons for grmaning
each waiver.
(3) Weapon Systems Not in Mature Full-Scale Production.
Although a waiver is not required, if a production contract for a major weapon
system not yet in mature full-scale production will not include a warranty on
essential performance requirements, the waiving officials must comply with the
notice requirements for major weapon systems.
(c) Departments and agencies shall issue procedures for processing waivers, notifications,
and reports to Congress.
(1) Requests for waiver shall include--
(i) A brief description of the weapon system and its stage of production, e.g.. the
number of units delivered and anticipated to be delivered dur;ing the life of the
program:
(ii) Identification of the specific warranty or warranties required by 246.770-2(a)(1)
for which the waiver is requested:
(iii) The duration of the waiver if it is to go beyond the contrac::
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(iv) The rationale for the waiver (if the waiver request is based on cost-effectiveness,
include the results of the cost-benefit analysis);
(v) A description of the warnties or other techniques used to ensure acceptable
field performance of the weapon system, e.g.. wan-anties, commercial or other
guarantees obtained on individual components; and
(vi) Exercise date of the warranty option, if applicable.
(2) Nodtfications and reports shall include-
(i) A brief description of the weapon system and its stage of production; and
(ii) Rationale for not obtaining a warranty.
(3) Keep a written record of each waiver granted and notification and report made,




2467- *Si E::mmll mll• s lI m alCN
APPWWIDX G OZCNLVZNBT 4330.17
let
DEPARTMENT OF TNE NAVY
Olrrc'l Of' Twe ICCOTtlqAIN
WASHINGOWO. D.C. 2O2SO*100
SECNAVINST 4330."17S0-4 (CamH)
SECNAV INSTRUCTION 4330.17 Sep 398
From: Secretary of the Navy
SubJ: NAVY POLICY ON USE OF WARRANTIES
Ref: (a) Navy Acquisition Regulations Supplement (NARSUP)
SUBPART 46.72
(b) Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) SUBPART 46.7
(c) DoD FAR Supplement (WFARS) SUBPART 46.7
1. Purpose. To ensure that the Department of Navy (DON) obtains
and amnnisters warranties that enhance the quality, reliability
and performance of systems. subsystems and materials.
2. Scope. This instruction applies to all Fleet. Fleet Marine
Forc•tiE Shore activities involved in logistics support for DON
systems, subsystems and materials.
3. Policy. it is DON Policy to:
a. Ensure that Navy obtains warranties for:
(1) all weapons systems used directly by the armed
forces. This applies to weapons systems which will have a unit
cost greater than Sl00.000. or for which the eventual total
procurement cost will be.more than $10,000.000. unless such
warranties are determined not to be cost effective.
(2) all other supplies and services (i.e., non-weapons
systems), when the contracting officer determines that obtaining
a warranty is advantageous to the Government. Such warranties
must equal or exceed the requirements of DFARS 46.770.
b. Ensure that Systems are established for:
(1) reporting failed items under warranty
(2) user return of warranted products
(3) collecting and analyzing actual warranty use and
claim data
4. Action. Addressees will implement and provide copies of
implemen•ing instructions to ASN (Shipbuilding and Logistics)
Contract Business Management within 120 days. Detailed
directives should address the issues presented in reference (a).
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a. The Chief of Naval Operations will:
(1) establish procedures to ensure that warranties are
obtained for:
(a) weapons systems meeting the thresholds specified
here.
(b) all other supplies and services (i.e..
non-weapons systems) per references (b) and (W).
(2) establish procedures to ensure maximum use of
warranted products before expiration of the warranty periods.
(3) establish a customer/user notification system' which
provides for feedback information on failed items under watranty,
rinimizing reporting requirements of fleet activities and
maintenance personnel.
(4) deo*e.o; procedu:es for ir..ed±.ate issuance of credit
-o the end iter. user. when appro ;r-:ate. when requisitioned
products under warranty are found zo be defective u;on
-nstallaticn.
(5) dev.elo; a system for 
€o'.lect-:ng actual warranty use
and claim data, and for performing an analysis of the data on an
annual basis with the firs: analysis to be performed on 30 June
fo1owing impemen.ta-±on of this instruction. and annually each
Jne thereafter. Provide copies of annual warranty data analyses
z; the Assstan: Secre;ta.-y of the Navy (Shipbuilding &
Log-s:ics) (AS.J(S&L)) within 60 days of the and of each annual
analysis period.
b. The Co=andant of the Marine Corps will develop
warranty policy for Karine Corps acquisitions, and establish
procedures for processing warranty claims.
c. The C=optroller of the Navy will ensure that procedures
are available to collect funds under warranties and that those
funds are properly credited to the appropriate accounts.
01 stribution: L e '/ "
SK-;L A2A (NAVCOPT.. OG.C) ki£:Est ir PYATT
A3 (Chief of Naval Operations) ASISTANT SECRETARY OF TrHE NAVY
A6 (Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps) 0,4paUL•IG ANO LOGISTICS)
caOy to:
SNDL Al (Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding and
Log-stics))
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187
APPUXDZX N NAVAZAINST 13070.7
ISO
LJEPARTM7.NT OF THE NAVY
~ \ ~Ay* w as. svcits comwasa.O "gA004ouaOEsO





From: Commander, Naval Air Systems Command
Subj: POLICY CUZDANUCE .7FO WARKAA!TY APPLICATION ON NAVAL Atl
SYSTEMS CO0MAND WEAPON SYSTEM PROCUREMENTS
let: (a) Section 794, Public Lay 98-212
(b) -Section 2403, Title 10, United States Code
(c) DoD Federal Acquisicion Regulation Supplement 46.770,
Use of Warranties in Weapon System Procurementr
1. Puroose. To set forth objecctives, establish policies, and
asailn responsiailitioe for the application of varranty provisions
as part of contracts for the development, production, and modifi-
cation of Naval Air Systems Com:and (NAVAIR) weapon systems in
compliance vich references (4), (b), and Cc).
2. Scope. This instruction applies to.all echelons of coamand
and all weapon systems under Cthe uanageiient control of the
Commanders Naval Air Systems Command CCOKNAVA•l).
30 Objectives. To-ensure Chat each weapon system and subsystem
contract contain* varranties covering design and .manufaccuring
requ.rements,.def'ecCs in materials and workmanship, and esseatLal
perforuance requirements which will provide NATAZV vith eufficiaec
time after delivery to determine that the weapon systems and sub-
systems have indeed achieved requirements specified in the conatcact
and are free from defects in materials anut workmanship.
4. Policy. It is the policy of CONNAVAIR in complying vith ref-
erenced legislation to:
a. Obtain" warranties on weapon systems following the provi-
sions of reference Cc), unless it is determined that the warranties
are not cost effective or are not in the beat interest of the Coy-
ernme.nt. In assessing the beat interests of the Covernuent, ensure
tha4 fleet readiness and mission effectiveness are given the hbgh-
eat priority. If it can be shown that a warranty ic not cost
effective or is not in the.be: itnterest of the Covernment, a
waiver should be requested folloving reference Cc).
b. Ensure that all weapon system warranties contain pravi-




C. insure that all a:quisition plans address the planned use
of warranties and thei: associated inpact on flect user =ain:e-
nance operations and the NAVA:R logistics support system.
d. Ensure that cethods are established to identify all war-
ran:ed itezs, includine marking both warranted material and ship-
pin; containers as appropriate.
a. Ensure thae the time period of warranty coverage is
clearly established, iL reasonable, and is sufficient to cover
the types of dvfecta and nonconformancea that are likely to occur
dur•;i servic€ use.
5. Reszonxibi licies,
a. Naval Air Svs:ems Couand Headquarteres (NAVAIRIIO)
(1) Assistant Com=ander for Svstems and Znjitneering (AIR-
05) vill eze:ciae overall management and administrative control of
HAVAZ• vaarrany programs by performing the following functionsr
(a) Serve as principal spokesman and contact with;.
NAVAIRHQ, and coordinator throughout NAVA12# for all mattars
related to weapon ayc:ea warranties.
(b) ?rovide technical advice, guidance, and general
ie:erpre:a:.ens conceriing warranty applicaionsa to all requiring
* NAVAEUIHQ divisions. .
(c) Provide a capability through the Cost Analysis
Divis.ion (AIl-524)-for warrancy life cycle cost analysis.
(d) Maintain a general overviev of Navy warranty
apptica:ions, mnakiug independent evalua:io"s in order to assess
the ne: benefits of each varranty to the Navy.
(e) Serve-as "heNAVAZI spokesman to higher level.. on
warranties as required.
S) Zerve a; the coordiz:•tnS :;cnt vith the Secre:ary
of the Navy (S!CNAV) and the Secretary of Defense, or their des-
ignazed representa:ives, for the processing and approval of all
varran:y waiver reques:s on NAVAIR weapon systems or subsystems.
(2) Assistant Coeaa~der for Lojis:ics/FleeC Suouo (A!R-
04) will provide ad=inistrative services, training, avce, amd
guidance on matters involving warranties. These responsibilities
will enompass the following funcCions:
(a) Establish a single poic: of contact within AZ-C4
for ma::ter involving varranties.
190
-VAVAA:R:Ms7, 13070.79 Dcc 85
(b) Provide advice and guidance on warranty appli-
calhitiy, in m&:caes relacing co weapon systems or subsystem.
cain:enance, modifications, and repairs.
(c) Provide requirements on matters pertaining to
logis:ics support and maintenance engineering for the transi:ion
o! "arranted eqUipment from development to production and also
for :he tr:ftsition to Navy organic support.
(d) Perform analyses of alt NAVAIR warranties vith
respect to economics and Logistic support impacts.
(e) .?:ovide for the logistic support analysis process
to determine the impact of proposed warranties before issuance of
the =aiactnance plan as required by MAVA I•nscruction 4790.4A.
f) When a NAVAIR weapon system warranty is incor-
porated in a contract, ensure integration of chat warranty into
the appzopriate weapon syscez maintenance plan.
(g) Ensure that warranty provisions are considered in
all logist;.cs planning actions.
(h) Zs:ablish a'effective fleet data feedback system
to support the administrction of all HAVAIR procurement warranty
programs.
Ci) Develop and provide a craining-program for
logis:ics supporctaCd fleet user personnel on. the proper imple.--
aen:a:ion and adminiscration of warracty programs.
(3) Assistant Commander for Contracts (AIR-02) will
(a) provide advice and guidance.in the development of
contractual warranty provis.ons for AVAIR. weapon •y•tem .procure-
mea: programs;
(b) establish procedures to track and 'accumulate data
relative to warranty costs;
(c) ensure proper &ad complete coverage of varran:y
requiremencs in all MAVAa contractual documents associa:ed with
the procure=entC of NAVAl! vwapon systems; and
(d) 4ct as the p;ric point of contact with contrsc-
tors on contractual mat:ers relacin; to weapon syscem warraaty
provisions.
(4) -Oice o! Couneel (AtD-0OC) vwil review alt warranty





(5) Cown:rol cr (AIR--8) will provide adv.ce and ass*.-
tanoe to program and loijotics managers in budgeting for and
justiying funding in support of varrancy applications prior :o
the execuCion of a concracc involving warranties.
(6) Conn-ant proarac mansIer or coordinator viill
(a) plan and budfec for warranty applications unless
S!CHAV has de:crn:ined ths: the warranty is not advantageous to
the Navy;
(b) be the final authority within NAVAIRHQ for evalu-
ation of varranties as they affect cheir program with particular
eaphasis oan the period of the warranty and, where applicables :he
essential perforanoce requirements that must be warranted;
(c) if deemed necessary, following coordination with
AIR-02 and AIR-OS, take a final recommendation through the
appropriate Navy chain of command to request & waiver of warranty
provisioce in con:racts pertaininu to their Program; and
(d) review and determine the effectiveness of war-
razty provisions on their progra= in terms of warranty costs acd
icprovements to fleet readiness .&ad mission effectiveness.
b. NAVAIR Field Activities and Inventory Control Points
(ICPr.). Heads of NAVAIR field .ccciviciez- cod IC? directors and
officers who execue.wor are the Procuring activity for.conrra:cs
that purchase or modify NAVAIR material vitl- be responsible for
administering, budgeting, funding, and applying*'warranty pro-
visions which meet the inten: of this instruction in all purchase
actions and reques:s.
C. Naval AvisjCon Lois:tics Center will provide advice and
guidance regarding varranty applications to naval air rework
facilities or ocher depot maintenance activities as they become
involved in the program. These activities should be coordinated
with AiP.A'5, AIR-01.,.and AZI-Ol.
6. A c t i
a. Addressees vill
(1) tcke a:rion to japlement the provisions of this
instruction, which incorporates direction provided by reference
(c) effe:tive 2 January 1985, on all new procuremants and
equipment modification contracts;
(2) in those cases where evalua:ion indicates that the
applicntion of a warrsnty as required undcr references (a), (b),




p:epat, ion of a waiver requet, vitch a detailed vri:Cen !us: -
ficacion ac:sched, for submiCCal to SCH4AV or the designated
A~sis ai: Secreta:y, via the chain of command; and
(3) take action to evalua:e cognft:anC.NAVAZR instruc-
tions and nilicsry sctndards and revise them as appropriate to:
cozpaibiliy vitch Chis insC:uczion.
b. When a NAVAIR veapon system or subsyscem (includin&
support equipaenc) has been selected for warranty application,
the cognizant acquisicion manager (SAVAIRIQ, field activity, or
IC?) vwil so apprise AIR-05 and provide AIR-05 vith a copy of the
proposed coa'.tscz varrancy clause(s).
F V. JXjPSO:(
3eeputy C==andac
Distribu:ion.: FKAIA (esCablished qusntity, ochers J copies each)
S DL: FKAIA (De~pucy Commsaders, Assiscanc Commanders,
-Cmoc~rol Icr, Command Special Assioca*~ts, Dae ý.4-g Program
U.4-m, ?. and Office and Division
Dir'ectors); FXAl.fAI F1KA6,AI IFAA~ 7lK; 1K.1,3 ; FXMtL4t' FK3Z;
Copy to: (2 copies .ac A'CL_.A-as ocherwise indjdaced)
SH3L: 1-' "=~-::U4 C?PSDO, NOW-C/IL) ; G;-3. ({oig a t own
copy)); FKAL (less FKAIA); FKAIA (-AIZ-07021 A/L (I copy),
AU~-72214 (LO copies), A1.7e&?(40 copies), All-5165 (10copies))
S:ocked: Comanding; Officer, Naval Publications and Forms
Cen:er, 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19120-5099
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDERS OF NAVAL SYSTEMS COMMANDS
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INSTALLATIONS
AND LOGISTICS, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROJECT OFFICE
CHIEF OF NAVAL RESEARCH
COMMANDER, MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND
Subj: WARRANTIES
Ref: (a) DoD FAR Supplement (DFARS), Subpart 46.7
(b) Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 31.205-39
(c) Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 46.707
The use of warranties in the procurement of weapon systems
is mandatory when items that can be used directly by the Navy
to carry out combat missions meet the thresholds established
in reference (a).
The basic elements of these warranties are as follows:
- Conformance to design and manufacturing requirements
- Freedom from defects in materials and workmanship
- Conformance to essential performance requirements
The same elements of written warranties are the basic
expectations with which we enter development and production
contracts. The contractor should be developing the item to
meet the performance requirements. A quality systf.m should
exist to assure conformance to design and freedom frcm defects
in manufacture and workmanship. It follows that we should
expect contractors to meet their obligations without the need
to negotiate additional warranty costs.
While it is not appropriate to negotiate additional cost
for a warranty under these conditions, it may be reasonable to
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consider through additional profit the added risk to a
contractor for costs which may be incurred in satisfying the
conditions of a warranty. The degree of risk will be related
to the complexity of the design and manufacturing requirements
and the difficulty in meeting essential performance
requirements. The risk associated with a warranty must be
quantified and documented in business clearances.
It is zxcognized that under certain unusual circumstances
contractors could not have satisfied warranty responsibilities
in the design, development, and production contracts.
Examples may include warranties exceeding specification
requirements or cases in which the contractor was not involved
in design and development. In these cases, it may be
appropriate to negotiate additional warranty costs. Warranty
costs must be evaluated and the cost/benefit analysis should
be documented in business clearances.
The provisions of references (b) and (c) should be
followed in implementing this policy vhich is effective for
all procurements for which approval or clearance has not been
obtained.
EVERETT PYATT
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(SHIPBUILDING AND LOGISTICS)
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7rcm: ( ~a) l r '!A A:2 l A4- S-st m 9 eC z n A5
t: SOC:-.i2n 2t13 7-l :11 Unitet states Czde
Ce) WSU?SJ 25-712
Pf )~~:s U330.1" of 18 Sep 37
(s) S3zJAV memo of 3 Sep 35
--c': '1' N~AVA:R Warrinty Administraior. Progr= Approach For CPNI.AV
:nszr*uc^tion 47,90.20 items (Ai-rcraft and Aircra." Equipment)
(2) N4AVA-6R Warranty Product Line Subgroup t'eaders
(3) FOrM 1AVA:-?R 13070/1, UTAVAZýR Warranty A~p1±cz-ion Checkl~ist
1.* ?Ur33e. To allarify the warranty policies and riespor'.sibilitiles of
reference (a). -.-.' notice is in tended to complement, not replace, reference
(a).
2. ' ack~round. Wefrence (a)' establishied the Navall Air Systems Command(.4AVA:3) warranty policy as a rssU-It of refterencts (b) and (c) . T.1-4s n o -;i:e
.corporazes the Provisions 0o' feftereces (4) and (e) that were issued
subseq%'.enZ to refer-ence (a) as veil. as retkneMents and cklariftkcat.4iors that
h.ave evolved as the NAVA:3R warranty program hias matured. C::t does not provide
the dtzaUl lag-, required in a warranty. That gu±.danct wVlI be provide! ty
subsequent gsneric warranty provisi4OCns and approach~ documenzaz4-zn.) To
4=pemen: reference (a), Consistent and non~ntrusive metzhods of adminsterin;
~a~l~:esfor N!AVIA: eqUIPoe nt in the tle a are required and th'ose mtthods
=Us". be ntf*'-ttd4 wraz U.nguaie. Flee-. war:an:y .- oc.a.
delineated In O?NIAV Tnst-uction 1790.2D (and d*scrtbetd in enc!.osur2 (1)) and
?!AV -1135.2 respectively.
-. '~.:v. -14:~cy or :ne Commander. N4aval. x~r Systv's C~nd 4n
a~.:.onto reference %..) , -'s to:
a. Obttalln warrinties on a-"-. items where2 the cost benefit analysi's
,4ezonstrates a warranty to be cost *effct-4vt or otherwise in. the best interest
of tnt Rav7. The rISU.t3 of the cist bensfit ana-ysis w-41-1 be pl~aced in znt
:*n~rIZ% r'.23.e
b. ?.n=:9 the burlen tz Wit teet resulting froc ..a-invy





vc.ll~itn warran:7. -.I%. warrant vI2.- tmbrsca NAVA:Ps za4:4am
. *. ?:-su* a no z-s: warranty pe r*!tin fl
e. :"entiy warrints itas.- by Lnd -i~dga Xark±4W ar~d/*F' 4 a~4.. In
the its=7s Ilogboo1c. Mrking. as a zia~imn mu~z iiolude :he statsemen
~ * ex~.?1: of th e warr!Lz:y, conzric, mLZýbS. a~ Z- r w :m
:Iastor 2 eaeia4zbil Zndox '.i4sz (!..Conzainezs will, be markead per t-~
I 21j. a~;;e4±x C, parigrz;h 20).23.
:*.a deuri:-ion o athe warrinty period will be a a-In±2um or oat year n--
ser*,4 Co. Waran:7 du:*i%1zr./a<mi. 5 isirmi* ze:zios MU~t~ con~sider anz.z:,-a:ed
t'.ea ti=9/s3Slf tiz required C r Gover-4eez Furnish.ed Squ4;ment (IFV/spars
to '3e incorporated into a delivered end 1%m
. so'ýsIbiiiIes. 7.te o 'owing provi.19s cari lation oil selecte
reso~~b..~:~esas stated 113 reference (a) paragraph 5:
a. A33isstar. Cmcande r for Systems- and Enleertn (A:1.-15)
(a) Sxorcise overa!2. management at th IAVaZR warmlnt7 progrirn.
vthiza consists oil th.9 warranzy points of con1tac: for A:73-05, the Ass.4tar.:
C.-=nder for Fleet Support and Field Activit~y Maniagement (AZR-04), the
A3343Zaat Commander for COntraCt3 (A:3-02). t.%* NAVA:-,. Acquis~itin Executive
and Deputy Coaiader for Op*.-a:ior-s (3 ),and the Office of Counsel. (A:!-
CCC .) i s an advisoy Srau; Ithat wiLL- develop poalalles/tzplementing procedures
an: 1%rv ==C.ma-,' gulancq.
01) Periodl:za2.y review waraantits in ?roecursment Requests (??Is,
to assess compli±ance -dith Cj~auid policy and to id1t-;I!7 adJUs::eft: to t-
Warantr ;rzgra al needed.
(2) A:R-.15 1-47.Sisns wila, assi4f/Soe1*cz 4arranzy sut-rup :tlr int
rt; risen -a-. on.. -,he subgrzups w.l- be a-aginied alzag produza: lines, as
dscrited in anc-losurt().~ subgri.?;. will develop. aa-4nain, and ensure
tne a;;ro;r~a~eat p.:*ir of Simua warrant:y ap;riachies, suppor% a?ror
MinaigrS dur,. i a:-g: do-veapme.n:. and review ?R's uasing thee~ue (3)
.arr1!:? &~L:Pl:IZ4n checklis: t* ensure aamp1-,Ance w~th NAVA:' ¶ia?!in~y
;047 :he su:3,au; lead~ers wi.V. obtal~ approval from :h.e NWC tsr z"e
ge;:e'.. Warrn:y a s-aacnes and will provide feedtaec t the 94W?C w .Z'i r11rt






(I) Logistics and M4-n"enaince Policy Division (Aw-l) lw.
pa.-:;c'pa:e on the NWPC, ac: as the :ain Cocas. p*oLnt on all warranty policies
and -ssues :: 1p;^..y to :-oS-s3'-ts and 2a-.ntenance Prcedur1s, and p.ov d,
aiv4:*e and guitance to :he Assistant ?ro.Sr:am naneer for Log!stics
(AP•L)/Log-.s:ics Manaser (LE.2) tield ac:-v-ty, a.d fleet Personnel reg-rdin-
warranty adm nis:ra:ion procedures.
(2) Suoolv Policy. Management Ind '-nancia1 ?roj:sr3 Division
(A-::I.z) will- :ým;len.. po"CI€tes and procedures rV1ated to -onerz
• .lr!9f.S~ei.e. spares.
(3) ?oduct Support D.tec:orites (?SD) and .roduct Suwpo.t Advocates
(PSA) wUil perform the functions ass gned in reference (a), paragraph 5c, by
prov.-din- advice and guidance regardlng warranty applications on programs
under their cognizance. These activities will submit their efforts through
A:R-411 and the appropriate ?roduc: Support Program Office (AZ.-4TP.) and the
Deputy Assistant Commander for Aviation Depots (AZR-43) point of contact "c
coord•nation with the IW'C and the cogn.i=an program manager.
(4) A?.JL/LM will ensure that the maintenance plan. technical manuals,
and all appropriate documents contain warranty information necessary to
provide suf.'.cient guidance for effective adminlstation.
C. A:R-02
(1) Po"icy and ManagementO Division (AR.-211) w.,1l participate on the
MWC, coordi-.ate AZR-02 war.anzy policy, and advise the Prin•eipa Contracting
O,.4t:ers (?CO's) regardIng warranty implementing procedures.
(2) PCO's or their duly authorized representative will ne*otiate and
contractually ad=-n•ister the warranty and any resulting roze.edis.
d. AZ3-OOC will participate on the ?.W.C, coordinate AP.-OOC warranty
policy, and establish Command procedures for ensurin compliance vith
statutory and regulatory requlrements.
(1) !IAVRQ Mtanagemnert Divisionl (AZTR-1¶9) will participate on the NIWPC,
provide ;uidance, and coor---ate warranty policy and in;.ementi.tg procedures
w-th all conrtrac admlnistratlon se-vices.
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(2) Cz3gi:ant Pr-z;!i= Managirs W.:.I:
advice Provided Oy the Cost Analysis 011-* CA:!-524) as sq;porze. byi !,h
ad: "n-4-.s:%a:Lor COt" -CtIng OffiCtS (ACO'3) and ?CO. and :t.s rtSsU:s
clos: Un,~ an&ay5lls A.-* ;r2viled ta %ne PC3 for InC:11sionc in the
Wb Oev2Laq th~e warranty using enclosure (3)'. firm !.AVA:ý 13171~/1.
N.Ay'k-OR faran::' &;~c~ar ~e4. :.da. pr2*14:2 IL c=m1e:.d *ecik:s: -dnetn
;rctss~.a; :.I@ PR, ands CoCr'lnatg t*-* WarrinZY d~~3u~ v.:h A:7-?.- Sn
(C) As3e3s toe Of eieeso ach %Ear-an"y.
(d) Deveilap/establish a varra":y izpL~een:ation plan in
coordination with the. APM1L/t1.M, AIR-119/contract adminiistration offiWeACC,
?CO,. and the contractor.
(t) coordinate the z'darnt *ith related . tiall/ rip len-Istent
spare. proc!.zring agencies to ensure camp&% :tbil 1-17 ith tfazaurs .i~a
ril--shment 'spa.- rs curtments, ensure thiat requirtem.'ts necessary t.-
m -41;6 -4-.e the cost of C mplementir4.6 inii al/rep lenishient spars Warrinties are
addreSsed, and provte Sul-dance with regard to the tip.; and *x~ent ofprgr
relazed initial/eplenislirnent spars wari-ant-Its. nThis ettIort will be
aC--Zopiksded il conjunction with AZ73-4 2 and th* AM/L.M.
5. F2": - AVA3'; 130-7011. NAVA:!. Warra.nt7 A;P atI Cb~ecklist, 4-s
avail.azle trom thi* .1AVA-3 Forms Stock Room.
~.canciLla:ian. Le Motio, remains3 -in *!!act untill -nco rporzaed int.- a
SNOL: F!CAIA (02puty Commander, M4AVA:R Acquisition -Executivt &aid -De;U:-
Camt-ander far Ope.ra:0ans, Assistanz Commanders. Co-I;troL1ler, CiO-and iSeCIA.
Assista4nts. Progrl1 Directors, Desij-tated ?oramr ft~anagrs, Dirsectorte
.reczars, and Office and 0ivislon Direi::ors)
*.:D: tZ: C(2 COo...S tACnA Un2.eS3 OthnediS* 4ndicatedl
(!~."34'~3 (n¶orggntzwn (I =oy)); FUIA C:?, -2 *C0 cop;.es A:!-712"'.3
Stocked: NAVA:3Mý 1 (A:I-'313.'3)
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